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PREFACE
While conducting research for this dissertation, I had
a curious conversation in the Reading Room of the American
Heritage Center in Laramie, Wyoming.  I made small talk
with another researcher while I waited for ever more
document boxes to be plucked from the shelves of the
archives.  She was a grandmotherly woman with bright eyes
and a weathered face.  As I recall, she was researching
genealogical records.  She asked me what subject brought me
to Wyoming.
“Grazing policy,” I replied.
Without missing a beat she rolled her eyes and said,
“Humph.  Taylor Act, I suppose,” referring to the 1934 New
Deal legislation that forever changed the relationship
between ranchers on the public domain and the federal
government with the creation of grazing districts.
“No, not really,” I said.  “The time before the Taylor
Act.”
In an instant, her judgmental expression lifted,
replaced with a smile. “Oh!  The good old days!”
I still wonder about that exchange.  First, why the
assumption that because I was studying grazing policy I
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must be researching the Taylor Act?  And why the nostalgia
for the era before Taylor?  To my regret I did not ask her
to explain her reaction.  Perhaps she had a living memory
of the generation before her who knew life in Wyoming
before the Great Depression, before the New Deal’s
reorganization of land policy, of a time when the public
domain meant something entirely different from what most
twentieth-century westerners came to know.  Was her disdain
for the Taylor Act merely a standard response to FDR in a
solidly Republican state?  Was she part of a family or a
business that suffered financially from grazing policy
changes?  What would her reaction have been if I had said
that I was also writing about Senator Francis Warren?  (A
conversation about Warren with another Wyoming resident
ended with the words, “He’s the person we love to hate.”) 
She was a stranger, our archive boxes arrived, and our
conversation ended.  I will never know her story.  But in
many ways this study grows out of those same questions.  
“And because it’s Wyomin it don’t seem so interestin
to you?”  Nikole’s grandfather drew a bottle from an inside
pocket, unscrewed the cap.
“Yeah.  I guess so.”  The same grassy shadows, the
same long wind, everlasting fence.
“Kid, let me tell you.  Goddamn important things
happened in this place.”
--Annie Proulx, 
“The Governors of Wyoming,”





AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY
 AND FRANCIS E. WARREN
In June 1934, President Franklin Roosevelt signed into
law the Taylor Grazing Act. By granting the federal
government the power to regulate grazing, the law marked a
fundamental change in the administration of the public
domain. At the time, the law did not attract much
attention; it was a “western issue” and just another item
to tick off on the New Deal laundry list. Even the New York
Times grouped the signing with other routine measures
necessary for Roosevelt to “clear his desk” before taking a
summer vacation.  Roosevelt’s White House issued a
statement about the new law.  The passage of the act, the
statement said, marked “the culmination of years of effort
to obtain from Congress express authority for Federal
regulation of grazing on the public domain in the interests
of national conservation and of the livestock industry.”1 
Now the Secretary of the Interior would have sweeping
powers to create grazing districts, as well as the
authority to regulate and manage the number of livestock
per range and the particular season of the year grazing
would be permitted.  As the Taylor Act was passed, the city
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of Washington, D.C., baked under a summer heatwave.  Only a
month earlier dust storms from the Midwest had deposited
Great Plains topsoil on the nation’s capital, literally
bringing the crisis of the West to the East.2  In the midst
of dust bowl and depression, the Taylor Act seemed to be
just another New Deal program designed to provide a measure
of relief and, more importantly, to regulate agriculture. 
What neither the Times nor the White House press statement
commented on, however, was the wholesale change in American
public land policy that the Taylor Act represented.  In the
context of regional drought and national depression, it was
viewed as a conservation measure.  Few noticed that it
effectively ended the era of homesteading, to say nothing
of the open range.3  
Members of the Wyoming Stock Growers Association
(WSGA) were not pleased with the new law.  In the previous
three years, ranchers had seen cattle prices drop by as
much as fifty percent.4  But even as they petitioned the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration to classify the
entire state of Wyoming as a drought area, the WSGA lashed
out at Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace when he
visited the state.  Wallace bluntly told the cattlemen that
their industry was “overproduced and their lands
overgrazed,” and that production and herd numbers must be
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brought down.  The WSGA members responded with harsh
criticism of the Agriculture Department, especially the
Taylor Grazing Bill.  Wallace seemed to take the barbs in
stride; he acknowledged that Wyoming cattlemen were
“perhaps the greatest collection of rugged individualists I
have met on this trip,” but he did not back down from his
concern with overproduction.5  The United States was on the
verge of a fundamental shift in its public land policy,
with or without the Wyoming cattle interest.
This dissertation examines the long path toward the
Taylor Act, especially as traveled by one powerful western
politician, Senator Francis E. Warren of Wyoming.  The
four-decade career of Warren and the first few decades of
Wyoming history coincide with the search for a national
grazing policy, and thus provide not only personal and
local history but important insights into national trends. 
This story of how one western politician interacted with a
major issue such as grazing policy reveals much about
American politics, the western economy, and the
relationship of a state to the State (Wyoming to
Washington, D.C.).  
The conflict over grazing in the West was a classic
example of a “tragedy of the commons” -- that is, a clash
over the use of resources between individual interests and
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the elusive common good.  The phrase itself was first
introduced in 1833 by William Forster Lloyd in a book on
population.  But ecologist Garrett Hardin popularized and
reintroduced the concept in a 1968 essay in Science. 
Hardin illustrated the commons by imagining a hypothetical
pasture shared by local grazers.  “Picture a pasture open
to all,” he wrote.  “It is to be expected that each
herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the
commons.  Such an arrangement may work reasonably
satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching,
and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well
below the carrying capacity of the land.  Finally, however,
comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-
desired goal of social stability becomes a reality.  At
this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly
generates tragedy.”  The inherent logic of the commons,
according to Hardin, culminated in the individual reaping
all the rewards of pasturing while the commons itself was
degraded.6
Hardin also linked the commons overtly to current
events; the commons was not only a hypothetical grazing
pasture, but also the Earth’s atmosphere, oceans, rivers,
forests, and so on.  Increasingly, historians are following
Hardin’s lead in using the “commons” as a basis of analysis
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in addition to the traditional paradigms of private
property or the good-versus-evil moralizations of the
Progressive Era.  Louis S. Warren in The Hunter’s Game, for
example, has explored the social conflict that erupted as
local hunting “commons” were transformed into a national
commons via regulation.  Similarly, Karl Jacoby, in Crimes
Against Nature, shows how customary local uses of resources
such as wild game hunting, fishing, and timber cutting
turned rural resource users into “criminals” almost
overnight as national parks were established.  The conflict
over public domain grazing also represents a changing
commons.  Local groups that traditionally viewed the open
range as a resource to be used by all -- or, more
cynically, those who maintained the power to do so -- saw
in the development of a national grazing policy the erosion
of their own commons.  Western politicians often found
themselves caught in the middle of this drawn out
transformation of the grazing commons.7
The separate histories of the livestock industry,
public lands and grazing, Wyoming, and Francis Warren
intersect to reveal a larger portrait of the American
political economy.  This introductory chapter summarizes
the development of the livestock industry, surveys the
major issues confronted in the construction of a national
6
grazing policy, considers how historians have explored the
issue over time, and offers a brief introduction to
Warren’s political career.  This is not a biography of
Warren, although there should be room for one on library
shelves.  In the same way that the historian Lewis Gould
used Warren as a template to examine certain aspects of
territorial Wyoming history -- so much that he subtitled
his book A Political History -- Warren’s experience can be
used to illustrate a conflict over the commons that would
not be resolved until the era of the Great Depression and
the New Deal.8  
Summary of the Post-Civil War Livestock Industry
Once “western history” almost seemed synonymous with
the history of the range cattle industry, especially on the
Great Plains.  After Frederick Jackson Turner legitimized
the history of the region as a subject worthy of
professional study, generations of Turnerians and other
writers filled library shelves with one account after
another chronicling western ranching.9  Farming and
ranching stood as two pillars of the western economy, and
the exploits of stock raisers drew the most attention.  
But over time the livestock industry gave way to other
voices competing for room in the textbooks.  By the end of
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the twentieth century, its story was distilled into a
familiar but flawed formula: “Cattlemen pour north from
Texas, speculate wildly, overstock the Plains, and emerge
from the dreadful winter of 1887 a chastened, shaken-down
set of businessmen who will henceforth raise their cattle
with rational methods.”10  For most textbooks, and for many
historians teaching the American history survey course to
this day, the lesson ended here.  It was convenient to
follow this Turnerian interpretation of the American West. 
As Patricia Nelson Limerick argues, however, this narrative
omits “crucial stories in environmental history.”  This
“end of the West” textbook model, for example, renders the
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 all but invisible. As Limerick
has noted, “with the cattle business apparently tamed and
off the public lands by the 1890s, there is no imaginable
reason for the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934 or for the
continued, bitter, sometimes violent conflicts over grazing
on Western public lands.”11 
Although this dissertation focuses on the American
livestock industry and grazing issues, it is worth a brief
summary of the global history of the subject.  The
contribution of Texas to the cattle industry was
substantial, but it overshadowed the larger context of
ranching in North America, and indeed the world.  The
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western range of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was not merely a few decades old, as many early
Anglo-Texan histories maintain, but was in fact part of a
long line of stock raising innovations and adaptations. 
The North American cattle frontier was a product of over
three centuries of African and European influences that
followed lines of colonization.  By the American Civil War,
the traditions and techniques of raising and moving
livestock on the open range were well established. 
Geographer Terry C. Jordan, in his comprehensive North
American Cattle-Ranching Frontiers, correctly argues that
the role of the Anglo-Texan cattle system is
“overemphasized” and “absurdly mythologized.”12
In the United States, the end of the Civil War opened
the way to a flurry of entrepreneurship on the Great
Plains.  As one historian of the range cattle industry
eloquently put it, “The Western range cattle industry rose
like a phoenix from the ashes of the Civil War.”  Supply
and demand met through the railroad.  Markets responded,
and “the northern migration of longhorns, beginning in
1866, marked the initial expansion of the business that was
to dominate the economic life of the Great Plains for a
quarter of a century” and beyond.13
A combination of circumstances set the stage for a
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twenty-year boom in the cattle industry.  The livestock
industry in the North and East was not prepared to meet
growing demands; Walter Prescott Webb shows that in the
East stock-farming was largely a family affair. Cattle
raising on the Great Plains, on the other hand, was
distinctive because of the enormity of scale and the use of
the horse.14  Other factors contributed to the rise of the
western livestock industry as well, including the near
extinction of the buffalo and the forced concentration of
Plains tribes onto reservations.  In addition, the advance
of the railroad kept the cattle industry ahead of the ever
marching line of settlement and provided efficient means
for shipping livestock to slaughterhouses.  These factors,
some social and some technological, encouraged the range
industry.  The brief but celebrated era of the long trail
followed.  Familiar names such as Goodnight-Loving,
Chisolm, or Stimson, as well as less personal geographic
names such as the Eastern or Western Trail, became assigned
to customary routes streaming out of Texas and the
southwest to northern ranges or markets.  In all, from the
end of the Civil War to 1890, upward of 10 million head of
cattle were moved and marketed.  The enterprise was vast.  
By the mid-1880s, however, beef prices began to drop
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as a result of oversupply.  A fatal combination of events
brought an end to the cattle boom.  Overproduction resulted
in diminishing returns to investors; increasing debt led to
tight credit, which in turn limited day-to-day operating
expenses.  Finally, a few years of unseasonably wet weather
fooled an already optimistic industry into believing that
expansion was the cure to a temporary slump.  Wet years
turned dry, with drought in the summers and unusually
bitter winters from 1885 to 1887.  Ill-prepared and
helpless, ranchers stood by helpless as stock died by the
thousands from exposure and starvation.  
The boom of the industry had gone bust, but this did
not mark the end of the industry, only its redefinition. 
Indeed, the range cattle industry followed the larger
trends of American business in this era: consolidation,
“rationalization” through scientific management, and
regulation.  Technological advances in feed and range
medicine moved the industry to rely on new and stronger
breeds.  Accelerating federal regulation over the industry
introduced new challenges, especially in an era of new
“conservationist” sensibilities.
Wyoming and the Emergence of Stock Associations 
as Quasi-governments
11
An important but overlooked element in the federal
regulation of public land can be found in the history of
livestock associations.  These associations grew quickly in
size and power in the late nineteenth century.  Early
associations emerged ad hoc in response to particular
problems or issues such as cattle theft, confusion over
roundup practices, or poorly defined and thus disputed
grazing areas.  Livestock associations were especially
effective at maintaining brand records and in organizing
quarantines to combat periodic disease outbreaks such as
“Texas fever,” a quickly spreading epidemic that threatened
the entire industry.  Livestock associations, then, grew
out of unique environments and responded to specific needs
of the industry; in this sense, they “rationalized” the
business.  As they expanded from localized, pragmatic
organizations to the quasi-governments they would become,
however, their role and reputation changed greatly.  As
quasi-governments, stock associations “administered” the
grazing lands. Their presence established chronological
priority that could be used to justify land claims. In
fact, the customs of the range and the informal practice of
western stock associations were the grazing policy of the
west. 
Livestock associations were not invented in the
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American West, however.  Indeed, the earliest form of
agricultural unions can be traced to medieval Spain with
the Mesta, an association of sheep holders who wielded
considerable power.  The Mesta emerged in Mexico in the
sixteenth century, yet another influence on the North
American range industry. Likewise, American historians have
found parallels between livestock organizations and eastern
manufacturing associations.   Accordingly, both followed
similar paths toward antagonistic labor and owner
relationships.  In the West, cattle associations almost
exclusively grew to reflect the interests of capital
(owners) over labor (the cowboy) and thus stratified a
class system on the plains.15  
Livestock associations became entrenched political
interest groups.  Territorial or state boundaries did not
necessarily define membership.  It was not uncommon for
members of one association to hail from an adjacent region;
for example, the mostly Texan members of the Panhandle and
Southwestern Stockmen’s Association often met in Oklahoma,
and owners in the Dakota Territory could pick and choose
between the Montana Stock Growers’ Association or the
Wyoming Stock Growers’ Association, depending on their
interests.  Livestock associations were both a cause and a
symbol of the regimentation of the western economy and,
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given the class distinctions, western society itself.  
Although ranch interests in Colorado formed an
association as early as 1867, a virtual explosion of
associations occurred in the 1870s.  The first group to
organize in Wyoming gathered in 1871 and formed the Stock
Graziers’ Association.  Two years later, a larger group
formed calling itself the Stock Association of Laramie.  By
1879 it changed its name to the more encompassing Wyoming
Stock Growers’ Association.  By the mid 1880s, this group
represented over four hundred members who owned over two
million head of cattle.  Over time, the WSGA would work to
limit access to the open range to its members, using both
legal and extra-legal means.16
The day-to-day function of the Wyoming association was
typical of such organizations -- the oversight of branding,
transportation, roundup organizing, etc.  Its role in
“fighting crime” on the range was especially notable.  The
“Johnson County War” of 1892, though not the subject of
this study, bears some consideration inasmuch as it
highlighted the tension between large and small owners.  In
the spring of 1892, after the annual WSGA meeting, a
trainload of over forty Association-connected vigilantes
(alternately dubbed “invaders” or “regulators,” depending
on one’s perspective) set out to hunt down suspected cattle
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thieves and rustlers.  Chaos erupted in Johnson County. 
Local officials and a two hundred-strong posse demanded
that the vigilantes be held for trial in Buffalo, but
Senators Francis E. Warren and Joseph M. Carey, along with
the persuasive abilities of attorney Willis Van Devanter,
later a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, engineered an
intervention by the U.S. Cavalry.  The political impact of
the incident was a public relations disaster for the big
owners and much of Wyoming’s political establishment,
including Warren (an issue addressed in greater detail in a
later chapter).  The full impact of the Johnson County War
is best left to other writers; for our purposes, however,
it illustrates the long reach of a cattleman’s association
into arenas usually reserved for representative
government.17  
Indeed, the WSGA was so powerful that one early
historian identified it as the de facto governing power in
early Wyoming, renaming the territory as “a cattleman’s
commonwealth.”18  Such power did not emerge overnight, but
a great deal of it can be traced to the passing of the so-
called Maverick Law in 1884.  This sweeping law handed to
the WSGA control over essentially all activities related to
the roundup of cattle.  The WSGA and the territorial
legislature became intermingled and even interchangeable in
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the Wyoming power structure.  As one historian of the
organization concluded, “the association was thus to become
a quasi-official institution with legal control over the
stock industry and the power to enforce its will.”  The
passing of the Maverick Law signaled a “merger of the
territorial government and the [WSGA] for the regulation of
the range.”19  Although the territorial years saw the
height of the WSGA’s power in Wyoming, even after statehood
the overlapping of association members and political
leaders ensured that the organization was a quasi-political
force to be dealt with. 
Indeed, in Wyoming the range ruled.  As one student of
Wyoming put it, “In none of the other regions of the Great
Plains environment was the cattle business of such
paramount importance as was the case with Wyoming. It was
here that the cattle baron reached his zenith in wealth and
importance.”20  And another authority wrote more bluntly
that the livestock business in Wyoming experienced “a
spectacular boom . . . and an equally spectacular bust.”21 
Because of the centrality of the livestock industry,
Wyoming was effectively a monoculture.  Like much of the
West, it was vulnerable to the whims of markets and nature.
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Major Issues in Grazing Prior to the Taylor Act
Livestock grazing on the public domain prior to the
Taylor Act can be divided into three stages: from the “open
range” of the post Civil War homestead era to the period of
the fenced range in the 1880s and 1890s, the
experimentation of regulated grazing in forest reserves
beginning in the 1890s, and finally the era of conservation
from the turn of the century on.  But these stages are by
no means discrete and self-contained.  
Until the 1880s, the livestock industry had a more or
less free reign in grazing on public land.  It was not
quite “first come, first serve,” but custom regularly
trumped the letter of the law.  The tide of settlement
encouraged by the Homestead Act and the removal of Native
Americans to a reservation system, however, soon
transformed the open range into countless units of land
ringed by barbed wire.  The technology of cheap wire
fencing appealed to many owners as a more affordable method
of control than the expensive and sometimes volatile human
labor of the cowhand.22
The emergence of economical barbed wire fencing in the
late 1870s quickly transformed the previously unfenced
public domain.  The General Land Office began to note an
increase in complaints from homesteading settlers.  Range
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fences crisscrossed public lands with little regard or
respect for section or new community boundaries.  Fear and
tension between farmers and ranching interests accompanied
the ribboned wire.  As one historian put it: “The settlers
reported that there were hundreds of miles of fence on
government land, on land suitable for farming, but that the
settlers needed to be bullet proof.”  Hibbard saved his
harshest criticisms for the fencing of the public domain:
“All told, it was the most unmistakable, wholesale
shameless instance of land grabbing that had yet been
practiced in America.”23  The issue of fencing looms large
in the Western imagination, but, like the open range cattle
industry itself, it really only existed for a brief period. 
By 1885, Congress responded to the situation and prohibited
enclosures on the public domain; by 1890, many of the most
egregious cases of illegal fencing on public lands had been
addressed and corrected.  By the turn of the century,
however, fencing problems would return, greatly frustrating
the Roosevelt administration.  Indeed, Francis Warren
endured a fencing scandal of his own.24
Congress appointed a Public Lands Commission in 1904
to investigate and summarize the problems facing public
land policy and grazing.  The commission’s findings were
remarkably frank about the situation: “The public lands are
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theoretically open commons, free to all citizens; but as a
matter of fact a large proportion has been parceled out
among the various interests.  These tacit agreements are
continually being violated.  Violence and homicide
frequently follow, after which new adjustments are made and
matters quiet down for a time.”  The report assessed the
environmental and economic impact of the grazing situation,
in addition to the social consequences.  The lack of
control over public grazing lands resulted, “naturally and
inevitably in over-grazing and the ruin of millions of
acres of otherwise valuable grazing territory.  Lands
useful for grazing are losing their only capacity for
productiveness.”25
The recommended remedy, proposed by the commission,
was to lease grazing lands by assigned districts.  The
commission suggested that the president be authorized to
set aside public land specifically for grazing districts. 
The Department of Agriculture would then appraise the value
of the lands and appoint officers to administer the grazing
districts, as well as charge a fee for grazing permits. 
These were merely recommendations; no one rushed to
overturn the entire public land system of the United States
overnight.  
Theodore Roosevelt’s administration echoed the
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suggestion for grazing districts, but added a noticeable
emphasis on local control.  Roosevelt was caught in a
political bind.  He wanted a grazing policy but also
depended on the political support of western Republicans
such as Warren.  The administration favored a grazing
district approach, but included several qualifications.  It
insisted on local control by those familiar with stock
raising.  The administration wanted to ensure that such a
local approach fostered cooperation between government and
business to avoid an antagonistic relationship.  Fees for
grazing permits must be affordable, low, or even a token
amount; the goal was not to use grazing policy to produce
revenue for the federal treasury, but to bring some
semblance of order and control to manage the land
efficiently.  Finally, any grazing policy should encourage
more settlement and homesteading and not prevent it;
clearly, the hold of the homestead era was still
significant.26
Whether from lack of leadership from the White House,
or from the inertia of American land policy, neither the
1904 nor 1907 proposals were acted upon fully.  Again,
Roosevelt had to deal with western politicians, and he did
not want to alienate New Mexico and Arizona, soon to enter
the union, and thus lose potential Republican states. 
20
Bills to lease the public domain were introduced into
Congress, but they inevitably failed.  Why?  There was no
method provided to distinguish grazing land from farm land;
the old problem of a monolithic conception of public land
persisted.  Other objections surfaced: the idea of charging
fees, however small, for previously “free” land was not
well received; a general resistence to consolidation; and
fears that a lease system would not only allow larger
owners to overpower smaller owners, but also lock in all
present owners, thus tying up the range to prevent any new
entrepreneurs from entering the business.
Grazing history took a different path in the forest
reserves, however, than was seen in the general public
domain.  The forest reserves were first created in 1891,
but the 1897 Forest Management Act, sometimes called the
Organic Act, truly established a national forest system. 
Occupancy and use of forest resources was regulated.  The
same year, a botanist in the Department of Agriculture,
Frederick Coville, offered a detailed assessment of grazing
in the West.  Coville recommended a regulated approach to
grazing on public land that would protect the forest
resources while simultaneously permitting use of grazing
resources.  According to historian William D. Rowley,
Coville’s “special tract permit system . . . provided the
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foundation for future grazing policies, both those of the
Department of the Interior and, later, those of the Forest
Service.”27
To many historians, the leasing of grazing lands in
national forest reserves was a success story.  Even a
naysayer wrote that forest service grazing was “the
redeeming feature of the general mismanagement of the
grazing lands.”28  In a 1915 report, the Secretary of
Agriculture wrote of forest service grazing success and
laid the groundwork for a similar approach to be attempted
with other public lands.  “When the regulated system was
established,” the report said, “the forest ranges, like the
open public lands today, rapidly were being impaired.”  The
report claimed that regulated policies restored
productivity, stabilized the industry, reduced range
violence, and increased ranch value. The secretary even
claimed that stockmen were “urging that a similar system of
range regulation be extended to the unreserved public
lands.”29  
This is not to say that forest service grazing was
unopposed.  On the contrary, over time many non-western
state congressmen and officials grew critical of grazing
fees that were too low; cheap forest grazing seemed to be
still more of a land give-away, even though it was
22
potentially an opportunity to increase federal revenue. 
Throughout the 1910s, grazing fees increased, much to the
protest of western stock interests.  Even so, the enlarging
of the land unit through grazing leases and the increase in
demand due to World War I provided a respite for ranchers.
Always sympathetic to the cattle industry, Walter Webb put
it this way: “It was not until 1916 that Congress
recognized in its land legislation that such a class as
cattlemen existed in the West.”30  But in the 1920s the
clamor to increase grazing fees returned and remained
constant until the depression of the 1930s, and westerners
resisted all the while.31
Policies toward grazing revealed much about national
attitudes toward conservation, the meaning of public lands,
and the role of the federal government in regulating
business, and the debate over public land grazing revealed
much about the changing attitudes toward property, nature,
and government intervention.  Should grazing be free or by
permit?  If free grazing was to be discontinued on the
public lands, what implications did that have for the
nature of “public” land itself?  And if fees were to be
charged, should they be token fees to cover administrative
costs, or could they be a genuine source of revenue for the
government?  At what level should grazing be administered,
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local, federal, state, or some combination of all three? 
In the landscape of conservation, was public land to be
held in “trust” or to be used by capitalists for personal
profit?  These questions and more sprang up in the years
between the closing of the frontier and the closing of the
public range. Western politicians wrestled with them, often
at their peril. One politician who faced such issues, and
sometimes walked away in defeat, was Wyoming’s Francis E.
Warren.
Francis E. Warren and Western Politics
Who was Francis Emory Warren?32  A few months before
his death in November 1929, the Denver News called the
Senator from Wyoming “the West’s great patronage
dispenser.”33  Indeed, Warren was especially adroit at
funneling federal appropriations into his home state.  But
Warren did more than bring home the bacon in an era of
pork-barrel politics.  He identified the gaps in the
Wyoming economy that could not be filled by the Union
Pacific Railroad or the Wyoming Stock Growers Association,
the dominant economic players.  To fill those gaps, Warren
created a political machine designed to use the federal
government as an “indispensable prop of local enterprise in
the arid West.”34  This was Warren’s great skill: creating
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and operating his own business empire and political machine
to the advantage of a constituent economy -- and himself,
of course.
Like many in the American West, Francis E. Warren came
from someplace else.  He was born in Hinsdale,
Massachusetts in 1844.  He served in the Union Army during
the Civil War and was awarded the Congressional Medal of
Honor “for gallantry on the battlefield” at the siege of
Port Hudson, Louisiana.  After the war he moved to Wyoming
and entered business and politics.  By the 1880s Warren
owned or controlled several companies, including the Warren
Mercantile Company and the Warren Live Stock Company, as
well as significant interest in the Cheyenne and Northern
Railroad and the Brush-Swan Electric Company, which brought
Cheyenne into the electric age.  
As he constructed this business empire, probably
making him the first millionaire in Wyoming, Warren became
politically active.  He served in offices ranging from
Cheyenne city council and mayor to the territorial
treasurer and chairman of Wyoming’s Republican Central
Committee.  In 1885, President Chester A. Arthur appointed
Warren territorial governor of Wyoming.  Warren lost this
position during the first term of Grover Cleveland, a
Democrat, but regained it when Republicans recaptured power
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with the election of Benjamin Harrison.  When Wyoming
entered the Union in 1890, Warren became the state’s first
governor.  He held that office for only about six weeks,
however, as the new state’s legislature quickly elected him
to the United States Senate.  Except for a brief period
surrounding the Johnson County War, Warren remained in the
Senate until his death in 1929, a thirty-seven year record
tenure not broken until the 1960s.  A New York Times
obituary dubbed Warren the “dean of the Senate” and noted
that he was “probably the State’s largest owner of real
estate, both urban and rural, and [was] the largest live
stock owner [in] a State in which live stock raising is the
fundamental industry.”35
During that thirty-seven year career, Warren amassed
seniority and influence.  As chairman of the Military
Affairs Committee he ensured Wyoming’s cut of the budget
through forts or posts.  He also assisted the military
career of his son-in-law, John J. Pershing.  One of
Warren’s aides, Willis Van Devanter, later served as a
justice on the United States Supreme Court.  As head of the
Senate Appropriation Committee, Warren stood in a unique
position to secure Wyoming’s share of reclamation projects
and other public-funded endeavors.
Warren figured prominently in what historians would
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identify as “western state mercantilism.”36  In the race
for economic prosperity and state promotion, Warren
frequently sided with protectionists, especially as public
policy affected the Wyoming wool and hide industries.  No
wonder, then, that Warren played more than a cameo role in
the crafting of the Dingley Tariff of 1897 and the Payne-
Aldrich Tariff of 1909.  Whether straddling the free silver
issue, which benefitted the mining states, or opposing
national forests to the delight of timber and grazing
interests, Warren earned a reputation as an “intellectual
leader of the anti-conservation forces in Congress.”37 
Warren had not been in the Senate long before he called for
unconditional cession of public lands to the states.  He
believed cession would draw more settlers (especially to
his sparsely populated state) and also provide some relief
to the livestock industry that had been stagnant through
the 1890s.  
The literature on Warren is surprisingly limited.  Two
University of Wyoming graduate students produced M.A.
theses in the 1940s.  These early surveys covered portions
of Warren’s congressional career, but they fell short of a
comprehensive study.38  The most sustained study given to
Warren is in Lewis L. Gould’s Wyoming: A Political History,
1868-1896, published in 1968.  While not a biography per
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se, Gould’s book examines Wyoming history using a slice of
Warren’s career.  The book ends with the 1896 election,
leaving further study of Warren to others. Gould’s book was
reissued in 1989 under a new title, Wyoming from Territory
to Statehood.  The new title and publisher’s new market
classification (under curious subject headings such as
“suffrage,” “travel,” and “local history”) further removed
emphasis from Warren.  
Since Gould’s 1968 political biography, historians
have addressed Warren primarily in the context of turn-of-
the-century reclamation issues or his rivalry with Joseph
Carey.  For example, Warren appears in Limerick’s Legacy of
Conquest.  Where Gould chose to emphasize Warren’s ability
to “exploit the intimate financial connection between
Washington and the West to benefit both his state and his
own career,” Limerick uses Warren as yet another example of
the western penchant for economic exploitation and neglect
of larger social problems.39  Similarly, Warren receives a
few token paragraphs in a twentieth century history of the
American West as a “guardian of the right” and an enemy of
progressive reform.40  Historian Donald J. Pisani has noted
that “too many environmental historians have looked at the
past as a morality play in which the champions of the
‘public good’ battled against the ‘plunderers of
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nature.’”41  Whether Warren is portrayed as a hero or a
villain, there can be no doubt that he was an important
figure in the development of Wyoming and public policy
toward the West, and for this reason merits closer
scrutiny.
Francis E. Warren, among the most powerful of senators
in his day but now little remembered outside of Wyoming,
had opportunities to alter fundamentally the land policies
of the United States as they affected the livestock grazing
industry.  But he was unable to bring about such a change
largely because other western states became more powerful
than Wyoming. The grazing states, let alone the West as a
whole, were not united. It took the Great Depression and
the New Deal to achieve a grazing policy. The New Deal and
the Taylor Act accomplished in a couple of years what
Warren could not in decades of political life.
Outline of Chapters
This dissertation follows a generally chronological
approach in its exploration of Warren and his role in the
conflict over grazing policies.  This introductory chapter
outlined the historiographical context of the livestock
industry and the political environment in which Warren
operated.  Chapter 2 presents Warren’s efforts from 1890-
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1898 to cede all public lands directly to the states as his
first attempt to win a workable grazing policy for the
West.  Chapter 3 follows the grazing debate into the
national forests with Frederick V. Coville’s 1898-1906 call
for regulated, managed grazing.  Warren’s hope for land
cession had collapsed.  Grazing policy as practiced in the
forest reserves would define policy for years to come. 
Chapter 4, then, examines the tense political situation
Warren faced as Coville’s system was implemented.  Chapter
5 continues that discussion through 1920 and finds Warren
in his most turbulent years, a period marked by personal
tragedy, political scandal, and regional rivalries that
diminished Warren’s will to do little more than maintain
his hold on power.  Chapter 6 explores Warren’s final
years, from 1920 to his death in 1929.  Warren died within
a month of the stock market crash; both events signaled the
end of one era and the beginning of a new search for
solutions to the grazing problem.
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CHAPTER 2
INSIDE WARREN’S DRIVE FOR ARID LAND CESSION
AND STATE CONTROLLED GRAZING POLICY, 1890-1898
I have been of the opinion for some
years that inasmuch as the state owns
the waters within it by the terms of
our law of admission, the state should
also own the lands . . . .  In this way
the people and the state would grow
rich together.1
A potential settler wrote from Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania to Senator Francis E. Warren of Wyoming,
inquiring about the availability of public land in Wyoming
and the opportunities one might find there.  Warren
responded with a terse appraisal of United States land
policy in the early 1890s.  “Every citizen is entitled to
160 acres without price,” he wrote, “except land officer’s
fees, providing he makes the same his homestead and lives
upon it five years.  Land can also be taken under the
Desert Act [of 1877] subject to irrigation and reclamation
by the claimant and upon the payment to the Government of
$1.25 per acre.”2  One might have expected more
enthusiastic promotion from a senator of a sparsely
populated state.  
The harsh reality, as Warren well knew, was that the
land policy of the nation was ill suited to the grazing,
irrigation, or general agricultural needs of the arid West. 
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A patchwork of laws and loopholes defined land policy after
the Civil War, but for Warren and many westerners there was
a straightforward solution to all their problems: the
unconditional cession of all public lands to the states. 
Cession was not the only solution to the West’s problems.
The Wright Act, passed in 1887 by the California
legislature to create irrigation districts, opened the door
to a wave of irrigation projects and created an economic
boom. Wyoming did not have the resources -- water,
population, or dollars -- of California, so irrigation
projects alone were of limited appeal to Warren. Wyoming
had an abundance of public land, however, and Warren wanted
the grazing industry to control it.3  Throughout the 1890s,
Warren believed cession to be the ultimate prescription to
relieve the West’s land problems; he repeatedly attempted
but failed to change the fundamental land policy of the
United States.  
Wyoming achieved statehood in 1890.  It had been a
long and, toward the end, unorthodox struggle.  As early as
1869, when Wyoming was first organized as a territory,
there was talk of statehood.  The issue gained momentum in
the 1880s in no small part due to Francis E. Warren.  In
1888 the territorial legislature petitioned the United
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States Congress for admission into the Union.  Bills to
enable statehood passed neither the House nor the Senate. 
Warren and others in the tightly-knit territorial power
structure forged ahead, however, acting as if there were an
enabling act when in fact none existed.  In the summer of
1889, Wyoming territory elected delegates and held its own
self-styled “Constitutional Convention.”  By November of
that year, Wyoming voters overwhelmingly approved a “state”
constitution 6,272 to 1,923. Voter turnout was
“disappointingly low,” and winning margins in some counties
-- Johnson in particular -- could be counted in the dozens.
A politically insignificant minority of Democrats opposed
statehood on the grounds that it would lead to “ruinous
taxation.”  The next month new bills for Wyoming statehood
began working their way through the Senate and the House. 
By the spring of 1890, Congress had passed Wyoming’s
statehood bill and President Benjamin Harrison quickly
signed it into law, making Wyoming the 44th state.4
Statehood was a victory for Republicans, but the high
times of the range industry were quickly becoming the stuff
of nostalgia.  Although the 1870s were, as T. A. Larson put
it, a “troubled decade” marked by confrontation with Native
Americans, dominance of the Union Pacific Railroad that
treated the territory as a personal coal box, and
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immigration dropping to a trickle in spite of
groundbreaking liberal suffrage laws, the 1880s had been
even worse because of disastrous winters and drought-filled
summers.  Indeed, the day after the signing of the
statehood bill, the Cheyenne Daily Leader cautioned: “Don’t
expect too much.”  As Larson concluded, this was a “timely
warning, for many people appear to have been carried away
by notions that statehood would solve most of their
problems.  This was not to be the case; harsh realities
would dispel the aura of optimism.”  Wyoming’s population
was low--only about 60,000, and that first census figure
did not count Native Americans living on reservations.  Low
voter turnout also embarassed the new state.  The center of
Wyoming’s economy, the cattle industry, reeled from an
overstocked and abused grazing range, falling prices, and
the harsh combination of droughts and blizzards from the
“white winters” of the late 1880s.  A sense of unease
spread through the new state, and even entrenched interests
such as the Wyoming Stock Growers’ Association declined in
power and influence.  This was the political and economic
context that Warren faced and sought to remedy through land
cession.5
The Wyoming legislature promptly sent Warren and
Joseph M. Carey to Washington as the first senators from
40
the Equality State.  Clearly, Warren was no stranger to
political life, but even he felt overwhelmed by the duties
of the office.  His priorities included securing a new road
from Fort Washakie to Yellowstone Park.  He then wrestled a
number of demands for post offices and postal appointments
in Wyoming, all the while conducting personal business
interests that ranged from selling cattle to pianos.6 
Writing to his friend Edward Slack, editor of the Cheyenne
Sun, Warren once confessed, “I get awfully discouraged
sometimes . . . . I hate to work like a turk during the
prime of my life, for more than a score of years, to help
out in business and in other ways, a lot of fellows who are
continually following me, and either yelping at my heels or
kicking my ‘beam end’ at every turn in the road. . . .
Seriously, I am about fagged out with this business,
almighty tired of it, [and] considerably disgusted.”7 
Warren was also discouraged with his own business
ventures in Wyoming. The Warren Livestock Company was the
largest in the state -- a “miniature empire” that stretched
across southeastern Wyoming and into western Nebraska and
northern Colorado -- but by the mid-1890s it was in debt
about $200,000. In the summer of 1894 the company went into
receivership. The senator’s other company, the Warren
Mercantile Company, avoided bankruptcy but still felt the
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effects of the ranching depression throughout the decade.
(Both companies survived, of course, so much that Warren
left an estate of about $6.7 million to his heirs.) Wyoming
Democrats pounced on Warren’s motivation for land cession
as little more than an attempt to grab more grazing land
for himself to turn his business fortunes around.8
Despite the fatigue and criticism, Warren found the
energy to propose a bold change to the public land
structure of the nation.  He did not work alone, however. 
Warren befriended Elwood Mead, Wyoming’s chief engineer who
soon became Warren’s right-hand-man on matters of land and
water legislation.  Mead was an academic who had gone west
from Purdue University in his home state of Indiana to
become a math and physics professor at Colorado State
Agricultural College in Fort Collins.  Mead resigned the
Colorado teaching job after less than a year, however, to
return to school himself.  He quickly acquired additional
degrees in engineering and science.  He returned to
Colorado in 1885 to work for the state engineer and by 1888
moved to Wyoming to take the territorial engineer position
there.  Mead’s politics were revealed in the policies he
advocated.  He was first a technocrat who saw the answer to
the West’s problems in engineered solutions.  This is not
to say that Mead was apolitical, however.  Indeed, he was
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skeptical that centralized, federal planning could ever
adapt to the unique situations of the western states.  At
least at this point in his career, Mead saw the state
government as the best lever to correct land and water
problems.  But states such as Wyoming were overwhelmingly
public land states; that is, their vast lands were not
taxable and largely out of the purview of state
governments.  Warren’s drive for land cession to the states
was a natural fit for Mead.  Together the two men crafted
legislation they hoped would revolutionize local control in
the West.  Mead rose over the years to loftier posts,
ultimately serving as the head of the Bureau of Reclamation
until his death in 1936.  He oversaw some of the most
complex reclamation projects ever undertaken, including the
construction of the Hoover, Grand Coulee, and Owyhee dams,
and his name is enshrined by the reservoir created by
Hoover Dam: Lake Mead, between Nevada and Arizona, the
largest man-made lake and reservoir in the United States. 
Like future Supreme Court Justice Willis Van Devanter, Mead
was another official with close ties to Francis Warren who
prospered well beyond his time in Wyoming.9
Elwood Mead’s career began in partnership with Warren
in Wyoming, however.  On February 16, 1891, Warren
introduced into the Senate a bill, crafted with Mead’s
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help, that would “cede the arid lands to the States and
Territories wherein they situate, and to provide for
irrigation and the utilization of pasturage lands and the
protection of forest lands, and for other purposes.”10  If
enacted, the United States would hand over millions of
acres to state governments in the West to do with as they
saw fit.  The Preemption and Homestead Acts -- and, more
importantly, their inherent flaws vis-à-vis the arid lands
-- would be relegated to history, and a new era of local
control would begin.  Warren’s bill, S. 5087, was referred
to the Committee on Public Lands, where it languished.  The
Senate, rarely in a rush about anything, was not in a hurry
to give away the West.  The Senate and the 51st Congress as
a whole adjourned for the session on March 3.  Warren’s
late arrival in the Senate did not allow much time to
propose legislation. 
But at least the idea of land cession had been laid on
the table.  This was part of Warren’s larger political
strategy.  “I knew when introducing my bill at the last
session that it could not get through in that term for lack
of time . . . but desired to get the subject before the
people,” he wrote later that summer.  Warren preferred a
slow and deliberate political style to a forceful and fiery
approach.  One of his oft-repeated mottos summed it up:
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“Never hunt ducks with a brass band.”  The optimal
technique of partisan persuasion was behind the scenes;
“the best way to build up the Republican party,” Warren
said, “is to keep very quietly sticking in a peg here and
there in our work and knocking out one here and there in
the works of the enemy.”  This philosophy applied to his
desire for land cession.  After the first lukewarm attempt
to introduce a bill, Warren regrouped and prepared for
another attempt.  “There is considerable sentiment built up
in favor of ceding the lands to the states by the
Government,” he wrote, but went on to admit, “also
considerable opposition.  I am giving more attention to an
endeavor to quietly overcome the latter than to force the
former just at the present time.”11  
Warren wanted more land to graze, but opponents feared
cession would set off a wave of reckless land speculation. 
Regional tensions over cession were as old as the nation
itself.  As one historian summed up the opposition to
cession, the policy change “threatened to depopulate the
Atlantic states, drive down the value of eastern farms,
encourage speculation, contribute to the growth of land
monopolies, cheat those who had purchased land from the
government at the minimum price, and undermine nationalism
by making the states far less dependent on the central
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government.”12  Although these general objections to
cession were in the political air, Warren’s own troubles in
promoting the land reform had causes closer to home and out
of his control.  In the crusade for land cession, time was
not on his side, largely for reasons he could not
anticipate.
The idea of ceding public lands to the states did not
originate with Francis E. Warren.  A brief summary of the
history of cession is thus in order.  From the earliest
days of the Republic, as Paul Wallace Gates has shown, “the
public land states began to exhibit disenchantment” and
clamored for full cession--that is, more lands under state
control.  It particularly chafed that all states had
entered the Union “‘on equal footing’ . . . yet were denied
ownership of the ungranted land within their boundaries,
whereas Massachusetts and all others of the Original
Thirteen had retained the ungranted lands within their
boundaries.”13  As the nation endured its growing pains, a
myriad of next-best-thing land measures emerged, from
funding school and agricultural college land grants to
focused land cession for the purposes of constructing roads
and eventually major land grants to the transcontinental
railroads in the mid-nineteenth century.  The states
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quickly “found [ways] of gaining land ownership of a
portion of the public lands.”14
Ironically, the more adept the states became at
acquiring land short of full cession, the less crucial the
need for cession became.  Partial cession was common; full
cession became intertwined with the losing antebellum
argument of states’ rights and the meaning of the
Constitution.15  By the time of the Civil War, federal
power was obviously solidifying.  The Homestead Act, with
its enormously popular appeal, put another nail in the
coffin for full cession to the states.  The dream of
cession did not disappear, however.  As the inadequacies of
the Homestead Act became glaringly apparent in the arid
West, the expansive public land states again called for
cession and would continue to do so through the Herbert
Hoover administration in the late 1920s.16
A resurgence of support for cession occurred in the
1880s in the context of drought and rising expectations for
irrigation and reclamation.  As Donald J. Pisani notes in
his history of public water policy, “In the late 1880s,
Colorado provided the greatest popular support for cession,
but during the 1890s the most effective congressional
leadership came from Wyoming.”17  And so we return to
Francis E. Warren and his renewed effort to secure public
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lands for the states.
Through the land cession issue Warren made many allies
of other western politicians.  He established a good
relationship with Thomas Carter, the Commissioner of the
General Land Office.  Warren knew that Carter had many
interests and audiences to placate, but he still counted
him as a comrade in the general cause of cession.  Carter
was a fellow westerner, from Montana. Writing freely to
Edward Slack in Cheyenne, Warren said of Carter, “He is
disposed to do something in our direction, but I am
inclined to think he will not want to embody in his report
the exact doctrine that we wish preached.  But whatever he
does will be far in advance of anything his predecessors
have offered.”  Months later, shortly before he again
introduced his cession bill, Warren registered even more
confidence in Carter.  “In every conversation I have had
with Carter and in every request,” Warren said, “he has
shown a disposition to do as near what I wanted as possible
and I make no complaint against him.  He is a dandy.”18
Again, Warren worked slowly but steadily to build up
support.
At this stage in the drive for cession, Warren was
careful to connect irrigation and grazing.  State control
of one but not the other seemed pointless.  “I included not
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only the forest lands . . . but the pasture lands also, as
it is necessary for the state to control these in order to
make the water supply sure in one case and the lands
valuable for stock farming on the other,” Warren wrote of
the construction of his bill.  “By renting pasture lands
from the state, which abut on the water,” he went on, “the
farmer and the stock grower could spend his summer in
raising his little crop and saving hay for hard weather in
the winter, while his live stock could graze back in the
mountains in summer and down nearer his settlement in the
winter.”19
Once his first fragmented congressional term was
concluded, Warren could spend the time needed to muster
support for his cession bill.  The legislature of his home
state of Wyoming, of course, unanimously memorialized
Congress in favor of cession for the arid states. 
Localities from Green River, Wyoming to Converse County
likewise sent cession petitions to Congress.20  
Other state legislatures followed similar paths,
including Idaho and Montana.  In January 1891, Governor
Toole of Montana addressed his legislature on behalf of
land cession and reclamation, generally supporting the idea
of state control of public lands.  “If we are to receive
any substantial or speedy benefits from our arid lands,”
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Toole said, “I believe the State must first acquire a title
to them, and then undertake by appropriate legislation to
reclaim and dispose of them.”21  
Over time Montana abandoned Warren’s plan, however.
Mounting allegations of corruption and collusion with the
railroad industry pulled Montana away from supporting
cession altogether, preferring instead that the federal
government simply sell the public lands and just give the
money to the states.  Opponents feared that ceded lands
would fall into the hands of railroad companies. In
Wyoming, the Union Pacific Railroad was the only industry
to rival the cattle business, but Warren had a cozy
relationship with the U.P. all the same.  On more than one
occasion he had mercilessly sided with management against
striking workers.22
The Montana challenge irritated Warren, and he
attributed it to personal slights.  “I am sorry that the
disappointment of a colleague over not getting some coveted
place on a committee should cause him to make grave charges
against me.  The statement that I have any interest with
any railroad corporation regarding the Arid Lands or for
cession to the states is absolutely without the slightest
foundation.”23  Even so, the Montana split was a hint of
things to come.
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Warren sought and gathered support for his arid lands
bill from a variety of newspapers, both western and
eastern.  Close to home, Cheyenne’s Daily Sun, edited by
Warren’s confidant Edward Slack, made a restrained, common
sense argument for simplified control of public lands to
benefit the grazing industry: “the [federal] Government
really gives up nothing, but it simply allows the land and
the water to come under one jurisdiction, which is the only
way the same can be properly disposed of.”24  Cheyenne’s
other major paper, the Daily Leader, also supported the
cession of public land to the states and local control of
the lands.  Unconditional cession was the key: “if the arid
lands are ceded to the several states, the General
Government should cede them unconditionally, leaving to the
individual states the solution of the problem of their
reclamation.”  The Leader said the public lands in their
current state were “white elephants . . . of no value to
the government, the states or the people.”  Public grazing
land, given wholly over to the states, would “set the State
up for business, drawing hither settlers who would be
assured a living from the start.”25  One would expect
Warren’s home editors to support a bill that promised so
much to their state.  As events over the next few months
transpired, however, even the base editorial support would
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wane.
Other western press outlets pressed the cession cause. 
The Rocky Mountain News of Denver, always a proponent of
land cession, was more blunt than its Wyoming neighbors. 
The federal government, it said, “lacks the promptness, the
zeal and the practical intelligence” of the states where
grazing mattered most.26  The Denver Sun echoed this
sentiment: “There is little chance that this work of
reclamation can be done except through the cession of the
lands to the States.  It would be an unfamiliar and
difficult task to the nation, but a familiar and easy one
to the States.”27  Finally, the Denver Republican,
unabashedly partisan, was optimistic about the passage of a
comprehensive cession bill.  “It will be a notable year in
the history of the arid regions,” its editorial proclaimed,
“if Congress . . . grants the arid lands to the States and
Territories.  Fortunately the prospect for such legislation
is good.”  Not only was cession the “reasonable” thing to
do, the Republican maintained, but it would in the long run
save the federal government money.  It would also alleviate
sectional tensions: “the Eastern farmers would not be able
to say that they were taxed to raise up competition against
themselves.”28 In Omaha, Nebraska, the Bee said that if
reclamation were left to the federal government it would
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mean more delay and “perhaps will never be done.”  The Bee
was more blunt about opposition from the South than most
papers, holding that “there is a very strong sentiment in
the country, particularly in the East and South, hostile to
the General Government having anything to do with
irrigation beyond making surveys for reservoir sites.”  It
went on to lament that “it will be a long time before this
can be overcome, if it can ever be.”29 Warren visited Omaha
and offered a brief speech in which he connected the
interests of Nebraska with the frontier spirit of
development and prosperity.30  In this Nebraska speech,
Warren emphasized cooperation and played down the specifics
of land cession.  In more private, personal political
venues, Warren was more aggressive about his cause.  “We
must agitate this question of arid lands and how to reclaim
them,” he wrote, “for it is the burning question in the
west and a problem that must be solved sooner or later.”31
Warren even secured an endorsement from a southern
newspaper, the New Orleans Times-Democrat.  The Louisiana
paper connected the arid lands of the West to the fertile
South and suggested that the West would benefit from
reclamation.  The paper wrote that “a far better solution .
. . is that the United States donate to the several States
and Territories all the public lands within their
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respective areas . . . a very similar gift was made to
Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Florida nearly half a
century ago.”  Although cession would meet opposition from
the South, for the moment, at least, arid and (some) humid
lands seemed to agree on the need to change federal land
policy.32
When they discussed the West at all, eastern
newspapers came around cautiously, Warren noticed; “so far,
they are a little slow east in taking up articles favoring
the ceding of arid lands, except those of a brief nature;
but, as interest grows, I believe they will be glad to give
place to more exhaustive articles.”33  To that end, Warren
referred eastern inquiries to writers such as F. J.
Stanton, a professor, geologist, and mining engineer in
Wyoming.  Stanton wrote a paper with a clumsy but effective
title: “The Public Domain: The People of the States, the
Rightful Owners; Give the Waste Lands to those who Reclaim
Them.”  Stanton’s argument began with the English
colonists, the collapse of the “Divine Right of Kings” and
the end of feudalism as a way of structuring land
ownership.  He then took a circuitous route through the
“western march of empire” to show that the force of history
was pushing toward land cession.  He concluded with
language at last more appealing to editorialists.  “We ask
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that the East shall concede to the West at least the Arid
Waste Lands within our borders,” he argued, and “give them
free and unrestricted to the various State Governments, so
that by a system of economy and industrial thrift, we can
keep our money here at home and add additional wealth to
our enterprising, hard fisted yeomen, who have conquered
the empire.”34  The style of Stanton’s prose reappeared
often in Warren’s comments on the Senate floor.
Of the eastern press, the Hartford, Connecticut Post
was the most forthright in highlighting the inadequacies of
the current land laws.  The solution was for the federal
government to “let go” of the lands “now useless and for
which it declines to appropriate sufficient development
money” and instead allow the individual states to determine
their own future.35
The New York Tribune also conceded that “the time is
approaching when the Federal Government should at least
give settlers a free hand.”36  The New York Times, though
supportive, was the most reserved about the potential
change in land policy.  It reported, “The proposal to
transfer to the States and Territories the arid public
lands within their respective limits was broached in the
last Congress, and has probably gained adherents since that
time, even if only as a choice in a dilemma.”  The Times
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was suspicious of a land grab,  but even this lukewarm
support was good enough for Warren’s cause.37
When the Republican party held its national convention
in Minneapolis, it included land cession in the party
platform.  Whether this ultimately helped or hurt the
cession cause is debatable, but it clearly politicized the
issue and the party identified with it.  The party plank on
cession acknowledged the weaknesses of the current laws as
they applied to the West: “The grazing lands are now of no
direct benefit to the General Government and can not be
sold, because, under the laws, no one can acquire over 160
acres, and such a small area is of no value.  Under State
ownership they would be allotted or leased.”  The revenue
generated by the allocation or leasing of public grazing
lands, the plank argued, would be enough to ensure the
protection and administration of both pastures and forests,
resulting in a self-sufficient system that did not require
federal intervention.  As to the fear of corruption at the
local level, the party emphasized a sense of ownership and
responsibility: “Each citizen of the state would have an
intimate personal interest in its proceedings, and would
watch it as if it were his own.  The shape of his
pocketbook would be affected by their work.  Is it probable
that corruption could creep in where there were so many
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interested eyes upon the watch?”  To suggest otherwise was
to doubt the very nature of democracy itself: “It would
seem like questioning the ability of our people to govern
themselves, to question their ability to administer the
waters, lands, and forests upon which their livelihood
depends.”38 This may have been disingenuous, but
Republicans knew how to play the rhetorical game of
democracy well.
In the 1890s, a variety of so-called irrigation
congresses met throughout the West to promote land cession
and large-scale irrigation projects.  These meetings were
usually attended, as historian Paul Wallace Gates reports,
by “representatives of land grant railroads, other real
estate groups, state land commissioners and land boards,
irrigation companies, lawyers, journalists, civil engineers
and businessmen -- stockmen and farmers were noticeably
absent.”39  Despite the lack of a direct grazing interest
in these groups, Warren nonetheless managed to secure a
variety of irrigation congresses to support land cession. 
He counted endorsements from the Western Commercial
Congress in Kansas City, and the Transmississippi
Commercial Congress, which met a number of times in
Galveston, Denver, Omaha, and Las Vegas, New Mexico.
Perhaps the most influential of all was the Salt Lake City
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Irrigation Congress held in 1891.  An irrigation convention
held in Montana took different positions on the ceding of
public lands to the states, but it nonetheless shared the
fundamental belief that the federal government had a role
to play in the reclaiming of arid land.   Almost
universally, these interest groups favored cession to the
states, believing the federal government to be unable to
administer the public lands to the benefit of westerners.  
Warren’s own campaign for cession was impressive.  In
February 1892, in a speech before the Committee Republican
Club, Warren spoke on the topic of “The Great and Growing
West.”  He began with a party-serving reminiscence that
must have made the Republicans in the room feel pride in
their role in the nation’s history.  A Civil War veteran,
Warren had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. 
He spoke of “Republican Principles . . . the ardent defense
[of which] on the sanguinary plains of Kansas . . . did
much to make us free.”  After reminding the group of their
shared partisan heritage Warren moved on to discuss the
modern West.  He made light of the reputation of the region
as lawless: “We went west for more elbow room, aiming to
retain all our virtues and leave our faults behind us. 
Possibly at times we have fallen from grace.  We may have
extinguished an occasional Indian or have seemed to approve
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of the summary hanging of a horse thief. . . . But these
were the backslidings of our youth.”  Returning to a theme
of national unity, he proclaimed, “the West is but the East
transplanted to broader fields and richer soil,”
overlooking the generally infertile soil of Wyoming.  Rich
soil, perhaps, but dry soil for certain.  Warren hinted at
land cession for the western states, not stating it overtly
but it was clearly on his agenda; “the arid region,” he
said, “has had to provide for its own internal improvements
. . . we are a long suffering people . . . yet we do not
complain.”  Rather than wearing out his welcome on the
specifics of his cession bill, Warren then returned to
appeals to partisan loyalty and assured his audience that
the West was solidly Republican.40
Warren continued to make a case for arid land cession
in a prepared “article” distributed to the press. 
Essentially a press release, the article was composed in
the style of an interview with the senator, recently chosen
to head the now standing committee on irrigation and arid
lands.  “The selection of Senator Warren is everywhere
regarded as most appropriate,” his own office wrote. 
Peppering Warren with easy questions in the “interview,”
the article asked: “Why should the lands be ceded to the
states?”  Warren’s stock response summed up his views on
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land policy and the need for change.  He answered, “the
present federal land laws are defective and inapplicable to
the arid region, each state can best frame the laws suited
to its peculiar conditions.”  After listing several
expected benefits of cession, Warren turned the questioning
around, “The question is,” he asked, “which can best be
entrusted with the work, the state or the national
authorities?”  His answer, not surprisingly, held that “the
state government is the proper agency.”41
Of all the endorsements, speeches and quasi-
interviews, the most revealing insights into Warren’s drive
for land cession could be found in a document that has the
markings of a speech but little details regarding its
presentation.  In this undated but signed typescript,
Warren presented his arguments for land cession, a summary
of a general discontent with the current land system, and
touches on larger issues of federalism.  Inasmuch as this
document summarized Warren’s ideology, it is worth a dip
into its details.  Next to Warren’s remarks on the floor of
the Senate, no better explanation of his policy can be
found.
“The United States should cede the Arid Lands under
proper restrictions to the states and territories wherein
they situate,” the text began with a punch reflecting the
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lanuage of his bill.  It quickly moved to criticize the
current public land policy.  The land laws of the West
created “continuous unrest and discontent.” Warren’s
solution of land cession would thus enable “the States to
frame land laws suitable to their peculiar conditions,” or
farming for the plains, and grazing for Wyoming.42
Again Warren joined the issue of state controlled
grazing districts to the need for reclamation.  Irrigated
lands, he said, would of course increase in value, as would
the grazing lands associated with them.  “To attain the
best results,” he said, “these must be made an adjunct to
the irrigable lands along the streams.  Every occupier and
cultivator of the irrigated lands should have a
proportional interest of control in the grazing lands.” 
This was the key to prosperity in perpetuity;  “it is only
in this way that the value of our grazing areas can be
perpetuated and the greatest benefit from the irrigated
areas secured.”43
In addition to the reservation of adjacent lands for
grazing purposes, Warren went on to outline a rental
system.  Owners and users of irrigated tracts along streams
could “by means of community fences or in some other
manner” protect their contiguous grazing lands. Warren
claimed that this would give grazing lands “four-fold the
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value they now possess.”  Warren pointed to the existing
system of grazing, such as it was, which essentially
provided no methods of regulating the use of the land
beyond custom.  Under current practices, the land was
“being surely but slowly destroyed.”  Warren believed a
system based on regulated grazing districts and rental fees
would return money to the irrigation project at hand,
benefitting both the grazers and the true, local  users of
irrigation.44  The assurance of adjacent grazing lands,
administered under a system to be devised by the states
according to need, was in Warren’s view an essential
ingredient in any success that might come from the ceding
of arid lands for irrigation.
In concluding his argument, Warren half-heartedly
acknowledged one concern of those who opposed land cession. 
To those who feared a “football of speculation” Warren only
replied, “This fear should not be entertained.”  In a
biting final statement, Warren expressed great faith in the
state governments and at the same time disparaged Congress. 
“The state government is the proper agency” to manage
grazing lands,  he maintained.  He trusted state
legislatures “because nearly every member would understand
from practical knowledge and experience the subject with
which he was dealing.  It cannot be so in Congress.”45
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On July 21, 1892, Warren took the floor of the Senate
on behalf of his arid lands bill calling for cession.  He
presented the bill and spoke at length, backed by a
mountain of evidence and testimony supporting his cause. 
Where his first abortive bill had been titled “to cede the
public lands,” this latest approach focused on irrigation
as harbinger of prosperity.  Like most astute politicians,
Warren knew the persuasive power of language and euphemism;
once in giving assistance to a student assigned to give a
presentation on the subject, Warren said, “‘arid land’ may
be a dry subject, yet ‘irrigation’ is a suggestive one and
[the speaker] may be able to hold his hearers to the
subject especially if the weather is hot.”  In the well of
the Senate -- hot and stuffy in the summertime -- Warren
began his own presentation with the premise that irrigation
was crucial to the success of agriculture.  It followed
that the arid lands should be reclaimed as soon as
possible.  “The present land laws,” he pointed out to his
fellow senators, “are inapplicable to that section and the
importance of prompt legislation cannot be
overestimated.”46  His cession bill, now numbered S. 2529,
would solve that.
Because Warren devoted more time and energy to S. 2529
than he had to any cession bill to date, a close
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examination of the provisions of the bill is in order.47 
Warren’s bill, designed to irrigate and reclaim the arid
lands “for the protection of forests and utilization of
pasturage” made irrigation, general agriculture, and the
rationalized grazing of live stock inseparable; this was a
connection not made by many future, and more successful,
reclamation bills.
Warren’s bill ceded all public lands not already in
use to the states and territories in which they were
located, with five conditions.  First, the states were
required to divide their new land into self-governing
irrigation districts and to work continuously to reclaim,
in good faith, “the whole area capable thereof.”  Second,
after ten years the president could reclaim the title of
any land he deemed not improved as a result of good faith
reclamation work.  This measure, however, was not quite an
open door for the federal government to take back land.  It
could only take back the land if it agreed to continue
irrigate it using federal dollars.  In addition, any lands
“useful for only pastoral purposes shall remain with . . .
the adjacent reclaimed lands.”  In effect, the grazing
lands would remain with the states regardless of the status
of any irrigation project on them.  This caveat, Warren
knew, was offered as a compromise to those most suspicious
64
of land cession, even as he knew that it was unlikely that
any resumption of federal lands would take place.  “If the
land is ceded,” he wrote, “and we are not able to reclaim
it we will certainly be no worse off.”48  Third, the lands
once ceded to the states could be borrowed against or even
sold outright by the states, provided the proceeds were
used toward reclamation.  Fourth, land sold to individual
settlers would be limited to 160 acres per person of
irrigable lands, with as much as 320 acres of nonirrigable
land as a potential addition.
The fifth provision of Warren’s arid land cession bill
held much promise in the direction of a national grazing
policy.  Any land not under reclamation and not already in
use by homesteaders would be available for grazing leases. 
Individual state legislatures, according to Warren’s bill,
would be given room to set prices and boundaries of grazing
districts.  The bill did require, however, that preference
be given to the proximity of the lessee -- i.e., “each
settler shall be entitled to rent the pasture lands which
lie nearer to the lands of such settler than to those of
any other settler.”  The recognition of grazing lands and
inclusion of their use as part of the overall cession of
public lands was a crucial point to Warren.  Grazing
districts, as a priority, would fall away from future
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reclamation bills.
As Warren continued his remarks on the floor of the
Senate, he reached far back into antiquity.  Citing the
work of George Perkins Marsh, Warren listed numerous
examples of ancient civilizations “that have risen and
flourished in arid regions where irrigation was practiced.” 
He quoted many passages from the Bible to draw a
questionable conclusion that the Garden of Eden was
irrigated: “In the description of the Garden of Eden in the
first book, we are told that ‘A river went out of Eden to
water the garden.’  Therefore, the first system of
irrigation was in the Garden of Eden.”49  Warren rarely
attended church; he was certainly no theologian.  He
cribbed this Biblical justification for irrigation from
something he heard at the Salt Lake City Irrigation
Convention, and he had appealed to Reverend A. A. Johnson,
the president of the University of Wyoming.  “Kindly look
at the second chapter of Genesis, 10th verse,” he asked of
Johnson, “and tell me if it is a good text from which to
argue that the Garden of Eden required irrigation, that it
was naturally arid land, but reclaimed as we reclaim our
deserts, etc.  If we cannot go this far, how far can we go
. . . ?  I would like a little brief on this subject, which
I can use in my ‘business’ of educating people.”50 
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Similarly, Warren introduced a map that outlined the extent
of the arid lands.  Writing to William Ellsworth Smythe,
Warren said “the map is a great educator to people who do
not understand arid land matters.  I find nearly all
eastern people must commence with the ‘kindergarten’ . . .
therefore the map is the strongest feature.”51
He discussed the more recent history of the United
States as well, tracing the development of land policy in
the United States to imply that disposal of federal lands
was a large trend in the emergence of local democracy; “the
very foundation of our National Government,” he argued, “is
based upon the wise administration of local affairs”; local
ownership and control of land was positively
Jeffersonian.52  
And yet, for all the march of progress, the public
land laws worked against the common man, Warren said.  The
very success of western settlement had thwarted the new
rancher or settler, who was “compelled to seek a home in
the arid land, if he desires to enter upon the public
domain, and under very great disadvantages.  Warren
concluded that relief of the arid lands inequity was a
moral obligation: “The Government owes it to the youngest
sons of the nation that they be given some of the benefits
accorded to their fathers.”53  
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On the subject of grazing, Warren had much to say. 
Continuing with the Jeffersonian theme of the self-
sufficient farmer, he demonstrated how irrigation and
grazing walked hand in hand.  “The large intervening or
adjoining tracts of land will be utilized for grazing,” he
said, “while the irrigated farms will furnish the small
grains, vegetables, and fruits required for local
consumption.”  He also emphasized the locality of
agriculture, returning to the criticisms he faced in Omaha
on the potential for the balance of regional competition to
be pushed off center.  Thus, while irrigation may turn the
arid lands into a new Garden of Eden, at the same time
“there need be no fear that the productions of the arid
region will be so great” as to threaten established
agricultural markets in other parts of the country.  This
was significant.  In statements before Congress, Warren had
to appeal to senators from other agricultural states that
had suffered from declining prices.54
The addition of grazing lands to the cession argument
was central to Warren’s thinking.  Much of the West’s
grazing lands, he believed, “can never be made the self-
supporting habitation of man, because they are too elevated
[to be reached by gravity canals] and too vast in extent to
be irrigated; but they furnish a valuable complement to the
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lands reclaimed, the first supplying the summer’s and the
second the winter’s food supply.”  Warren rightly
maintained that Congress had never truly grappled with a
land policy that specifically addressed the unique
environment and needs of the western states.  As an added
bonus, by folding grazing districts in with irrigated
lands, Warren’s approach would encourage settlement.  By
offering grazing lands adjacent to reclaimed lands, “it
will make more valuable the irrigable areas and supply the
settler with an important source of income by adding the
business of stock-raising to that of the farmer.”  Warren
summed up his argument on grazing with a choice quote from
the National Irrigation Congress’s stance, an argument that
made different elements of the public lands argument part
of the same cession package:  “The State should own the
forest lands and hold them, that it may preserve the
forests . . . from destruction and the water supply from
becoming intermittent and useless.  The State should own
the grazing lands and hold them that they may be made
valuable, and that the revenue from them may be available
to pay the expense of protecting the forests.”  Finally,
“the State should own the irrigable lands, that it may
obtain a revenue from their sale with which to regulate and
distribute the water supply for their irrigation as to
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produce the greatest benefit to the commonwealth and the
individual irrigator.”55  Full cession of the arid lands to
the states would accomplish these goals.  Warren concluded
his lengthy presentation, professing confidence and
optimism. 
Despite the effort Warren put into his cession bill,
however, it was doomed for reasons he could not have
anticipated.  As a Senate priority, the bill was far down
on the calendar.  But events beyond the control of Warren
proved more devastating than the slow pace of the Senate.  
In the spring of 1892, the so-called Johnson County
War, sometimes called the War on Powder River, exploded
into the headlines of the nation.  On April 5, over forty
vigilantes, or self-described “regulators,” crowded into a
train at Cheyenne and set out to track down, arrest, or
even assassinate as many names as possible from a Wyoming
Stock Growers’ Association hit-list of supposed rustlers. 
Two names from the list had been eliminated before the
tables turned on the vigilantes.  The sheriff and citizens
of Johnson County confronted the hired guns.  The governor
of Wyoming, Amos Barber, with assistance from Senators
Carey and Warren, appealed to the federal government for
army intervention to calm the situation.  The violence
quickly subsided, only to be replaced by months of
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courtroom controversy.  The Johnson County War was a
classic example of class conflict -- large owners with
means versus small ranchers with limited power -- brought
to the point of violence, and it would become a major
political issue in the fall 1892 election.  Although
Senator Carey was far more connected to the vigilante
“invasion,” it was Warren--as the junior senator facing
reelection--who bore the brunt of the backlash.  
In addition to rousing the president at night to
enlist the aid of cavalry troops, Warren watched the affair
unfold with great concern.  The political implications were
disastrous.  At first, he hoped that the controversy would
be short-lived.  Writing to Cheyenne journalist I. S.
Bartlett, Warren tried to remain optimistic; “the cattle
controversy disturbs me exceedingly and we are just now
obtaining a very unenviable notoriety,” he said, “but as
everything has its day and finally comes to an end, I
suppose we will get through it.”56
Writing to his personal secretary, Warren was more
frank about his concern.  “The cattle war is in every
newspaper in the east,” he lamented, adding that he was
“bothered to death over it.”  But more than the personal
distraction from being associated with such backward
frontier violence, he feared the political consequences. 
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“Such things always hurt the party in power, and almost
surely the Republican party, whether in power or not, as
the Democrats have a way of catching all of the excitable
and disgruntled ones.”57  In this, Warren was prescient.  
As the days passed, the Johnson County affair consumed
all discussion of Wyoming.  Warren’s quiet and steady
efforts to win support for his cession bill seemed passe in
the face of such sensational news from the “wild west.”  To
his friend and rising jurist Willis Van Devanter, Warren
confided, “It seems to me a very unfortunate affair all
around. . . . As misfortunes never come singly, I assume
the present season is to be a red-hot, mean one all
around.”  Not only did Warren worry about his own political
future, he also sincerely regretted the sullying of
Wyoming’s reputation.  The state was barely two years old,
obviously not off to a good start as a member of the Union. 
“I am mortified and saddened beyond expression,” he wrote,
“that our young state must suffer such reverses at a time
when she can so illy [sic] endure them.”58
Although Warren frequently said that he served at the
pleasure of the people of Wyoming, and that lacking their
confidence he would be happy to return to Cheyenne to carry
on his private businesses, he knew well the political
consequences of the Johnson County fiasco.59  Anticipating
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the coming season of vicious campaigning, he held that it
was “a dirty piece of business for either party to
undertake to pander to the lower element of society and to
court with thieves and vagabonds for the sake of temporary
party supremacy.”  Worst of all, he believed, “Wyoming can
never grow and thrive under that kind of depraved
politics.”60
Responding to a message of support in the wake of the
Johnson County situation, Warren was appreciative but
replied with a startling prediction of his own political
fate.  “I venture to say . . . that should some black
hearted political corruptionist come along and say that
Warren had some slight acquaintance with, or had sometime
been a friend of a cattle baron, or should say that the
arid land bill was for the purpose of killing off all small
settlers and poor people, either charge would be believed
and I would be ‘in the soup’ again.”61 
The Johnson County War not only undermined Warren’s
work on land cession; it cost him his seat in Congress. 
When Warren and Carey were sworn in as United States
senators on December 1, 1890, they drew numbers, according
to the rules of the Senate, to determine the staggering of
terms.  By the luck of the draw, Warren pulled the short
term number; he would face reelection in two years.62  As a
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result, Warren had to face the Wyoming legislature at the
height of the Johnson County War trial and under a growing
Populist assault.  Warren was not reelected, and the
divided Wyoming legislature could not settle on a
replacement; for a period, the newborn state of Wyoming
could only count one senator in Washington.  Although
Warren endured numerous political attacks in the wake of
the Johnson County War, such vindictiveness would have been
hurled at anyone; had Carey drawn the low number that
December day, he would have faced the same situation. 
(Indeed, Carey’s days in Congress were numbered as well; he
would be turned out mid-decade, largely for his unpopular
stance on the silver issue.)  Warren’s worst fears came
true; his name, and the cession of arid lands movement,
became associated with the war on the Powder River.  
Warren had been warned that the land cession issue
could be costly.  But he brushed it off in a breathless
run-on sentence: “I am pretty tired of politics I can tell
you and if my good endeavors may be enlisted by the enemy
as to ‘turn me down’ there will doubtless be somebody rise
in my place to carry on the work and I will probably feel
that my greatest success personally is my political
misfortune.”  He went on to say that the present land laws
were “a misfit for our country entirely” and needed reform
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by someone.63
Even so, as the spring wore on and the trouble did not
abate, Warren grew more worried, especially as his arid
lands bill became tarnished by the civil strife.  “It would
be laughable to me,” he said, “if not so ridiculous, the
manner in which a few papers first lied about and
misrepresented the provisions of the bill, and then
manufactured bugaboos about the danger.”  Ever more
frustrated that his work was being sacrificed to scandal,
Warren lamented, “I wish every man that has a theory about
the arid lands would give me the benefit of his work in
drawing a bill complete from A. to Z. And then he would
know more what he was talking about.”64  By the summer he
was very concerned about the political consequences of the
troubled spring.  “This cattle business ought not to enter
into the campaign at all as between Republicans and
Democrats,” he said.  He then turned on his heel and
politicized the issue himself: “Of course, the attacking
party of cattle men taken altogether were 3/4 Democrats. 
The herds they represent and the money interest in them is
2/3 or 3/4 Democrats.”65
With Warren out of office on March 4, 1893, and his
reputation tainted, the already uphill battle for arid land
cession ground to a halt.  Warren’s rival, Joseph Maull
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Carey, would fill that vacuum with a reclamation bill of
his own.  Passed in 1894, the Carey Act stopped far short
of the unconditional cession that Warren believe so crucial
to the West.  The Carey Act was a case study in political
compromise.66  In essence, the Carey Act granted to the
arid states up to one million acres of public land each,
provided that the land be reclaimed by the state or sold in
lots of 160 acres to individual settlers.  A ten year time
limit attached to the bill underscored its experimental and
tentative nature.  In constructing the bill Carey carefully
avoided the criticisms of other arid land bills, including
Warren’s much bolder call for total cession of public
lands, to say nothing of the adjacent grazing lands.  As
such, it was adopted into law in 1894 with little fanfare
or national attention.  
The subsequent history of the Carey Act proved to be
disappointing, if not surprising.  Wyoming was the first
state to seek lands under the Carey Act, but the general
economic slump of the 1890s prevented most states from
investing heavily in complicated reclamation projects. 
William Ellsworth Smythe, editor of Irrigation Age and a
close correspondent of Francis Warren, was lukewarm about
the Carey Act, stating that it helped “neither one side nor
the other of the old controversy between those who favored
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and those who opposed the absolute control of the public
lands by the several states.”67  The Carey Act was an
attempted solution to an irrigation problem, but it stopped
short of a wholesale restructuring of the public land
policy.  Where Warren’s cession bill linked water, land,
forest and grazing districts as the sine qua non of ceding
public lands to the states, the Carey Act was essentially
just another patch on the quilt of land laws.  Indeed,
Carey specifically avoided the grazing district issue
altogether in order to placate the populist and anti-
monopoly voices that had cost Warren his seat in Congress. 
The sharp limitation on acreage available for settlement
seemed to ignore the lessons of the failed 1877 Desert Land
Act.  That this latest law was sometimes referred to as the
Carey Desert Land Act only added insult to injury.  Despite
the flaws of the Carey Act, elements of it remained in
force through the twentieth century.  It proved enormously
successful in Idaho, for example.  In the context of
examining Warren’s attempt to fashion for the first time a
coherent grazing policy, the Carey Act was partly
responsible for killing the movement for full land cession
in the West.
After spending a few years at home in Wyoming, tending
to business and mending political fences, Warren found
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favor again with the Wyoming political establishment and
was returned to Washington in 1895.  He was busier than
ever, and more fatigued, too.  Warren suffered a variety of
health problems, including an eye injury that temporarily
blinded him and caused him to miss many of the opening
ceremonies of Congress.68 
Even so, Warren soon returned to the business of
Wyoming and the West in the Senate.  He continued to have a
hand in irrigation legislation, sometimes forcefully.  For
example, Warren piggybacked Wyoming and much of the West
onto a river and harbor appropriation bill that originated
out of New England.  (Warren offered a last minute
amendment that set in motion a flurry of western additions
to the bill, effectively changing the measure’s original
meaning.)69  Any discussion of land cession was sharply
limited to the routine introductions of petitions and
memorials from the Wyoming legislature or small measures to
add lands to the Shoshone and Arapaho reservations.70  The
grand plans of full cession were, for the moment, a distant
memory.  For the time being, Warren resorted to piecemeal
legislation, the very thing he believed his sweeping
cession movement would have avoided.  In an angry letter to
the American Agriculturist, Warren justified his river and
harbor piggyback legislation with a critical assessment of
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the arid land situation.  “As to what Congress has failed
to do . . . there is much indeed.  The laws already passed
are fragmentary.”  With great emphasis, he went on: “Over
one-fourth of the United States is arid grazing land and
from past experience and present prospects must always
remain such.  There is not a law in our statutes which
recognizes its existence or provides for its management or
disposal.”71  Writing to Mead on the river and harbor bill,
he said, “Please think of it hard from now until next
December and tell me under what plan we can get in to this
river and harbor or some other appropriation bill.  My
motto is, we either want money for improvement or we want
the lands.”72
Frustrating Warren even more, the Populists upset the
balance in the Senate, prompting Warren to say, “it is a
bad season in Congress . . . The Republicans have less than
a majority, the Democrats ditto, the Populists holding the
balance of power when it comes to a vote upon any
question.”73  The Populist irritation threatened more than
miscellaneous patronage bills.  A presidential election
loomed on the horizon.  “We seem to be running wild with
the throttle wide open having no political power,” he
confided to his private attorneys.  “Excuse this tirade,”
he apologized, “but I think ‘Damn’ so often that I have to
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vent once in a while.”74  Moving into the election season,
Warren was further distracted from land policy by his need
to keep the Wyoming Republican machine together for the
autumn.75 Given all this, Warren was forced to drop cession
as a priority.  “I had thought it best,” he wrote to an
aptly named Mr. Wantland, “to wait a little myself about
pushing the cession of the arid lands because of the
prominent part I had taken in the Senate before.”76 
By 1897, however, Warren was edging closer to action
again.  In February he introduced several petitions from
the Wyoming legislature calling for the cession of the
public domain, but still no bill.77  On February 6, he
wrote to George Maxwell with some optimism for
reintroducing the 1892 bill.  Warren, still a little burned
from the experience, looked to the House of Representatives
“to take some interest and make some move in the matter.  I
find there is a rapidly growing interest there and I
believe the time will soon arrive.”78  But the time had not
yet arrived.  The West was still better represented in the
Senate than the House. News of the death of Elwood Mead’s
wife reached Warren days later.  Mead was Warren’s right-
hand man on irrigation and engineering matters, and the
chief architect of much of Warren’s legislation.  Now he
was left a widower with young children.79
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Later, though, Warren notified Mead of his most recent
measures to further the acquisition of public land.  Warren
introduced a variety of schemes, from land ceded based on
congressional representation, 60,000 acres for a Soldiers
Home, and 50,000 acres for a Montana institution for the
blind and deaf.  Warren would grab any opportunity to cede
lands to the states.80
On March 2, 1898, Warren introduced S. 4016 and S.
4017, irrigation and land cession bills, respectively. 
These bills were reworkings of the 1892 cession bill into
which Warren had put so much effort.  But it was too late
for any real hope of adoption.  By now Warren served on
many Senate committees and found his priorities scattered,
from the tariff issue to the looming war with Spain over
Cuba.  Too much had changed since the early decade.  Warren
had weathered the heavy storms of accusation from the
Johnson County War and had outlasted the Populist bubble. 
But because of the Carey Act and the numerous small scale
irrigation moves Warren had made in the interim, full
cession stood less of a chance in 1898 than it had in 1892. 
Irrigation had its own momentum apart from the
creation of a national grazing policy.  By the late 1890s,
as one historian put it, Warren was “torn between home rule
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and states’ rights on the one hand, and the glittering
prospect of federal construction of dams and canals on the
other.”81  Only a few days after reintroducing the cession
bill, Warren himself wrote as much to Mead, stating that
the “cession of lands [will] have to follow along a little
on the rear.”82 Moreover, the Wyoming economy -- already
wounded by the droughts and blizzards of the 1880s --
suffered still more in the nationwide depression of the
mid-1890s.  Western states such as Wyoming seemed less
enthusiastic about the prospect of administering their own
public lands, and though they were reluctant to admit it,
the federal treasury was a more stable and appealing source
to finance development.  The passing of the Carey Act stole
the thunder of those who called for full land cession.
Finally, cession failed because of internal western
divisions as much as from any outside opposition. States
such as Wyoming or Montana relied on grazing far more than
more irrigable states such as California or Oregon.  Warren
struggled unsuccessfully to forge a coalition behind his
cession plans.  In Congress, the West could not maintain a
united front.83
Land cession that included a grazing policy saw its
best chance for success, and it was a small one at that, in
the early 1890s.  Warren’s solution to the West’s land
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problems began dying in the bad press of the Johnson County
War.  By its final gasp in 1898, any chance of progress
toward a national grazing policy would have to come from
elsewhere.  In the late 1890s, the first steps toward a
regulated grazing policy were being taken in the national
forests, promoted not so much by Western politicians but by
technocrats with a new, rational view of land use.  And so
we turn to Frederick Coville’s experiment with grazing
districts in the national forest system, and the way Warren
had to respond to a grazing solution apart from full land
cession.  Warren’s role as a driver of the grazing issue
was beginning to change.
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FREDERICK V. COVILLE 
AND THE GENESIS OF MANAGED GRAZING
Warren’s movement to cede federal lands to the states
had stalled, if not failed completely.  But the need for
more grazing land remained.  Grazing in the national
forests drew the attention of stock owners, politicians,
and a new interest emerging on the scene, conservationists. 
Forests were especially crucial to Wyoming cattle graziers. 
By the time the first grazing fees were instituted in the
mid-1900s, the state could claim upward of eight million
acres of forest land, and that figure did not include
Yellowstone National Park.1  Francis Warren and other
western politicians were caught in a balancing act between
the realities of an overgrazed range in need of repair and
the protests of stock owners accustomed to a laissez-faire
system of public land policy.  At the turn of a new
century, a fee-based grazing system took shape in the
national forests that would become the template for decades
of regulation.
Although often overshadowed in popular memory by
Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot, it was a botanist
with the Department of Agriculture who planted the seeds of
the grazing policy that would be implemented.  Frederick
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Coville first made a name for himself with an 1897 study of
grazing in the Cascade Mountain Forest Reserve in Oregon,
“probably the first scientific range investigation in
America.”2  Coville was a pragmatic conservationist.  He
did not advocate the exclusion of livestock or the walled
off preservation of public lands.  Instead, he promoted a
rational use of natural resources, administered by the
government and regulated in the interest of preserving the
resource for all.  Despite this contribution, Coville is
often a mere footnote in the story of American forests.3 
This chapter seeks to remedy that oversight by examining
the history of an idea and the man who nurtured it. 
Coville’s story is central to Warren’s search for a grazing
policy because forest grazing set the tone of the debate. 
Where Warren was once a primary actor in the cession
debate, with forest grazing he was forced into a reactive
role.  No longer driving the issue, Warren had to manage it
in response to Coville’s reforms.
The establishment of national forest reserves in the
1890s marked a significant shift in the federal
government’s approach to the public domain.  This is not to
say that an ethic of conservation did not exist prior to
the 1890s, however; Yellowstone National Park had been
created in 1872, for example.  But the idea of maintaining
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permanent federal control over forests was taking hold. 
The Forest Reserves were created by the Forest Reserve
Act of 1891, then called the General Land Law Revision Act
or, more often, simply the Creative Act.  The law granted
power to the president to set aside, or reserve, forested
lands from the public domain.  Historian Harold K. Steen
has shown that Section 24 of the act -- the section which
granted essentially unchecked presidential power to create
forest reserves -- was an “eleventh hour” measure and that
to a great extent “Congress passed this most important bill
without being aware of its content.”  Even so, President
Harrison quickly seized the moment and within two years set
aside over thirteen million acres as forest reserves,
beginning with Yellowstone.  President Cleveland added
another five million acres to the reserves and then paused
until Congress had provided the means and method of
actually protecting the reserves.  The pause lasted until
the final days of Cleveland’s term, when he surprised
everyone with the so-called Washington’s Birthday Reserves
-- an additional twenty-one million acres set aside on
February 22, 1897.  Cleveland’s last act angered many in
Congress; the new reserves encompassed a great deal of
farmland and even some existing cities and towns.  Some in
Congress wanted to repeal the declaration altogether, but a
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compromise was reached that granted the president the
authority to alter reserve boundaries appropriately.  When
President McKinley took office, Congress finally passed
legislation to protect and administer the forest reserves.4 
Biographical information on Coville is limited. 
Coville was born in 1867 in Preston, New York.  He attended
Cornell University and graduated with a degree in botany in
1887.  Upon graduation he joined several expeditions to
conduct fieldwork, from a geological survey in Arkansas in
1888 to further research in the Death Valley in 1891.  In
1899 he joined railroad magnate E. H. Harriman’s expedition
to explore the flora and fauna of Alaska.  Coville was most
associated with the United States Department of
Agriculture, where he served as chief botanist from 1893 to
his death in 1937.  Of particular note was Coville’s
service in directing the National Herbarium, a part of the
Smithsonian Institution transferred to the USDA in 1868 and
then back to the Smithsonian in 1896.  In addition to his
administrative duties, Coville maintained a lively pursuit
of personal research; he shared credit with another
scientist in domesticating the wild blueberry, for example.
The best summary of Coville’s contributions came from
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Gifford Pinchot.  When Coville died in 1937, Pinchot
eulogized Coville in words worth noting: “[He] laid down
the essentials of a sound and far-sighted grazing policy.”
Historian Samuel P. Hays echoed this sentiment when he
concluded that Coville “deserves special notice . . . in
formulating the scientific basis for a range conservation
policy.”  And yet no historian, not even Hays, explored
Coville’s life and career at length.5
As early as 1897, Coville was convinced of the
importance of the public forest lands and the need to
administer grazing rationally and systematically.  He
followed a two-front strategy, arguing both within the
government and in a series of articles and opinion pieces
in a variety of popular periodicals.  This would be
Coville’s pattern of persuasion over the next few years,
and it proved to be effective.
In April 1897 Coville submitted a short editorial to
Outlook, seeking to disarm the fear that the national
forests would be imposed on the West without regard to
local circumstances.  “A new impulse has been given to the
old movement for an administration of our public forest
lands,” he began.  “Heretofore the plea for a forest
administration law has come chiefly from students of
forestry matters,” he continued, adding that now the demand
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was coming “from the western people themselves and in no
uncertain terms.”  Coville called attention to Senator
Richard F. Pettigrew of South Dakota, “whose people were
seriously affected by the Black Hills [Forest] Reserve.” 
Pettigrew had introduced an amendment to the Sundry Civil
Bill to open the forest reserves to prospecting and mining,
to survey and segregate viable agricultural land, and to
regulate the sale of timber for local use.  Coville
supported Pettigrew’s move as “admirable from every
standpoint” and said that it “ought to pass without
opposition.”  From the beginning, then, Coville viewed the
forest reserves as valuable natural resources that could
and should be used by westerners, albeit with a rational
plan to manage them.6 
In 1898, Coville secured a position as an editor of
The Forester, the official publication of the American
Forestry Association.  This was in addition to his regular
government job.  The mission of the AFA and The Forester
included all aspects of forestry, from the scientific to
the political.  As editor, Coville cultivated respectful
relationships with western ranchers and stock owners.  He
often solicited and published the opinions of those who
would be affected the most by any reforms to grazing
policy.  Writing to one stock owner, Coville recalled,
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“When I was at your ranch [last summer] I remember that you
expressed the opinion that the rules and regulations
relating to the forest reserves were entirely inadequate to
satisfy the demands of western communities.”  Coville went
on to ask for a short article “giving your views on the
inadequacy of these rules.  Such an article would be widely
read among people interested in our forest policy.” 
Coville sweetened the proposal by noting that this
particular rancher’s suggestion to name P. monticola with
the common moniker “Silver Pine” was soon to be adopted by
the Department of Agriculture and would in all likelihood
“come into general use.”  As a botanist, Coville’s delight
seemed sincere.7
Even at this early stage, however, Coville received
words of concern from graziers.  One rancher inquired about
the changing policies of the General Land Office.  Coville
replied that the policy was “apparently . . . in the
direction of the recommendations in my sheep report which
possibly you may not have read.”  Coville enclosed a copy
of his report, just in case, lectured the rancher that “so
far as forest protection is concerned [the goal] was to
secure fuller control of the sheepmen” with the “hope of
placing responsibility [for fires and overgrazing] where it
belongs.”8
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Regaining focus on the goal for a grazing policy in
the forest reserves, Coville again proffered in the public
sphere an article outlining the need for reform.  In the
early summer of 1898, he wrote an article on public grazing
lands for The Forum.  In his cover letter, Coville made the
case for his piece.  “There are fully half a dozen bills
pending in the House and Senate,” he said, each “referring
in one way or another to our grazing lands and none of
these bills, which fortunately appear to be making little
progress, is, in my opinion, aimed in the right direction,
so I trust that this paper, if accepted by The Forum and
published, may do something toward calling attention toward
a wise method of dealing with our public grazing lands.” 
The periodical accepted the submission and published “Our
Public Grazing Lands” in the September 1898 issue.  The
appearance of Coville’s article was a milestone in the path
toward a national grazing policy.  It was a short article
of only about ten pages, but any understanding of grazing
policy into the twentieth century demands a close
inspection of Coville’s argument.  This article was the
ideological alarm bell that those seeking to reform grazing
policy would follow for decades.9 
Coville opened with a sensational quote from a
September 12, 1894 Rocky Mountain News account of a
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conflict between cattle and sheep ranchers that ended in a
murderous stampede of nearly 4,000 sheep.  “When the posse
reached the foot of the cliffs it came upon the carcasses.
. . . The sight was most sickening, as the frightful fall
had burst them open, and bloody entrails, brains, and
shattered bones were scattered in every direction.” 
Coville’s opening narrative choice was deliberate.  But
Coville was not penning a cheap dime novel western.  On the
surface such a conflict “appears to be only another
illustration of the Western man’s reputed disregard for law
and the constituted authorities.”  Coville spared no one:
“In reality, it is the inevitable result of a lack of law,
for which the Eastern man is fully as responsible as the
Western.  Incidents such as the one above described happen
on the public lands, and are the outcome of the present
public-land laws, which Congress has made and which
Congress alone can unmake.”10
Coville’s article quickly moved from the sensational
to the statistical, citing the growth of the livestock
industry in the West after the Civil War and the
overgrazing that followed.  Using Wyoming as a primary
example, Coville presented a table showing the changing
numbers and value of cattle and sheep.  Pointing to 1886 as
the peak of the cattle industry, he then charted the
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decline of cattle and ascent of sheep, which could graze on
a wider variety of ranges; curiously, Coville neglected any
mention of the brutal winters of that decade.  He
emphasized the lack of policy as the root of the grazing
problem. “These statistics,” he concluded, “merely show in
mathematical form the facts already so well known,” namely
that the rangelands of the West were overgrazed and in
trouble.11
Coville saw the origin of the problem in the land laws
of the United States.  Social conflicts in the West were
directly related to the economic situation, which in turn
was defined by land policy.  In one striking paragraph,
Coville  states: “I do not wish, for the mere purposes of
supporting an argument, to draw too black a picture of the
decadence of Western grazing-lands; but I do wish to assert
as strongly as possible my belief, that if the laws
governing our arid lands remain unchanged, lawlessness will
continue, the destruction of private property and human
life will go on, the prosperity of communities will be
lessened, and one of the rich resources of the nation will
be wasted [emphasis as in original].” According to Coville, 
the current grazing practices of the West were
unsustainable and even a pathway to desolation.12
Having pronounced doomsday, however, Coville offered a
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surprisingly simple solution.  He called for fencing the
range.  (Simple, perhaps, but complications would arise
with questions of who got access to the fenced range land.) 
Fencing would allow grasslands to rebound in just a few
seasons.  Fencing was of course nothing new, but it had not
been applied systematically with an aim toward restoration
of the grass.  More often, fencing was an illegal land-
grab, a way of making public land effectively private,
irrespective of the law.  But Coville’s fencing plan was
not centered around private property.  “The conclusion
might be hastily drawn that the proper remedy for present
difficulties would be to transfer the public grazing-lands
from Governmental to private ownership,” he said.  “To this
course, however, there are two objections -- a moral and an
economic one.”13  
Coville’s moral objection to privatizing the grazing
lands rested in the inadequate size of homesteads offered
under present land laws.  The 160 acre limit was
inappropriate to the land needs of the arid West.  Even if
the land grant size were altered, Coville saw an
unstoppable slide toward monopolization.  “Enormous tracts
of land in the most thinly settled portions of the West
would inevitably come into the possession -- perpetual and
absolute -- of a few men.”  At the dawn of progressivism,
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there should be no room for monopoly.14
The economic objection to the disposal of public lands
was less clear.  Essentially, Coville argued against
privatization of the public lands because of a “lack of
knowledge of the real value of those lands.”  Some parts of
the West were better suited to irrigation and agriculture
than others, and it would be a mistake to sign those lands
away to grazing purposes without knowing more about them. 
Coville also addressed the proposal to cede the public
lands to the states, mentioning Warren’s moves in Wyoming
specifically as a grazing state in favor of land cession. 
Coville pointed to the failures of the cession movement in
Congress as evidence of “wide-spread distrust among the
people of the West of the State, as opposed to Federal
management of the public land.”  Finally, Coville dismissed
the pro-cession argument as unrealistic, saying that “it
seems extremely doubtful whether any effective action in
this direction will ever take place.”  Coville opposed
cession of the public lands to the states, but at the same
time knew that it was a dying cause.15
The best remedy for the grazing problem, Coville
suggested, was a plan to limit stock foraging.  He
continued to outline his proposal: “I am convinced that the
Grazing-land Problem will be solved more easily by a system
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of leasing than by any other plan.”  Leasing would promote
a direct interest in the land by the lessee, the next best
thing to land ownership while still remaining a part of a
larger directed system.  Coville did not presume to be the
originator of the idea of leasing.  Indeed, he pointed to
examples where leasing had been successful: the state of
Texas, which did not have to surrender its public lands
upon annexation, unlike the rest of the western states; the
Northern Pacific Railroad, which faced an overgrazing
problem on its land and solved it through a managed leasing
system; and even Australia, which instituted its own
version of managed grazing.16
Coville’s Forum article left room for the specifics of
a leasing plan to be worked out later.  The purpose of the
piece was to illustrate the need for reform and to spark a
discussion about the details.  But he did conclude with a
few points that he believed should be considered when
creating the system.  First, a “prior lease-right” should
be acknowledged, allowing the small rancher to graze close
to his ranch.  Second, homestead entry or irrigation needs
should take precedence over grazing needs; if this were to
change over time, the grazier should be compensated for the
loss of land.  Third, reimbursement for fencing or other
improvements should be provided to the lessee if or when he
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surrenders the lease.  Finally, the government should
retain the right to revoke a lease at any time if evidence
of overgrazing or other mismanagement surfaced; this
ability to terminate leases, Coville argued, would guard
against land speculation.17 
Coville’s study and proposal caught the attention of
Gifford Pinchot, then head of the Division of Forestry
under the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the forerunner of
the U.S. Forest Service.  In a brief note “on some forest
problems” published in the USDA’s Yearbook for 1898,
Pinchot addressed the grazing problem in general and
Coville in particular.  “The question of grazing has
aroused more opposition to the forest reserves than perhaps
any other single issue,” Pinchot declared.  The specific
complaint of sheep grazers in the Cascade Range Forest
Reserve in Oregon symbolized the conflicted expectations of
the grazing industry.  On the one hand, sheep grazers were
fully dependent on the free use of the land.  It was in the
industry’s interest to have the lands regulated, especially
to prevent forest fires, which both reduced grazable land
and hurt wool prices when sheep rubbed against charred
vegetation, charcoal-staining the wool.  On the other hand,
sheep grazers needed the clearings created by fires;
“whether it was to the interest of the owner or not,”
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Pinchot wrote, “the sheep herders, carelessly or by
intention, have frequently set fire to the forest.”  This
ad hoc “management” of the forest was destructive to the
land and the industry.18
Pinchot also praised Coville for taking on the
challenge and said that his findings were to be trusted. 
Coville’s conclusion, as Pinchot summarized, was that while
some forests should be closed to grazing completely, “to
regulate pasturage, if it is rightly done, is usually far
better than to prohibit it altogether.”  Writing in 1898,
Pinchot knew that regulation of the forest reserves would
be a challenge, practically and politically.  “The meaning
of the word ‘forestry’ changes in the public mind from
decade to decade,” he said, although he was optimistic that
“forestry is gradually winning a better standing and a
larger place in the consideration of the people.”19
Ultimately, Coville’s proposition was an experiment. 
“The leasing system is not proposed as a permanent system,”
he wrote.  “But it promises to be a satisfactory temporary
expedient for protecting our grazing-lands until we
discover their real value and how they may be disposed of.” 
He then suggested a generation-long experiment with
leasing.  After thirty or so years the system could be
reevaluated to determine if leasing should continue or if
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in fact that lands should be disposed to the states or
privately.  It would, in fact, take about thirty years
before the United States settled on a comprehensive grazing
policy.20
Although Coville’s article was important in the realm
of public opinion, he knew that any development toward an
actual grazing policy would come from the political arena. 
He knew that his position in the Department of Agriculture
was limited in its ability to promote legislation.  But
Coville was astute and knew how to redirect political
momentum.  A letter marked “personal” reveals Coville’s
savvy.  He had recently conversed with the Secretary of
Agriculture, James Wilson. Wilson agreed that a grazing law
was needed but also said that “it would be neither
altogether proper nor politic for the Department to push
legislation at its own instance.”  To be effective the
issue must originate with western congressmen or senators. 
Coville then recommended that his Forum article be
referenced or even copied in all constituent correspondence
with lawmakers.  Coville also extended a hand to John
Wesley Powell.   “I have been very much interested recently
in the question of the management and disposition of the
public grazing lands,” he wrote to the major.  “In looking
up the literature bearing on this subject I find that you
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have been over the same ground. . . . I would very much
like some time the opportunity of talking the matter over
with you.”  The botanist who regularly published articles
in National Geographic Magazine and responded to children’s
inquiries about class projects also knew how to work the
corridors of power.21
In the aftermath of the Forum article, Coville
continued soliciting advice and building intellectual
bridges to other thinkers on the subject of grazing and
public lands.  After a National Irrigation Congress meeting
in the summer of 1898, Coville noted with interest other
papers on the topic.  In sending away for papers presented
at the conference, he observed that grazing was “one of the
most important public questions in the west.”  His Forum
article even attracted the attention of George H. Maxwell,
“the leading Pacific coast advocate of improvement of our
irrigation system”; Coville was pleased to grant permission
to Maxwell to republish his article in the National
Advocate.22
By the next year, the idea of leased grazing began
moving out of the realm of the hypothetical and into the
reality of proposed legislation.  Together with George
Maxwell and Elwood Mead, Warren’s ally, Coville drafted a
bill to create a leasing system on the public lands.  Their
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proposal purposely avoided funding issues at the national
level.  Coville wanted to prevent the emergence of a
“cumbersome and inefficient” bureaucracy in Washington,
intending instead for authority to flow through the
Secretary of the Interior at first and then quickly pass
down to the individual states.  By the time Interior
Secretary E. A. Hitchcock transmitted a draft of the bill
to Congress in the spring of 1900, however, much of the
soft language had hardened.  The draft bill was simple --
“to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to make a
charge for grazing within the forest reserves” -- but
Hitchcock’s letter accompanying it was not friendly to the
grazing industry.  “There is no good reason why the live-
stock men should enjoy the resources of the reserves free
of charge,” he grumbled.  This language was unnecessary and
overshadowed the sense of rational use and planning
beneficial to all that Coville had emphasized.  Even
Pinchot’s language hardened, accusing grazers of being one
of the “chief enemies of the forest” in his Primer of
Forestry.23
Indeed, Coville admitted that his idea was proceeding
from drawing board to implementation more quickly than he
expected, perhaps too quickly.  “It seemed to me that the
evils incident to the present system would culminate in a
*Chapter 4 explores in detail the resistence to Coville’s
plan and regulated forest grazing.
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movement for legislation on the subject.  Such a movement
has come about even more rapidly than I anticipated.”  He
continued to seek advice and counsel, especially from those
in the West.24
Coville’s desire to slow down coincided with an
increase in concern and even protest.*  Some questioned the
objectivity of his earlier study of the Cascade range. 
Washington’s Senator George Turner, of the “Silver
Republican” fusion ticket and later a true Democrat,
entered into the Congressional Record testimony that cast
doubt on Coville’s visit to the Cascades.  One writer from
North Yakima alleged that “an expert is regarded here as a
sheep pimp.  They come here and are met by sheepmen [and]
entertained by sheepmen. . . . I attempted for nearly one
whole day to have an interview with Coville when he was
here, but the sheepmen kept him away from everybody not
favorable to that industry.  The whole thing is a perfect
farce and humbug from start to finish.”  Another man
confirmed this event, albeit with more diplomatic language. 
“Frederick V. Coville, an expert from the Department of
Agriculture, recently made a tour of investigation through
this country for the alleged purpose of learning facts
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concerning grazing conditions.  He was met at the Hotel
Yakima by a delegation of sheepmen, who gave him the
desired information.  The Times correspondent attempted to
interview him, but he was spirited away.”25
Beginning in January 1900 Coville himself began to
receive letters and clippings opposing his plan, often
forwarded to him by George Maxwell.  Coville’s measured
response to each criticism helped him both to refine his
argument and revealed the nature of the opposition.  A
typical exchange indicated the fear small stock holders had
of a regulated grazing system.  Coville assured his
correspondent, Paris Gibson from Montana, that a prior
lease right would be preserved for the small settler.  He
then concluded by referring Mr. Gibson to his article in
The Forum; Coville did not, oddly enough, enclose a copy. 
No one in Congress had as yet introduced the bill Coville,
Maxwell, and Mead had crafted, though there was another
bill floating through the Senate that came close.  Coville
told Gibson that the Foster Bill, Senate Bill No. 1947,
would with minor modification “benefit your whole country.” 
Coville even provided the necessary changes to make the
bill comply with the goals he set forth in his Forum
article, namely the preference for agricultural or
irrigation use over grazing and a prior-lease right for
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individual settlers.26      
But Paris Gibson was not satisfied with Coville’s
answer.  Gibson was concerned because at that moment his
region of Montana was undergoing a settlement boom. 
Closing off the lands seemed counterintuitive when more
people needed them.  Coville dismissed the Montana case as
“exceptional” and maintained that “under a proper lease law
there will be no retardation of settlement in your region.” 
Coville confessed to his ignorance on the specifics of
Montana land, but quickly moved to find common ground with
Gibson.  “I agree with you in being opposed to state
cession, and I believe that state leasing is dangerous.” 
But in the end, Coville acknowledged that he had “more
confidence than you, I think, in the administration of a
carefully drawn lease law by the Department of
Agriculture.”  Compared with the protests that would follow
in the coming years, the exchange between Coville and
Gibson was a gentlemanly conversation.27
Coville pressed on with the Foster Bill as his best
hope.  He defended it against accusations that its
introduction was secured by his department.  “So far as I
am aware,” he wrote, “the Secretary has not committed
himself to any particular leasing bill but has stated in
his annual report that a leasing system seems necessary if
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we are to maintain the productiveness of our public grazing
lands and provide a basis for their care and improvement.” 
Coville was either being modest or playing it safe
politically; the idea of leased grazing literally had his
name on it.28  But the Foster Bill would not survive and no
comprehensive grazing policy would be established yet.
The momentum for land reform subsided, though it never
disappeared entirely.  Pinchot kept it alive, for example,
in his ongoing discussion of the need to counteract forest
destruction, though here grazing was not presented as the
culprit that it once was.  In a report submitted to the
Smithsonian Institution’s Board of Regents in June of 1901,
Pinchot discussed forest destruction at length, focusing on
fire and water run-off as the primary threats to forests. 
Indeed, grazing was barely mentioned at all, a remarkable
turnabout from Pinchot’s earlier writing.  Likewise, the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, Binger Hermann,
also seemed less interested in grazing than other matters. 
“A national forest policy calls for a national irrigation
policy,” he wrote, notably leaving out grazing matters
aside from a few comments on the new regulations in the
Cascade Range.  Grazing was not unimportant, but
comprehensive reform was not the priority at the moment. 
Indeed, another report said, “Practically no changes have
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been made in the rules and regulations governing grazing in
the forest reserves.”  By 1903 this would begin to change. 
Interior Secretary Hitchcock again drafted a bill to
control grazing in forest reserves.  The emphasis in this
bill was on punishment -- through a fine of up to one
thousand dollars or as much as a year imprisonment -- of
those caught grazing in the reserves without a permit. 
Regulated grazing was becoming serious again.29
The pressure for a national grazing policy resurfaced
with a new vigor.  The Transfer Act of 1905 reorganized the
administration of the forest reserves from the Department
of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture.  In the
same year, the Bureau of Forestry became the U.S. Forest
Service. And Frederick Coville once again was a major voice
in the chorus calling for a managed grazing system.
On October 23, 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt
charged a Public Lands Commission “to report upon the
condition, operation, and effect of the present land laws,
and to recommend such changes as are needed” to promote the
greatest good for the greatest number of actual settlers,
as well as “to secure in permanence the fullest and most
effective use of the resources of the public lands.”  The
Commission worked from December 1903 through March 1904
primarily in the office of the Commissioner of the General
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Land Office.  It was an open meeting, with testimony from
Senators and Representatives, among others impacted by the
subject.  Members of the Commission, including Gifford
Pinchot and F. H. Newell traveled in January 1904 to attend
and participate in the meetings of the National Livestock
Association and the National Woolgrowers’ Association. 
After the industry meetings, Pinchot and Newell visited
many major western cities, from Sacramento, California to
Cheyenne, Wyoming to confer with state government officials
and interested citizens.30
To measure public opinion throughout the West in
general and within the stock industry in particular, the
Commission prepared an extensive questionnaire.  The
circular distributed to stock holders asked questions
regarding the use of the public lands.  It also sought the
opinions of stock holders on “the most practical method of
improving their condition and insuring their permanent
utility for grazing purposes.”  In the final report, the
findings of the survey were gathered, analyzed, and
presented by Albert Potter, a Forest Inspector with the
Forest Service, now under the Department of Agriculture. 
The information gathered, while not exhaustive, paints a
good portrait of the grazing industry  at the time.31
Over fourteen hundred surveys were returned from
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various western states.  By far the most responses came
from Wyoming (216), followed by Colorado (163), Montana
(158), New Mexico (130), Utah (121), Idaho (112),
California (104), Oregon (88), Arizona (74), Nebraska (55),
South Dakota (55), Nevada (35), North Dakota (30), Kansas
(26), and Oklahoma Territory (10).  The proportion of
population and relative size of the livestock industry
within each state accounts for some of these figures, but
it is striking that one of the least populated states in
the country, Wyoming, stood out as the most vocal.32
Other interesting revelations from the survey
followed.  In order of importance, perceived causes of an
increase in pasturing capacity, or carrying capacity, were
attributed to fencing, irrigation, increased rainfall,
securing control of adjacent pastures, and even forest
reserve regulations.  Perceived causes of a decrease in
carrying capacity, again in order of importance, included
overstocked ranges, drought, “excessive sheep grazing,”
poor handling of stock by labor, premature grazing, and
finally settlement.  Suggestions for improvement on the
public range included, in order of priority, exclusive use
of individual pastures, limiting the grazing season,
increased irrigation, reseeding depleted ranges, increasing
the size of homesteads from 160 to 640 acres, and finally,
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selling the grazing lands outright to the stock holder. 
Again, these findings were neither exhaustive nor
comprehensive, as the survey relied on those willing to
participate and only addressed active stock holders.  But
the results do offer a glimpse into the mind of the stock
holder at the beginning of the century.  The conclusion
that “the large majority of stockmen consider the present
condition unsatisfactory, and desire the enactment of some
form of legislation which will place the ranges under
better control and encourage their improvement” seemed a
sound reflection of the times.33    
The magnitude of the public lands of the United
States, at the time encompassing one-third of the country,
presented an enormous challenge to the Commission.  From
the outset, the Commission knew it could not please
everyone in every place.  Accordingly, it sought the “broad
middle ground” between two extremes -- those who insisted
on no alterations to the public lands laws whatsoever, and
those who called for a complete repeal.  From any
perspective, Roosevelt’s Commission was treading in
politically dangerous waters.34
Even so, the Commission took as a starting point the
consensus that the present land laws were antiquated with
regard to the remaining public lands.  “Most of these laws
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. . . were framed to suit the lands of the humid region.” 
In order of priority, the Commission listed the forest
lands first, as they were the most valuable remaining in
the public domain.  Next it addressed the repeal of the
Timber and Stone act of 1878.  Finally, the Commission
approached the desert-land law, but was “not at present
prepared to suggest radical changes” to it.  In this first,
partial report the Commission recommended little in the way
of grazing policy, other than to suggest a survey of the
forest lands to distinguish land better suited to
agricultural and irrigation purposes from mere grazing
use.35
By the submission of the second partial report in
February 1905, the Commission addressed the issue of
grazing in greater depth.  It opposed to the immediate
application of any “rigid system” to all grazing lands. 
Instead, the Commission recommended two “flexible”
measures.  First, it recommended that authority to create
grazing districts should be given to the president. 
Second, the secretary of agriculture should be given
authority to classify and appraise the lands set aside by
presidential proclamation.  The Department of Agriculture
should then be authorized to appoint officers to administer
each grazing district and collect a “moderate fee” for
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grazing permits.  Even here, though, the old homestead
value of “bringing about the largest permanent occupation
of the country by actual settlers and home seekers”
prevailed.36
The second partial report offered a detailed
assessment of the grazing lands.  The majority of the
public lands in the West, it argued, were unsuitable for
agriculture.  These lands were estimated to be 300,000,000
acres, or fully one-fifth of the United States.  All agreed
that the chief value for most of this land lay in grazing. 
But the Commission addressed the problem of whether grazing 
was positive for the country’s development or negative and
the cause of abuse.  The conclusions echoed Coville’s
argument.  “At present the vacant public lands are
theoretically open commons, free to all citizens; but as a
matter of fact a large proportion have been parceled out by
more or less definite compacts or agreements among the
various interests.”  Worse yet, those agreements were
continually violated.  Grazing interests were in frequent
collision because of incursions upon each other’s domain” 
-- domain, one should not forget, that was supposed to be
public.  Social conflict erupted from this collision;
“violence and homicide frequently follow, after which new
adjustments are made and matters quiet down for a time.” 
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The lawlessness of the public domain made for a precarious
living; “an agreement made today may be broken tomorrow by
changing conditions of shifting interests.”  Environmental
damage -- and thus economic ruin -- paralleled social
conflict, though perhaps over a longer period of time. 
Overgrazing was ruining millions of acres.  Like Coville,
the Commission’s findings offered hope.  Careful management
could spur environmental recovery.  But after decades of
abuse, there was little time to spare: “Prompt and
effective action must be taken, however, if the value of
very much of the remaining public domain is not to be
totally lost.”37
Finally, the Report spoke to the economic
stratification that the current land policy had created in
the West.  In recognizing class divisions and inequitable
distribution of wealth, the Commission challenged the
American myth of a classless society and condemned the
Social Darwinism that some used to justify their power. 
“There exists and is spreading in the West a tenant or
hired-labor system,” it claimed.  Such statements were
politically risky, as future administrations would
appreciate when accused of socialism or even communism as
they pursued their grazing policies.38
The Report of the Public Lands Commission was the
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culmination of Coville’s long struggle to apply a rational
and comprehensive system of managed grazing to the public
lands.  Coville himself was a major contributor to the
Commission, as seen in his extensive article in the
appendix, “A Report on Systems of Leasing Large Areas of
Grazing Land, Together with an Outline of a Proposed System
for the Regulation of Grazing on the Public Lands of the
United States.”  Coville’s task in this article was to
explore how a new system of range management might increase
the carrying capacity of the public grazing lands.  To
accomplish this, Coville examined in greater depth the
examples he had written about before, namely the grazing
system in Texas and on Northern Pacific Railway lands in
Washington state, as well as an additional discussion of a
smaller-scale grazing plan in Wyoming.  Coville focused on
the Texas grazing experience because “it was in Texas that
a method was first worked out by which to break away from
the free-range system.”39
Coville’s Commission article was far more exhaustive
and thoroughly researched than his previous editorials, but
it generally followed the same line of thought.  Over half
of the article examined the development of a grazing system
in Texas.  Coville briefly traced the history of early
Anglo agricultural settlement in Texas, beginning with The
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Austin family in the 1820s.  In the original plan for land
distribution, Stephen F. Austin proposed to the Mexican
government homestead allotments of 640 acres, plus 320
acres for a wife, 160 acres for each child, and 80 acres
for each slave held.  The Mexican government, still reeling
and reorganizing from its recent independence from Spain,
was reluctant to follow Austin’s proposal.  Even so, under
the Mexican land system, the Anglo colonists fared well. 
The Mexican system was based on a unit of measurement known
as a vara, or about thirty-three and a third inches; a
labor was a square of land measuring 1,000 varas on a side,
or about 177 acres; 5,000 varas constituted a league; one
square league was a sitio, or about 4,428 acres.  To add to
the confusion, a square league was often still called a
league, so that “league” could refer to two different
increments.  The net result, however, was that most of
Austin’s colonists took a labor of land for farming and an
additional league of land for stock raising.  In total,
Texas colonists “instead of receiving the 640 acres
originally promised by Austin received about 4,600 acres.” 
As Texas entered its own independence movement, the
American system of land surveying replaced the Mexican
approach.  By 1836, this was a step backward for Texan
homesteaders; volunteers in the Texas army were granted 640
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acres.  Coville’s diversion into the intricacies of the
Mexican land system was not a mere exercise; it illustrated
the point that the public lands were being distributed in
bigger and more practical units than in the United States. 
Having a larger land unit from the beginning avoided many
of the problems that plagued the U.S. system in the late
nineteenth century, or so Coville claimed.  His decision to
hold up the Mexican land system was naive at best or
duplicitous at worst.  Mexico was wracked by conflict
between small landholders and massive estate powers. 
Texas, too, suffered from monopolistic land ownership at
the expense of the individual.  But Coville was not an
objective historian.  He was an advocate who selectively
used evidence to further his case.40
Coville examined other aspects of the Texas public
land system in detail.  Generous provisions existed for the
funding of county schools, universities, and asylums from
the leasing public lands.  These precedents were set during
the sovereign period of the Republic of Texas and persisted
when it was annexed by the United States.  Subsequent lease
laws in 1883 and 1887 refined the Texas system into a model
that Coville believed greatly promoted the common good for
both the people and the environment of the state.  At the
conclusion of his examination, Coville listed fourteen
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benefits of the Texas grazing system.  It would be tedious
to list all here, but a few stand out.  First,  the “closed
range” of a grazing system, as opposed to an open range
free-for-all, encouraged responsible grazing on the part of
the stock holder; leased lands were akin to owned lands,
fostering a personal stake in their well being.  It
followed that deliberate overgrazing was discouraged. 
Stock theft and violent social conflict declined as well;
because of the well-defined and clear presence of the rule
of law, Coville maintained that “the use of fear, threat,
and open violence as a means of controlling portions of
public land for range purposes has almost disappeared in
Texas.”  Because of more efficient grazing, carrying
capacity increased range productivity.  Revenue from leased
lands benefited the public at large through education and
health funding.  Finally, “one of the most notable results
of the Texas lease law was its stimulation of settlement.” 
Taken together, these apparent benefits of the Texas system
fit nicely with the charge to the Commission to promote
both productive use of the land and to increase
settlement.41
From the experience of the Northen Pacific Railroad
Company Coville also offered a case study in grazing done
correctly.  The railroad acquired large areas of public
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land in Washington state commonly referred to as “scab
lands,” or lands so rough that plowing was not possible. 
Like much of the arid West, the railroad’s land was
valuable only for grazing.  After years of grazing without
restriction or fee, the land had become so abused that the
company faced losing its value altogether.  As a remedy the
railroad instituted a leasing system.  At first “coercive
measures” were used, as stock holders had been so
accustomed to grazing freely on the land that they balked
at suddenly facing a fee.  With the aid of state law to
enforce trespass and the benefit of time, grazers finally
changed their ways and acquiesced to the railroad’s fee
system.  Coville noted that the railroad’s goal was not a
permanent leasing system or anything so grand as a new land
law; rather, it dealt pragmatically with an environment in
decline.  Coville concluded that the Northen Pacific
Railroad Company’s grazing experiment was a small-scale
success in reversing the problems of overgrazing and even
easing the tensions between sheep and cattle interests.42
A final example that Coville enlisted in his cause was
that of the Wyoming system of grazing lands.  By the turn
of the century, five-sixths of Wyoming’s 62 million acres
were federal public land.  Only about 4 million acres was
controlled by the state government, so the example was
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limited in scale.  The administration of the state lands
rested in a board comprised of the governor, the secretary
of state, the state treasurer, and the state school
superintendent.  The state instituted a leasing system with
minimal costs to the lessee; one dollar for the application
fee and grazing fees of mere pennies per acre.  Coville
likened the Wyoming state grazing system to that of Texas
in its success, but of course acknowledged that “these
advantages have not, however, been so sweeping in Wyoming,
from the fact that only a small part of the lands in
Wyoming are at the disposal of the state.”  In reality the
Wyoming state lands were dwarfed by the size of the federal
public domain.  But for Coville’s purposes the Wyoming case
indicated the potential for the administration of a grazing
system that would be accepted by stock holders and
beneficial to the land.43
Coville concluded his contribution to the Report of
the Public Lands with an outline of a proposed grazing
system for the United States.  Coville stressed that the
administrator of the proposed system must be “a man of
unquestioned integrity” who was intimately familiar with
the problems and environment of the West.  He then listed
other requirements, all of which Coville himself matched.
Though there is no direct evidence that Coville ever sought
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the job, the thought must have crossed his mind. 
As the culmination of so much work, and as the
blueprint for grazing policy for years to come, the details
of Coville’s proposed plan should be noted. First and
foremost, any grazing on public lands henceforth required a
permit; this effectively closed the range.  The grazing
permit system, naturally, would only apply to those lands
declared by presidential authority to be grazing districts,
and prior to that the plan required a thorough survey to
identify and segregate irrigable agricultural lands from
the grazing system.  Coville called for grazing permits to
be issued to individuals, thus ensuring exclusive pasturing
rights; he recognized, however, that there may be a need
for “community pasture.”  Grazing permits were to be finite
and subject to review, termination, or reclassification. 
Coville also inserted a “prior lease” right into his plan,
ensuring that “a bona fide settler [should] have the
preference to a grazing permit for lands within one mile”
of the homestead.  Likewise, preference would be given to a
homestead for grazing lands adjacent to the homestead.  As
to the cost and funding of the system, Coville suggested
annual payments in advance for permits; the amount for each
fee would be determined by appraisal, though Coville
desired that “the payment be not less than one-half cent
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nor more than five cents per annum, or, when the permit is
granted on a per capita basis, not less than five cents per
head per season for small stock or 25 cents for large
stock.”  The revenues generated by grazing permits would
fund the administration of the system, and aid road
construction and maintenance within the districts.  When
grazing fees were established in 1906, they ranged from
twenty to thirty-five cents per head of cattle in the
summer season, and from thirty-five to fifty cents per head
for year-round grazing.44
In 1906 the recommendations found in the Report of the
Public Lands Commission were implemented, bringing a new
public land policy to the West.  Frederick V. Coville was
central to the history of this idea.  As the idea became
reality, however, the subject of managed grazing was out of
his hands and into the realm of politicians and interests. 
Some stock owners welcomed the new plan.  Others protested
it.  Still others vacillated like Hamlet, calling for a
grazing policy managed by the government on one hand and
crying “Let us alone!” on the other.  Francis Warren was
caught in the middle of this debate.  This chapter charted
the history of an idea, from a botanist’s observations in
the Cascade Mountains to recommendations for a sweeping new
land policy.  The next chapter examines in detail the
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ambivalent response to that idea and how Warren and grazing
interests wrestled with it in the reality of the West.
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CHAPTER 4
AFTER CESSION, THE NEXT BEST THING?:
WARREN AND THE POLITICS OF MANAGED FOREST GRAZING, 
1899-1906
With the collapse of the land cession movement in the
late 1890s, those in search of a solution to the West’s
grazing problems were forced to look elsewhere.  Although
hope for total cession of the arid lands to the states
lingered on and occasionally surfaced in perfunctory bills,
the political reality of the perceived western land grab
was that cession was a lost cause.  A new movement was
taking shape, however, to promote the leasing of grazing
lands in the public forests.  The previous chapter
addressed the intellectual development of leased grazing
through the story of the leading technocrat behind it. 
This chapter examines the tense political situation in
which Coville’s idea emerged.1  While technocrats such as
Coville struggled to implement a grazing policy, a variety
of competing interests rose to challenge any move toward
land use reform.  These interests were hardly monolithic or
unified in their opposition; indeed, opposition to Forest
Service grazing policies split along lines that pitted
small owners against large operations, sheep grazers
against cattle ranchers, and a general resentment
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westerners had of “outsiders.”  As a senator from a western
state dependent on grazing the vast public domain, Francis
E. Warren had to negotiate both the protests against and
promotion of leased grazing.  
Positions were not static.  As William D. Rowley
suggests, the conservation/anticonservation method of
analysis “suggests a seething reaction in the West” when
“more thorough study [shows] favorable reception” from some
western grazing interests.  Although Francis Warren opposed
forest reserves when pressured, he also came to support
regulated grazing.  In this sense, historian G. Michael
McCarthy, writing in Hour of Trial, was correct in
identifying Warren as a “main figure in the
anticonservation coalition” at one point and then later as
a “conservationist” himself.  This chapter follows Warren’s
transformation, and even that of the livestock industry
itself.2  In the same way that Coville’s grazing system
defined future models, Warren’s experience with on-again,
off-again calls for regulation also anticipated the
political conflict that would mark future decades.  How did
Francis Warren and the disparate members of the grazing
industry respond to the growing movement to regulate the
public lands? 
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At an 1899 meeting of the newly formed National Live
Stock Association, industry members were treated to a
debate on the idea of grazing livestock in government
forest reserves.  The “debate” was noticeably lopsided. 
The speaker arguing against forest grazing spoke briefly
and in platitudes, while the proponent went on at length,
using up the allotted time with loud calls of “Go on!” from
the audience.  However stacked the deck may have been, the
arguments offered insight into the opinions of stock
holders at the turn of the century, opinions that policy
makers such as Warren were forced to acknowledge if not
accept.3
An opponent of forest grazing regulation, John Mackay,
represented the sheep industry and clearly felt outnumbered
by cattle interests.  The sheep industry, especially in
Wyoming, had grown in prominence in the late 1880s.   The
slow rise of the sheep industry was quite different from
the boom-and-bust of the cattle business.  Sheep could
graze on lands that cattle could not reach, and sheep were
often better supervised by handlers and thus faced fewer
losses to predators or inclement weather.  Enmity between
the cowboy and sheepherder provided western storytellers
with endless plot devices.  Each needed the same public
land.  The sheep industry rose at the very time the cattle
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industry was declining; animosity between the two groups
was hardly surprising.  As historian George W. Rollins
concluded in his study of the struggle for control of
public land in Wyoming, “the failure of the Federal
government to provide a land policy which took cognizance
of the exigencies of [the cattleman and sheepman] was a
powerful contributing factor to the struggle waged by the
rival interests for control of lands.”4
In an attempt to win favor with the National Live
Stock Association, sheepman Mackay railed against
Washington bureaucracy and argued that to allow forest
grazing regulation would usher in an era of uninformed
“eastern” policy that was ignorant of life in the West.  He
claimed that forest reserves had been established in the
West with little consultation with those affected.
Furthermore, Mackay continued in a conspiritorial tone to
suggest that forest policy was controlled by a few active
members of the American Forestry Association.  Mackay
attacked the motives of those calling for regulated forest
grazing: “It seems as though they would like to establish a
feudal system in America . . . so that some idealist,
scientific expert or privileged person might view dame
nature in its primitive state.”  Moreover, Mackay cast the
debate as an us-against-them, westerner versus easterner
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issue. “Our eastern neighbors,” he said, “should not try to
rivet upon us something which is a great detriment and
injury to us.”5
This fear of a “feudal system” or “eastern control” in
the West was a common theme among those who opposed
conservation policies.  In his case study of Colorado as an
example of opposition to conservation, G. Michael McCarthy
identified this period as an “hour of trial” for the West. 
Would “insurgents” prevail in their adherence to maximum
land use, to be determined by local interests, or would
conservation forces win out in forcing scientific resource
management ostensibly to protect the West for all? 
Ultimately, as McCarthy demonstrated, the conservationists
won the argument largely because of the fragmentation of
western interests.6
At the 1899 meeting of the National Live Stock
Association, therefore, the argument presented in favor of
forest grazing was much better received than Mackay’s
arguments against it.  A. R. King refuted Mackay’s points
about the lack of representation in the federal government. 
He attacked sheep graziers for overgrazing and, especially,
preventing the regrowth of land damaged by forest fires. 
“If you want to establish a feudal system, turn over the
headwaters of the streams either to the sheep barons or the
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cattle kings of the country, and we will have a feudal
system, where every small man is the slave of the large
man.”  He finished his statement to great applause and,
bordering on the dramatic, the striking up of the
convention band.  Over the course of the meeting,
resolutions were introduced that were anti-sheep and even
called for the total exclusion of sheep from the forest
reserves.  By the end of the meeting, however, the
resolution actually adopted was mild: “Resolved, that all
live stock shall be allowed to graze upon government forest
reserves.”  In the end, the “official” stance of the
National Live Stock Association implied a degree of unity
among types of stock holders, but the record of the meeting
betrayed the truth.  This exchange among stock holders
illustrated the tension between opposing elements of the
industry at the turn of the century, and would signal more
conflict to come.7
Francis Warren had yet to become embroiled in such
contentious grazing controversy in 1899, although that soon
changed.  In the aftermath of his failed land cession
bills, he turned his attention to irrigation and general
patronage for the state of Wyoming.  Warren continued the
piecemeal approach of attachments to river and harbor
legislation. Frequently he faced opposition from western
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colleagues as well as eastern politicians.  Irrigation was
Warren’s main concern at the moment, though grazing matters
were intertwined with many projects; in one proposed
amendment, for example, Warren inserted a small grazing use
clause into a reservoir construction survey.  But as the
winter weather turned unusually harsh in Wyoming, Warren’s
river and harbor machinations also faced jeopardy. 
Warren’s cession failure was compounded by this latest
defeat.8
Worse, a stream of inquiries about forest grazing
began to trickle into Warren’s office.  Some questions
arrived regarding the Interior Department’s proposal to
expand the use of timber reserves in Yellowstone.  Warren
generally favored such a move and dismissed objections as
“raw head and bloody bones” stories.  He received word from
his ranch manager that the harsh winter had been
devastating to his own stock, so an expansion of grazing
opportunity would be potentially beneficial to Warren’s own
financial interests.  Expansion of the Medicine Bow forest
reserve was also in the works, an issue in which Warren
took a keen interest.  At that point the Medicine Bow
forest encompassed parts of Wyoming and Colorado.  Warren
worked to place a Wyoming man to oversee the reserve,
though it was an uphill battle; he was “pressing hard for
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Wyoming, although according to the records we have a little
more than our share already.”  Another planned reserve near
the headwaters of the Green River in the western part of
the state offered still more opportunities for Wyoming
patronage in the system.9
In January 1899, Francis Warren dutifully presented a
memorial from the Wyoming legislature that was an anxiety-
filled response to the idea of forest reserve grazing
regulation.  The memorial prayed for any regulation “to
allow the unrestricted grazing of live stock on such
reservations . . . in the future as in the past.”  Wyoming
offered the Teton Forest Range as a reserve that could be
off-limits to grazing in exchange for the use of other
forests in the state.  This was an easy compromise,
however, as the Teton Forest was already closed to
grazing.10
More vigorous opposition to leasing came from Montana,
where U.S. Senator Thomas Carter opposed leasing on the
grounds that it undermined settlement and promoted
monopoly, “[turning] the remains of the public domain into
cattle ranches under barbed-wire fences, with a monopoly of
land and water in the hands of a few individuals.”  The
debate that ensued revealed that a leasing bill, for the
moment, had little hope of surviving the Committee on
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Agriculture and Forestry, much less passing the full
Senate.11
Warren began to take note of the growing controversy
about grazing in the forest reserves, especially the
hostility toward the sheep industry.  “There is a world of
people here and all over the United States,” he wrote,
“continually protesting against grazing sheep in the Forest
Reservations, many of them demanding most importunately
their strict exclusion.”  Warren’s own livestock company
held sheep, and these protests began to force Warren’s
hand.  In April 1899 he sent the Secretary of the Interior
a veiled threat to withhold support for the Medicine Bow
forest if grazing were restricted.   Warren parroted the
sheep industry’s assertion that sheep actually reduced the
threat of forest fires by consuming “rank growth” in the
reserves.  Later in the year, Warren criticized the recent
delay in the issuing of grazing leases and permits.  Warren
assured his constituents that he was agitating on behalf of
Wyoming stock interests.  Furthermore, he reassured the
rancher that he was “in favor, most heartily and
emphatically of insisting upon live stock ranging in the
open parks and prairie embraced in timber reserves.”  To
another Wyoming resident, Warren wrote about the Medicine
Bow situation: “I have never opposed the establishment of
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the Medicine Bow Forest Reserve, nor any other, providing
that they include in the reserve only forest lands, or
second that they give reasonable permits . . . to be used
for grazing.”  Warren went on with this reassurance: “I am
willing to proclaim it from the house-tops that I want
either one of two things, forest reserves that shall
include only forestry, or forest reserves that include
incidentally grazing lands.”  By the end of the year,
Warren was also working to secure grazing in the Big Horn
forest reserve in northern Wyoming to please the cattle
interests there.12
In January 1900, the National Live Stock Association
met in Fort Worth, Texas and again took up the issue of
public land grazing.  Among the items on the agenda was a
lengthy discussion about a leasing plan.  Proponents of
leasing argued that to oppose any reform was to ensure the
continuation of a broken system.  In previous years the
Association had called for opening the public domain to
grazing; by 1900 this was a given, with a new emphasis
squarely on leasing those lands to the cattle industry.13
The smaller voice against grazing leases again came
from John Mackay of Utah.  Mackay argued that the leasing
of the forest reserves would terminate homesteading in the
West once and for all.  He also maintained that “great
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corporations within a few years will own the major part of
this grazing land.”  Even if antitrust measures were taken,
Mackay believed “the corporations would get inside, and
also . . . injure some of the best citizens.”  In vain,
Mackay attempted to unify the interests of sheep and cattle
owners, but his presentation was so brief and so lukewarmly
received that it seemed half-hearted.  If the National Live
Stock Association reflected the opinion of the industry,
then the industry favored leasing.14
Warren increasingly found himself a victim of guilt-
by-association, or at least that is how he perceived it. 
Where the live stock industry seemed to be moving toward
leased grazing, Warren’s own sheep interests connected his
name with “land grabbing.”  Newspapers such as the Denver
News and others all but accused Warren of being a tool of
the industry.  This put him in an awkward position, for he
had introduced many bills in previous years that sought to
lease lands in Wyoming.15  The attacks on Warren fatigued
him.  In a candid, personal letter, he confessed that he
was “getting tired of keeping in the fore front when I am
the target for everybody and everything.”16  
Increasingly Warren attributed this deluge to
political divisions within Wyoming.  Although his woe-is-me
correspondence often bordered on the paranoid, these
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complaints from his home state were not entirely the
products of Warren’s imagination.  Even as he built the
“Warren Machine,” as it was frequently called, he stepped
on enough toes in Wyoming to ensure that while he might
have been powerful he was not necessarily popular.  The
most devastating charge since the Johnson County War --
namely, an illegal fencing scandal -- was still several
years away, but Warren primed the pump of political
favoritism well in the 1900s.  T. A. Larson, the dean of
Wyoming historians, offers a damning list of Warren’s
political offenses: “Warren was accused of carrying two men
on the Claims Committee payroll while they were residing in
Cheyenne and doing private work for him; carrying his son
Fred on the government payroll as a folder in the Senate
folding room while Fred was attending Harvard; improperly
leasing his buildings in Cheyenne to the government; using
his influence as chairman of the Military Affairs Committee
to secure a contract for his electric-light company to
furnish electricity to Fort Russell; and violating the law
against enclosing the public domain.”  The most visible
example of Warren’s “patronage” for Wyoming was Fort D. A.
Russell, an obsolete outpost that, once Warren took the
chair of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, suddenly
tripled in size and housed a full brigade.  One historian
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called Fort D. A. Russell “a monument to the pork
barrel.”17
Eventually Warren began to succumb to the pressure
from the sheep industry, despite the personal conflict
associated with it, and became more vocal in opposing
leased grazing if it made no provision for sheep.  In
February 1900 he acknowledged the receipt of a growing
number of petitions from Wyoming citizens entitled, “We
Don’t Want It.”  To one constituent he wrote, “So far as I
am concerned I shall support no leasing or other land bill
which will effect what you fear.”  This was just what the
constituent wanted to hear.  Warren left an escape clause
for himself, however. “I think however it is possible to
have legislation that will provide for some disposition of
a portion of the lands without doing injustice to anybody
and which shall provide for helping the smaller ranchmen
and settlers.” Privately, Warren still maintained that
total land cession to the states was the answer.18  But he
knew this was a small hope.  The movement toward a leasing
system was gaining momentum, and the live stock “industry”
of cattle and sheep interests lacked consistent unity on a
position.  By the spring of 1900 Warren noted with relief
“the excitement having passed away.”  He also noted that
the National Live Stock Association “endorsed the leasing
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of land, and later that the Colorado Association declared
against leasing or cession -- and so it goes; they back and
fill over it entirely too much.”19
In the Senate, Warren generally remained reticent,
content to let the issue take its course.  A notable
exception to Warren’s silence occurred in March 1901. 
Senator Richard Pettigrew of South Dakota was railing
against sheep grazing as a destructive force in the
forests.  Warren rose to offer a “clarification,” or mild
objection.  Warren pointed out that sheep were only a
threat to certain, young forests, and that generalizations
about sheep grazing in the entire forest system should be
avoided.  “On some of these forest reserves,” he said, “a
man may ride all day without seeing a tree.”  He added, as
a nod to his home industry, that Wyoming contained no
forests “of such character that they would be injured by
the pasturage of sheep.”  Pettigrew did not respond, and
the Senate moved on to other business.  Warren had made his
point, standing up on behalf of an industry close to both
his state and his own business interests.20
A consensus was forming within the livestock industry,
for the moment at least.  At the fourth annual meeting of
the National Live Stock Association, held in Salt Lake
City, members were treated to the by now usual resolutions
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in favor of grazing and the usual unbalanced debate against
it.  In addition to the routine focus on American grazing
policy, the industry group published a paper on the land
laws of Australia.  The secretary of the association
studied land policy in New South Wales, a region heavily
devoted to live stock raising in the manner of the American
West.  He found that prior to 1884 the land laws in
Australia were “in a very crude state.”  Early stock
raisers had claimed “pre-emption” and effectively
monopolized that land to the detriment of the small farmer
or stock holder.  The Australian government imposed a
grazing tax, but it was so small that the big interests
easily absorbed the cost and continued as before.  In 1884,
a wholesale revision of land policy took effect, and the
grazing fees were revised according to a scale of land use
and improvement.  In addition, the Australian system
provided for the outright purchase of public land by
individuals if certain conditions were met.  The National
Live Stock Association held up the Australian system as a
model of grazing success.21
With a new administration in the White House, the
movement toward a national grazing policy accelerated.  In
December 1901, Gifford Pinchot addressed another gathering
of the National Live Stock Association at its meeting in
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Chicago.  Pinchot spoke with candor, opening with remarks
on the conflict between cattle and sheep interests.  The
function of the government, he reminded the audience, was
to wiegh opposing claims and advance the greatest good. 
“Any just solution will almost inevitably fail to meet
entirely the views of either party,” he said.  Pinchot then
presented several points that the Secretary of the Interior
wished him to make on the subject of grazing in the forest
reserves.22
First and foremost, any new policy must address and
bring to resolution the conflict between sheep and cattle
interests.  Only the government could establish the
boundaries between sheep and cattle ranges satisfactorily.
Such a move, Pinchot argued, would “transfer the struggle
between sheep men and cattle men . . . to the government
officers, who should be just and impartial judges in the
premises.”  This, he believed, would put an end to the
violence and “armed strife” of the range.23  
Next, a new role for local organizations and
associations would be found in the administration process,
in consultation with the government and just under the
forest officers.  Here disputes and problems could be
worked out, thus giving graziers a stake in the process
rather than simply being renters of the land.  Pinchot also
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discussed the importance of segregation on the range, both
for sheep and cattle.  Together with grazing permits that
lasted for five years, exclusive use of the range would
“create at once an interest . . . in the condition of the
range and make it worth [the holder’s] while to protect and
improve it.”  In short, Pinchot proclaimed, “Here is a plan
which gives the individual a powerful interest in the
protection of his range and turns his energy toward range
improvement instead of toward range destruction.”  Pinchot
suggested that the foraging of the forests be looked upon
as a form of agriculture; “forage,” he said, “is a crop
regularly and abundantly produced by the forest reserves
and as a rule it should be regularly harvested.”  The
record of the address indicates that Pinchot concluded to
applause, which was more than could be said for Mackay in
his debate positions.24  
By 1902, the cattle industry was pushing even harder
for leased grazing.  A colorful speech by Frank Benton of
Wyoming to the American Cattle Growers’ Association in
Denver revealed much about the mind of the industry.  “One
of the most vital questions of interest before the
cattleman of today is the leasing of the public lands,”
Benton began.  “I cannot understand how a cattleman can see
two sides to this question,” he went on, “and yet some
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cattlemen have been so fortunately situated so far as to
object to leasing.”  Benton divided those opposed to
leasing into three groups.  The first group secured its
grazing land through brute force, intimidating others with
threats and violence.  The second class of cattlemen to
oppose leasing, Benton said, were those who illegally
fenced in the public land but lived a “let us alone” way of
life.  The third class was a group of freeloaders who could
barely call themselves cattlemen, so neglected did they
allow their stock and ranges to become.25  
Benton, having raised cattle for over thirty years,
knew that the free range was a thing of the past, and the
only solution was “to have a lease law and lease as much
government land as you can.”  The move to a lease law,
Benton maintained, would end conflict on the range; “have
your cowboys raising hay in place of raising hell,” he
said.  Time was running out, too: “What is everybody’s is
nobody’s, and at the present rate of killing out the grass
it is only a few years until there will not be any grass
that even a sheep can live on, let alone a steer.” 
Finally, Benton concluded by saying that he was “satisfied
to let the United States government manage the lease
system.”26
At the same meeting, John Irish of California also
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spoke on the subject of land leasing.  His speech was
considerably longer and less folksy than Benton’s, but it
still made largely the same points in favor of leasing the
public lands for grazing.  Indeed, he complimented Benton
on his speech.  Irish praised Theodore Roosevelt, “in heart
and spirit a western man.”  Irish outlined the situation of
the public domain, calling for irrigation where possible
and grazing for the remaining land.  He said that it was
the duty of the government to protect the 400 million acres
of its grazing land for use.  Like the National Live Stock
Association, Irish pointed to Australia as a model.  Like
Coville, he considered the Texan grazing system a success.  
In short, Irish called for the managed regulation of the
public domain.  Racing toward a rousing conclusion and
great applause, Irish said that a grazing policy in the
United States would ensure “the richest, the best and most
permanent live stock range in the world, eclipsing
Australia, better than the pampas of the Argentines, and
pouring into our own country a stream of wealth that will
flow as steadily as the fabled Pactolus, the river of
gold,” in which Midas washed.27
By 1903 Warren himself addressed the live stock
industry on the subject of grazing more directly than ever
before.  In January at the meeting of the National Live
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Stock Association in Kansas City, Warren gave a speech
entitled, “What Congress Should Do for the Live Stock
Industry.”  After opening with a long joke, the contextual
humor of which is lost to history, Warren settled in to
address the topic.  “What should Congress do?” he asked. 
“It should do everything that Congress could do for any
great industry.”  Warren went on to discuss leasing the
public domain.  Congress, the President, and the Secretary
of the Interior wanted to do something, but were hampered
by small representation  of western interests in Congress. 
“This grazing country is small when compared to the United
States, and the population of the arid country is still
smaller in comparison,” he pointed out.  Warren also
attributed the lack of progress to internal political
divisions in the West itself, where “the conditions are
different in every state.”28
Warren then recounted an exchange he had with
President Roosevelt -- who, he reminded the audience, “is
one of us” -- that served to remind the audience of the
importance of changing the land laws.  
He said to me, “Warren, when you people
know what you want about the public
range, let me know.”  I said to him,
“What did you mean in your message
about the repeal of the land laws?”  He
said, “It is this way: We have a great
many subjects under consideration.  It
is a fact that all the people east,
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west, north and south agree that the
present land laws are a misfit,” and,
he added, “that calls for some
legislation.”  He said, “These
complaints come to me and I see only
one side of the question, and it is for
you and Congress to handle this
matter.”
Warren received applause at this and then went on to
discuss the fact that the sheep industry stood opposed to a
leasing law.  He claimed that he had “not been in
consultation with those representing the sheep industry,”
although this was stretching the truth.  He spoke a few
platitudes about the “highest legislative body in the
world” before only offering this solid statement on the
cattle and sheep split on grazing: “Sooner or later,
legislation will have to be made settling this question in
states where we have public lands before we can have peace
and harmony.”  For the rest of the speech, the only other
point where Warren acknowledged the tension between sheep
and cattle interests was not in relation to public policy
but in regard to membership in the Association itself. 
Someone questioned Warren on whether sheep owners should
leave the Association altogether.  Warren replied that they
should not.  Although Warren’s remark brought forth
applause, it belied the reality of the tension between the
two groups and masked his own interests as a sheep owner. 
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No one questioned Warren’s motivations openly, but many in
the room must have been thinking about it.29
E. A. Harris of Iowa rose to speak on behalf of the
small stock holder and the homesteader.  He disagreed with
the direction the Association was going toward calls for
leasing and regulation of the public domain, especially as
it might affect the sheep industry.  But Harris seemed
resigned to this development; “this thing,” he said, “has
been so thoroughly manipulated by this Association that
there is now practically only one side to it . . . I am
satisfied the die is cast.”  Harris claimed that proponents
of leased grazing frequently gained favor with the members
simply by dropping Theodore Roosevelt’s name.  Warm,
nostalgic feelings toward T.R., Harris said, masked the
lack of accountability in the use of so-called “experts” in
the formulation and administration of a grazing policy. 
Harris’s voice was drowned out, however, by subsequent
speakers who once again called for disposal of the public
domain in grazing districts.30
Although Warren dismissed charges that he was in
“consultation” with the sheep industry, he was in fact in
contact with it.  A month after the National Live Stock
Association meeting, Warren wrote to the president of the
Natrona County Wool Growers’ Association in Casper,
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Wyoming.  Sheep grazing had recently been banned in the Big
Horn forest reserve, and Warren responded to his
constituent’s concern.  He introduced a resolution
“providing for a careful inquiry and report upon western
land, timber, and grazing matters.”  Increasingly, Warren
was forced to address the grazing situation in more than
simple platitudes.31
Warren’s stance on a leasing system would grow to
reflect the administration’s.  In the autumn of 1904,
Warren toured Wyoming and several major cities throughout
the West.  His notes for the speeches delivered on that
tour reveal a variety of changing and changed opinion on
the subject of forest grazing.  First Warren established
the importance of the forest reserve system; “forest
preservation,” he argued, “is as much a necessity for the
welfare of Wyoming as is the conservation of the water of
its streams.”  Warren pointed to the recent creation of the
Medicine Bow forest reserve as an example of the Interior
Department responding to and working with localities in a
positive manner.  Likewise, the Yellowstone reserve was
managed by Wyoming men with a connection to the land and
personal interest in its well being.  Above all, Warren
attempted to educate his constituents on the meaning and
goal of the forest reserve system; “the land and products
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in forest reserves are not reserved from use but for use,”
he maintained.  The entire Wyoming live stock industry
depended on grazing in the public domain.  Warren concluded
with a vote of confidence in the Roosevelt administration
and the forest system it directed.  Warren even broke the
news of his own changed opinion to the wool industry.  “My
own opinion,” he wrote to the National Association of Wool
Manufacturers, “is that it would very largely increase the
production of the public domain if a leasing system could
be established, in addition to forest reserves, and
portions of the range could be re-seeded occasionally.”32
By December 1904 Warren prepared a speech entitled,
“The Necessity of Using the Forest Reserves for Grazing
Purposes.” To be delivered at the upcoming American Forest
Congress, it was the most comprehensive outline of Warren’s
thought on the grazing problem.  He began the speech with
several paragraphs reviewing land policy and the creation
of the forests reserves in 1891; “if the law authorizing
the creation of forest reserves had been enacted half a
century earlier,” Warren said, “the people of the United
States would today be richer than they are by billions of
dollars.”  He then spoke about forest fires and general
protection of the forests before finally arriving at the
subject of grazing, the most pressing issue of the day. 
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“The most serious complaint [was against the restriction]
of live stock grazing on the reserves.”33
Warren’s speech did not shy away from discussing the
at times vicious relationship between sheep and cattle
interests, though he elicited some sympathy for the sheep
holder.  “The first attempt to put a sheepman out of
business was when Cain slew his brother Abel, who ‘was a
keeper of sheep.’”  Warren went on to argue that this
prejudice had become enshrined in policy based on ignorance
and faulty science.  “It took many years for the Western
stockman to convince the officials in Washington that sheep
do not climb trees and do not eat coniferous plan or tree
growth.”  Politically astute, Warren made exceptions for
the current Commissioner of the General Land Office and the
Chief Forester of the Department of Agriculture,
“enlightened men both.”34
Warren’s speech offered selective examples of expanded
grazing and increased carrying capacity.  But he called for
more.  “More liberality could be shown in granting grazing
privileges without detriment.”  Finally he returned to the
case of Wyoming as metaphor for the entire West and offered
five suggestions for policy change.35  
First, Warren called for thorough and intelligent land
surveys to segregate land best suited for grazing as
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opposed to agriculture.  This would put the homesteading
farmer’s mind at ease.  Second, adequate trails or roads
should be made across the reserves so that live stock could
be moved throughout the pastures or to market with a
minimum of disruption to other forest users.  Third, local
officials should determine the grazing capacity of the
reserves and open them as fully as possible at the
appropriate times of the year.  Fourth, all administrators
of the grazing system should be drawn from the local area
whenever possible; Warren did not provide details on how to
accomplish this. Even so, this was a nod to states’ rights
and local control.  And fifth, grazing privileges would be
limited to taxpayers and ranch owners in the state in which
the reserve was located only to prevent absentee ownership
problems.  This would prevent the emergence of the much-
feared “feudal system” in the West.36
Warren’s plan for regulated grazing echoed many of the
points that Coville had been pushing for years.  Indeed,
there was little in Warren’s speech that Coville would have
disagreed with, though Coville might have been more
impartial about the sheep versus cattle division.  Warren
concluded his remarks by supporting the current direction
of grazing policy.  “I am satisfied,” he said, “that the
inclination of the present officers of the government in
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charge of the forestry service is favorable to the granting
of these several necessities of the grazing interests.”37
In 1905, as Pinchot, Coville, and the Public Lands
Commission prepared to present their findings and
recommendations, the National Live Stock Association also
pushed a policy of leased grazing.  One paper presented at
the annual meeting argued for “Control of the Public
Grazing Lands through the Department of Agriculture.”  The
author, J. M. Wilson of Wyoming, began with an assumption
that a grazing plan was necessary: “Something must be done
to regulate or control grazing.”  But this was a new era,
one after the frontier had “passed away,” and grazing
practices must reflect that.  Wilson argued that a grazing
policy would best be administered under the Department of
Agriculture.38
In another paper, C. E. Wantland of Denver -- Warren’s
old correspondent -- revisited an Association resolution
from five years prior that called for leased grazing. 
“Five Years After” the right idea and five years
squandered, he argued.  Wantland referred to the current
Public Land Commission and endorsed its mission and
expected findings. “They are friends of the West,” he said. 
Wantland cautioned the stock owners of the Association not
to make the same mistake of five years earlier.  His
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colloquial statement summed up the problems of a West
divided against itself.  “Unless you pull together and
insist upon being in the game from start to finish, you
will certainly get partially lost in the shuffle.”  Warren
himself put in an appearance at the 1905 meeting, though he
offered only a few comments and suggestions in the wording
of resolutions, and none of any consequence.  His presence
alone was a form of endorsement.39  
Throughout 1905, Warren made the case for a grazing
lease policy more than ever before, though he was
distracted by the marriage of his daughter Frances to
Captain John J. Pershing.  In an interview with the
Cheyenne State Leader in January 1905, Warren again listed
the five goals of a grazing policy that he first outlined
in his Forest Congress speech.  When asked by the Wyoming
Tribune about opposition from stock holders to a new
leasing policy, the paper reported that while some Wyoming
stockmen were opposed, most would, in Warren’s opinion,
prefer to go along rather than be deprived entirely of the
right to the reserves.  The Wyoming Industrial Journal
reprinted Warren’s Forest Congress speech.  Warren had
prepared an additional speech on “The Patrol of the Forest
Reserves,” but Senate business pulled him away from the
platform.  The speech was later published in St. Louis
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Lumberman.  The text had little to do with grazing
specifically, its subject being of course about the
protection and policing of the forests.  But it still
contributed to Warren’s growing interest in regulating the
reserves.40
In April 1905, Warren made a far more important speech
to members of the wool industry, represented by the Wyoming
Board of Sheep Commissioners.  The ongoing Public Land
Commission, he said, “took cognizance of what we had to
say.”  Warren was playing both sides of the fence here;
“we” to the audience at the moment probably meant “we
sheepmen,” but Warren was in truth referring to the meeting
of the National Live Stock Association in Denver, where
sheep interests were certainly present but, as discussed
above, often overshadowed by cattle interests.
Warren then ticked off, accurately, the
recommendations of the Commission, focusing especially on
the creation of grazing districts to be leased by stock
owners.  Warren supported and promoted the Commission to
his audience of sheep interests.  “In this recommendation,”
he said, “we see a gleam of hope for the improvements we
desire. The plan proposed may not be just what we want, but
I believe it heads in the right direction.”  He predicted
prosperity as a result of the new grazing plan.  “The sheep
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industry will witness as great an improvement in the coming
decade as it has in the past.”41
Even as the Commission’s suggestions were coming to
the forefront, however, Warren disengaged from the grazing
discussion for several months.  From July through November
1905, Warren was a member of the Secretary of War Taft’s
entourage touring East Asia.  Warren’s newlywed daughter
was living in Japan with her husband, Pershing, who was
stationed there.  For the time being, the intricacies of
grazing policy receded from the attention of Senator Warren
in favor of family and overseas travel.  It was just as
well.  Warren’s office began to receive inquiries about the
new grazing policy. Warren’s staff responded with polite
notes informing the writer of the Senator’s absence, but
reassuring them that upon his return he would give “those
whose interests are affected by the proposed imposition of
a grazing tax” his close attention.  One wonders about the
reaction nervous sheep graziers must have had upon learning
that the entire grazing system was about to change while
their senator was touring China and the Philippines.  
Upon his return, Warren faced questions and concerns
about the new system.  He was scheduled to participate in a
“grazing conference” in January 1906 in Denver.  The
invitation to the conference, sent to stock holders,
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featured a message from Gifford Pinchot designed to calm
their fears.  “Now that the fee for grazing in the forest
reserves has been established, with the full approval of
the President (himself a stockman) . . . the interests of
stockmen should be given the fullest consideration.”  This
was a smart move by Pinchot, though it indicates that from
the start the Commission knew its recommendations would not
be well received by all.42
Warren’s response to early inquiries about the grazing
policy varied depending on the inquirer.  He was all things
to all people.  To one constituent, he sounded skeptical of
the new plan.  “I am sticking as close to the Forestry
Bureau as a Spanish fly blister,” he said, “in the interest
of preserving the range we have and getting more if we
can.”  And to another constituent Warren claimed that he
was “trying (first) to have the [grazing fee] withdrawn
altogether, and (second) failing in this, to secure for
Wyoming the lowest possible rate.”  Grazing fees could vary
from twenty to fifty cents, depending on location and
season.  Warren would lobby for the lowest rate.43  
In 1906 the Forest Service began implementing the new
leasing system.  The goal of technocrats such as Frederick
Coville, interests such as the National Live Stock
Association, and, by then, politicians such as Francis
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Warren had been realized.  At last, a comprehensive system
of range management could be applied to the public domain.
The Department of Agriculture went so far as to claim that
“the regulation of grazing on the forest reserves meets
with almost universal approval.  Opposition to the fee is
disappearing.”  These statements were optimistic at best,
and naive at worst.44
While many people and groups had worked tirelessly to
arrive at this point, it faced immediate opposition when
put into practice.  A river of protests flooded into
Warren’s office, most centering around the proposal for the
new Sierra Madre forest reserve.  Grazing reform was
thought to be a panacea, the next best thing to total
cession of the public domain to the states, but it would
turn into a headache for Warren.
Warren began the year with high hopes that the new
policy would be well received.  He took great pleasure in
noting, for example, that the Medicine Bow forest reserve
“would not be diminished from last year’s [grazing
authorizations] but on the contrary will be increased.” 
Writing to a sheep grazing constituent, Warren attempted to
allay his fears.  “I am assured by the officers of the
Forest Service that sufficient stock will be admitted to
the Medicine Bow and all other Wyoming reserves.”  As to
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any hope of repealing the new plan in the near future,
Warren reiterated that Roosevelt was “absolutely committed”
to the new policy of charging for grazing privileges on the
reserves.  “The best we can do in this matter,” Warren
said, “is to get the lowest possible rates for our Wyoming
owners.”45  
Even with this optimism, Warren knew to expect a bumpy
road ahead.  Writing to the State Engineer of Wyoming,
Clarence Johnston, Warren said, “It is going to be no easy
thing.”  Politicians not directly impacted by the new land
policy tended to hold a “you chose your own land” or “you
have made your own bed, and now you must lie in it”
attitude toward the West.  Warren reported that Congress
was more stingy and suspicious about public land matters
than ever. Still, he joked with Johnston saying, “We may
develop hypnotic influence enough to arrive at some point
of success, and I am only too ready to open up the
battle.”46
Warren’s jocularity aside, reactions to the new system
began to roll in, first as questions, then concerns, and
finally protests.  A sampling of the protests Warren
received and his response, or lack of it, speaks volumes. 
Sheep owners in Carbon and Sweetwater Counties carbon-
copied Warren’s office with a petition they sent directly
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to Gifford Pinchot protesting the organization of the
Sierra Madre forest reserve.  The Carbon County
Woolgrowers’ Association followed suit claiming that the
new reserve would decrease the number of sheep owned in
Carbon County by a quarter of a million head.  “The sheep
industry is the CHIEF INDUSTRY [sic] of this county,” they
wrote.  Where Warren frequently pointed to the Medicine Bow
reserve as a success, one protestor argued that this
situation was entirely different, for the Sierra Madre area
was “almost devoid of green timber” and contained a
promising copper district and good grazing range for sheep. 
The writer made a slight jab at Warren personally: “It is
well known that the Forestry Regulations are against the
sheep business -- promises to the contrary
notwithstanding.”47
Over the month of February 1906, the protests
continued to pour in to Warren’s office. The mayor of
Rawlins penned a respectful but disapproving note to Warren
on the new reserves.  Another resident said the Sierra
Madre reserve, “while helping only a few, such as Forest
Riders and Assistants and the ‘healers’, would diminish the
revenue from the taxable property to the extent of $750,000
and would restrict business in all its branches and injure
the people of this county [emphasis in original].”  Still
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another writer emphasized the importance of copper mining
to the region and a surprising connection between sheep
grazing and mining; “it is a well known fact,” he wrote,
“that that famous Ferris-Haggarty copper mine, which
occasioned the mineral activity in this region, was
discovered by a sheepherder.”48
Some protests were addressed to Warren directly. 
Others were sent to the entire Wyoming Congressional
delegation (which, it should be noted, only included three
people).  A self-declared “pioneer of southern Carbon
County” demanded that the “so-called reserve be thrown open
to the public and allow the sheep pasture as heretofore . .
. without any restrictions whatever.”  A county clerk wrote
to “testify” to the devastating effect upon local revenue
that would surely be caused by the new reserve, from the
sheep business itself to tenable property and “upon every
other class of business.”  Most protests were coldly
businesslike, but a few approached the subject with more
emotion: “Stop and consider for a few moments what the
crippling of such an immense industry such as the sheep
business means, directly and indirectly, to every man,
woman, and child in this county.”  Such protests -- and
these are but a sample of that found in Warren’s papers --
painted a bleak picture.49
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The protests demanded a response.  Warren quickly went
to work and answered many but not all the concerns.   To
those who sent the petition, Warren wrote that he was
forwarding it on to the Secretary of Agriculture for
consideration, along with “others of like nature which I
have filed.”  Warren offered a quote provided by the
Agriculture Department: “The petitions and protests will be
given the most careful consideration, and nothing will be
recommended by the Forest Service to the injury of Wyoming
interests.”  Warren added to the statement an assurance
that it was his “intention to continue earnest efforts
against the creation of any reserve likely to injure the
business interests of the people of the state or any part
of it.”50
By May 1906 Warren moved from simply forwarding
petitions and protests to an active campaign to influence
and adjust the grazing fees.  Warren had abandoned his
hopes for land cession and state controlled public grazing
land.  Federally managed forest grazing was the new
reality, and Warren had to live with it.  Over the next
fifteen years, Warren’s devotion to the livestock industry
would be tested and tempered by personal scandal, rising
grazing fees, and falling prices.  If anyone had believed
the new leasing system would bring simplicity and
169
standardization to the public domain, he was mistaken.51
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FEDERAL GRAZING, FENCING SCANDALS, AND 
FRANCIS E. WARREN, 1906-1920
With any hope for full public land cession to the
states fading into distant memory and leased grazing in the
national forests becoming more institutionalized, still
more challenges loomed on the horizon for Senator Francis
E. Warren.  From 1906 to 1920, he was forced to temper his
hitherto unfailing support for stock owners in the face of
national priorities that increasingly favored farming. 
Personal tragedy, political scandal, and regional rivalries
weakened Warren.  As the nation revamped its public land
policy in a series of measures that culminated in the Stock
Raising Homestead Act of 1916, the senator from Wyoming --
a state with so much at stake -- was curiously uninvolved. 
Falling stock prices, rising grazing fees, and changing
attitudes about public land made many in the livestock
industry uneasy.  The long reign of Republican political
control endured the interregnum of the Woodrow Wilson
administration.  Warren survived the period bruised but
intact, even as storm clouds of a greater depression
billowed over the open range.  
The flood of protests over forest grazing that Warren
first received in 1906 soon slowed to a trickle.  There
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were always dissenting voices, but over time the grazing
policy settled into place.  Coville’s vision of a
rationalized range became a reality.  Through specified
allotments, grazing permits and fees, clearly defined
grazing seasons, limits on herd sizes, the public domain
was being transformed into what Gerald Nash called the
“federal landscape.”1
The Department of Agriculture, now in control of the
national forests, began a campaign to placate, if not win
over, the hearts and minds of western stock owners and the
politicians representing them. When ranchers balked at the
fee system, the forest service reminded them that the land
values of public domain were calculated on average of a
third the value of comparable private land.  In the
Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture, a publication
that often featured articles and bulletins designed to
inform and educate the agricultural producer, the federal
bureaucracy outlined the situation in a small section
titled, “Attitude of Stockmen Toward Restriction of
Grazing.”  Here the department acknowledged the tension but
chose to emphasize optimism over pessimism.  “The
regulation of grazing on the forest reserves meets with
almost universal approval,” it said, adding that
“opposition to the fee is disappearing.”  This was an
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overstatement, to be sure, but the new system produced
positive results.  Overgrazed ranges began to heal.  Cattle
and sheep enjoyed better grazing conditions under the
administered range.   Warren frequently sent copies of the
Yearbook to concerned constituents.2
In the Senate, Warren defended the new grazing policy. 
In a discussion of grazing in the national forests, Senator
Heyburn of Idaho criticized the measure as being unfairly
beneficial toward a certain economic class--namely, stock
raisers--at the expense of the individual homesteading
farmer.  As Heyburn’s language strained with hyperbole,
Warren rose to defend his constituents’ interests.  “I
presume,” Warren countered, “the Senator from Idaho does
not wish the Senate to understand that the Government is
renting its lands outside of forest reserves to cattlemen?” 
Heyburn acquiesced. Warren continued to emphasize that “the
lands which are included in the forest reserves are those
over which sheep and cattle had ranged before,” and then
added that the only thing truly new about the policy was
that the stock raisers had to pay a fee now where none had
been charged before.  If that were true, Warren’s
motivation for land cession -- now abandoned -- was in fact
a self-serving land grab.  If anything, Warren argued, the
stock raiser alone was paying for the new policy.  Warren
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concluded by calling Heyburn’s bluff: “Does the Senator
maintain that the creation of these forest reserves is for
the purpose of giving control of the land to cattlemen and
to sheep men?”  “No,” Heyburn replied.3  
The transfer of the forest reserves to the Department
of Agriculture, and the grazing fee policy that accompanied
it, soon became a significant source of revenue for the
government.   Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson, in a
report detailing the money collected from grazing fees and
“lines of business upon forest reserves,” said that  a
“very large portion” of departmental income would come from
grazing fees.  A table accompanying his report offers a
suggestion as to why some states resisted the policy more
than others.  For 1906 total income from grazing fees was
estimated at $73,183.  Within that amount, $3,422 came from
Idaho, while Wyoming only brought $644 to the table. 
Perhaps Warren was eager to defend the policy because it
was not costing his state very much.4
In a private letter to his daughter, “Mrs. John J.
Pershing,” Warren spoke of recent politics, a rarity in his
correspondence with her.  “Did pretty well for Wyoming this
term,” he wrote, and then gave a tip to his son-in-law on a
method of increasing his income thanks to a loophole in
officer pay policy: “tell Jack he wants to study up the
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Army Appropriation law . . .”  In another letter to a
constituent in Cody, Warren bragged about his work for the
stock industry, specifically regarding a speech he gave
toward the close of the session and his work on the tariff
on hides.  The specifics of grazing policy, at this point,
worked in favor of Warren’s Wyoming interests.  He kept his
attention on the whole of the livestock industry.5
The speech in the Senate that Warren referred to was a
long one on the livestock industry in general and the
tariffs that affected it in particular.  Warren offered a
lengthy variety of statistics and platitudes about the
importance of the independent stock raiser to America.  The
point he was driving home, however, was protection for the
industry.  “Farmers and cattlemen want protection,” he
said, not only in the production phase but on the finished
“product,” in this case hides.  Privately, Warren did not
expect any congressional action at the moment, but his
speech anticipated a large tariff fight to come. 
“Protection can not be sectional and selfish,” he said. 
“It must be general and adequate.  Such protection is now
in force under the operation of the present law.  It is the
most perfect law known.  We shall, as a matter of course,
have to revise it some time, but not to-day.  We are too
busy, too well employed, too well paid for our labor, too
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prosperous to think seriously of tariff revision in the
year of our Lord 1906.”  Warren’s speech was laying the
groundwork for a future battle over protection.  Grazing
policy would be a major element in that debate, as free-
traders accused the stock industry of already having enough
aid from the government.6
Before the tariff issue completely grabbed Warren’s
attention, however, and despite the Secretary of
Agriculture’s pronouncement that all was well, many western
ranchers were less optimistic about the new grazing policy. 
The National Live Stock Association, the umbrella
organization for the industry formed in 1898, found that
the grazing issue dominated its 1907 meeting in Denver. 
Several members from Wyoming spoke with passion on the
subject.  As usual, cattle interests overwhelmed sheep
interests, and both railed against any perceived
governmental threat to their grazing situation.  Many
feared losing the use of current grazing land.  The State
Association of Wool Growers, centered in Rock Springs,
Wyoming, opposed leasing the public domain, fearing that
cattle interests would literally run over those of the
sheep graziers’.  Carson Adams of Wyoming offered a most
novel, if unworkable, solution to the entire affair.  “The
grazing land in Wyoming is all occupied,” he said.  “The
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best way to handle the leasing of public lands or grazing
privilege would be to make the state of Wyoming one grazing
district.”  At first glance such a proposition seemed
equitable, if not idealistic, but Adams soon tipped his
hand and showed his motivation to favor large owners. 
Echoing the era’s Social Darwinism, Adams said that
stockmen would work out the details among themselves “as a
hard winter will take care of any surplus.”  Local control
was appealing, but it also tended toward monopolization and
even violence, as Coville so aptly described in his
articles a decade earlier.  Some members called for the
total repeal of the 1891 Forest Reserve Act.  In the end,
the only consensus that came out of the Denver meeting was
that stock raisers were not happy with the new grazing
system.7
Warren had to face this continued unrest over grazing
policy.  Worse, charges emerged that the Warren Live Stock
Company was illegally fencing in government enclosures. 
The priority of removing illegal fences during the
Cleveland administration had taken a back seat when
Republicans regained power, and by the McKinley
administration the open range was again crisscrossed with
barbed wire, much of it strung illegally across public
land.  Beginning in 1905, Wyoming State Senator S. A. D.
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Keister, a Democrat, called for an investigation of illegal
fencing that specifically targeted Warren’s company.  The
Wyoming legislature, solidly Republican and in much
political debt to Warren, shrugged off the accusation and
even castigated Keister for bringing it up.  Even so, the
squabble in Wyoming caught the attention of Secretary of
the Interior E. A. Hitchcock, who promptly ordered an
investigation.  The resulting report alleged that the
Warren Live Stock Company had illegally fenced in excess of
40,000 acres of government land for over twenty years. 
Would Warren and his company face prosecution?  As T. A.
Larson wrote, “Ordinarily, such a report would have led to
court action, but this was not to be the case in this
instance.”8  This much of the story is general knowledge in
Wyoming history.  What follows, however, is less well
known.  
A revealing letter to his business manager shows that
Warren was distracted by the charges but not overly
concerned.  The senator had friends in the highest places. 
He wrote to President Roosevelt, denied the charges, and
got quick results.  “The Department was satisfied that they
could not get any results from proceeding against our
company,” Warren wrote privately.  His letter continues,
describing a meeting with Roosevelt using language laced
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with intrigue: “The President did not show me their report,
but indicated what it was.  Then he called on . . . his
private letter-book, turned over, with his own hand, the
pages until he found two different places and put in book-
marks, then passed the book to me and asked me to read, in
confidence, the two letters he had sent . . . concerning us
and our matters.  We were in his back private office at the
time.  He went out to pump-handle--shake-hands and say
‘dee-lighted,’ to the large crowd that had accumulated in
the outside room of his office in the meantime, and I
carefully read the letters.  I did not have tme to copy any
of the expressions, but the letters were ‘corkers’ . . .
[they were] diplomatic . . . nevertheless, every sentence
intended to cut like a razor.”9  What “evidence” Warren may
have seen remains a mystery, but it was enough to give him
peace of mind about the fencing charges.  The Republican-
controlled Congress ensured that the scandal would not
reach the pages of the Congressional Record--for the
moment, at least.  
Despite pulling strings for Warren, Roosevelt had
strong opinions on fencing the range.  Indeed, perhaps one
reason that Roosevelt was willing to smooth things over was
his view that the law regarding enclosures was ill-
conceived and essentially forced stock raisers to violate
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it.  Warren wrote again to his manager emphasizing
Roosevelt’s position.  “The President is exceedingly
anxious to provide for leasing, by the government, all its
grazing lands, but more particularly those which are within
the fences.”  This letter marks one of the few times Warren
discussed current politics or policy in direct connection
with his personal business.  The subject of fencing grabbed
his attention in a way that other subjects did not.10
Roosevelt wrote to Warren following up on their
meeting.  The president emphasized the importance of local
control in range management.  He went on to emphasize the
importance of a small grazing fee, even a token.  “I am not
anxious that the government should get a great revenue from
grazing on the public range.”  Roosevelt’s preference would
not be realized; over time, as the grazing policies
matured, fees from forest grazing became a top revenue
earner for the Department of Agriculture.  Roosevelt did
not want the federal government to make money off the
public domain, but that is precisely what happened.  The
Forest Service was motivated by grazing fee revenue,
however. The more funds it could raise through services the
less it had to depend on the whims of congressional
budgets.11
For the moment there was little consensus in Wyoming
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apart from general displeasure with the current situation. 
Warren continued to field requests and put out the small
fires of competing interests.  He was increasingly more
candid about the discord, however.  “In view of the widely
divergent opinions of stockmen,” he wrote in a familiar
refrain, “it is quite certain that no legislation . . .
will be enacted at this session of Congress.”12
While industry interests struggled in vain to reach
any agreement beyond “something must be done,” discussion
in the Senate required Warren to maintain a more unified
appearance.  In a contentious debate over the
appropriations to be made to--and more importantly the
income generated by--the national forests, some in Congress
accused stock raisers of being the sole benefactors from
the system, so much that they should pay more for the
privilege.  Warren responded to an argument about degree
with the logic of absolutes.  “I do not think anyone
believes we ought to bar all the cattle and all the sheep 
. . . we ought to permit grazing.”13
Warren was frustrated.  “We have been having a devil
of a time,” he confided to W. E. Chaplin, a newspaper
editor in Cheyenne.  Most frustrating of all to Warren was
the inability of western interests to unify.  “There is a
tremendous opposition . . . from Montana, Idaho, Colorado,
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and I guess, Utah.  There are two sides of the question,
and people supporting both sides.”14
The debate in the Senate continued.  Senator Patterson
of Colorado wanted to introduce an amendment to the
agriculture appropriation bill that would, on the surface,
prohibit the charging of fees for grazing in the national
forests.  But Warren saw in this a veiled attempt to close
off the range to existing interests.  His constituents --
and his own Warren Live Stock Company -- depended on access
to forest grazing lands. Cattle interests generally favored
leasing; sheep owners opposed it.  Warren, both a sheep and
cattle owner who benefitted from leasing as a large
operator, found himself at odds with his own constituency
in supporting leasing.15  
Perhaps sensing that the debate was for the moment at
an impasse, Warren reminded the Senate -- and his
constituents -- that his heart was with local control and
states’ rights.  “My early contention was that the States
themselves should control the grazing lands.  The first
speech that I ever made here in the Senate was upon that
side of the subject.”  But land cession was so far removed
from the current tit-for-tat debate that Warren knew it was
not a valid option.  He called for the “urgent necessity of
some kind of regulation for grazing lands” beyond the
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existing system.16
To a voter in Sheriden, Wyoming, Warren outlined his
priorities for grazing on the public domain beyond the
national forests.  Warren expected that federal regulation
of the entire public domain was around the corner. 
Warren’s desire was “to inflict the minimum of hardship
upon western stockmen with the maximum of benefit,” and
reminded his constituent that this view was shared by
President Roosevelt.  Most importantly, Warren ticked off
his main goals for a grazing policy.  This list came
straight out of his old pro-cession arguments.  Any grazing
policy should be locally controlled, implemented with a
minimal fee, and give preference to small stockholders with
adjacent land.  Variations of this communication to
inquiring constituents were common, and Warren was
consistent in outlining his priorities.17   
As Warren predicted, no consensus on leasing public
lands emerged.  It was “the difference of opinion among
western members of Congress” that prevented any progress,
he wrote to a man in Widdowfield, Wyoming.  To another
constituent he followed the same line, citing “such a wide
divergence of opinion among western men on this subject.” 
Warren took some of the opposition personally.  “The
opposition political newspapers of our State are branding
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‘Roosevelt and Warren’ as tyrants, equaled only by the Czar
of Russia.”18 
But Warren’s old rival, Joseph Carey, found himself
supporting leased grazing.  Carey spoke at the 1908 meeting
of the National Live Stock Association in a forum devoted
to the grazing question.  His statement was cleaned up,
expanded, and later printed as a pamphlet under the title,
“Stockmen Should Study Both Sides of Question: Great
Problems Not Solved by Frantic Tirades and Personal Abuse.” 
Carey admitted that he had been an opponent of leasing in
the past, but he had since changed his mind.  The question
of range control was of “historical” importance, he said,
and there had been no shortage of good ideas.  From Powell
to the present Roosevelt, recommendations for a just and
beneficial range policy were ripe for the picking.  The
problem, Carey maintained, was division among westerners
themselves.19
Carey summarized the priorities of a grazing policy as
he saw it, reflecting in large part those of Warren.  He
called for an extremely low grazing fee--four cents an acre
at most--to be controlled at the local level, continuation
of homestead openings to attract population, and finally
measures to ensure that the income generated by grazing
leases be returned to the locality in the form of school
190
and road funding.  Carey emphasized the need for action. 
“The next Presidential election,” he cautioned, “is likely
to be a battle royal, and no one can predict the result.” 
But more than politics in Washington, the key to
establishing a workable grazing policy rested in the hands
of the industry itself.  “There will be nothing done now
unless [the stock owners] agree to a measure and request
its enactment into a law.  Their representatives in
Congress would undoubtedly carry out their wishes.”20
While Carey pleaded for unity among the industry,
Warren continued to struggle with sectional disunity in the
Senate.  He engaged in a back-and-forth with Senator
Heyburn of Idaho over very specific sections of public land
that Wyoming and Idaho “shared.”  Heyburn accused Warren of
pressuring of Forest Service officials to attend a
convention as a sign that he was in the pocket of the
industry.  Warren defended himself.  “The woolgrowers had
invited them, and they wished me to use my influence to
insure their attendance. . . . As my letterbooks will show,
I have both received and written numerous letters along
that line.”  Heyburn backed down, but his point was made. 
The larger point--that western politicians were at an
impasse as to the policy they craved--could hardly be
missed.21
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By 1909, however, resistance to regulated grazing
seemed to be waning.  Two key resolutions passed at the
National Live Stock Association meeting hinted at growing
acceptance.  One resolution supported measures to lease
unappropriated public lands, especially a bill being pushed
by Senator Charles Curtis of Kansas and his counterpart in
the House, Representative Charles Scott.  The trade group
endorsed leased grazing as “a reasonable, just and
equitable measure,” which would do much to improve the
stock raising industry of the West.  Furthermore, following
Carey’s appeal for western unity, the resolution called
upon its members to “vigorously urge upon Congress its
early passage.”  The meetings of the National Live Stock
Association frequently promoted such resolutions, but an
even more specific resolution was agreed upon at the 1909
convention.  Perhaps seeking to smooth over tensions
between ranchers and bureaucrats, the association endorsed
the Forest Service and, most notably, its chief Gifford
Pinchot.22
Warren looked favorably upon these moves by the
industry.  Writing to Carey, he said, “The resolutions
adopted, I think, should be satisfactory to live stock
raisers and farmers generally.” He then entered the
resolutions into the record of the Senate.23  As often the
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case with pronouncements of compromise, however, these
resolutions disguised a still very real undercurrent of
dissatisfaction.  While the final “resolutions” of the
National Live Stock Association presented one face, the
proceedings of the meeting revealed a continuing discussion
on the matter of grazing.24
Warren received similar messages pressing for the
reformed grazing policy.  The Albany County Cattle and
Horse Growers Association passed a resolution resembling
that of the larger association.  The Albany group, however,
also focused more closely on the subject of fencing.  The
removal of fences caused “much hardship and loss upon
people engaged in the cattle and horse industry.”  While
Warren received such complaints, he continued to pull
strings for constituents, even writing to Pinchot directly
on behalf of at least one person in securing leasing
permits.  The desire for change was in the air, but not
much was happening on the ground differently than before.25
On the floor of the Senate, Warren was well aware of
partisanship.  In one discussion, he reminisced about his
long-lost land cession bill.  The notion of ceding public
lands to the states came up, though not as a serious
measure.  With a touch of humor, Warren said, “I may say
that I thought so some years ago.  I introduced a measure
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here.  I promptly went out of the Senate on that speech and
upon the idea that the lands should be deeded to the
States.”  Senator Joseph Bailey, a Democrat from Texas,
quipped in response, “If the Senator had not made the
speech, he might have passed his bill.”26 Warren wondered
aloud if he could ever achieve cession “without getting
retired.”27
Warren’s activity on the grazing issue and land policy
in general in 1910 was minimal.  He introduced an amendment
to a sundry civil appropriation bill to improve the roads
in Yellowstone.  He also introduced a bill to extend the
time homesteaders were allotted to establish residence upon
their claims.  But major grazing measures came from other
politicians.  Senator Joseph Bristow, a Republican from
Kansas, introduced a measure to fix the sheep grazing fees
in forests.  This was a sign of the direction legislation
over the next several years would take; in the absence of a
complete overhaul of grazing policy, western politicians
worked to limit fees, extend payment deadlines, and in
general chip away at the current system.28
Livestock associations continued to press for grazing
reform, however.  The Wyoming Stock Growers Association
supported what was by then called the Scott Grazing Bill
(H.R. 22462) promoted by the Kansas delegation.  The WSGA
194
passed perfunctory resolutions supporting new grazing
policies, urging its members to “use every effort with our
Senators and Representative,” (only one for sparesly
populated Wyoming) to enact the bill.29
Joseph Carey, now a judge in Wyoming and prominent
member of the WSGA, took the lead in pursuing grazing
policy reform.  Carey supported the Kansans’ grazing bill
wholeheartedly.  In removing himself from one WSGA
committee to focus exclusively on the grazing issue, he
commented, “A a proper leasing law . . . is the ultimate
salvation of the cattle, sheep and horse business in this
State . . . I believe I would favor almost any kind of
leasing bill, rather than have no leasing system.”30
If 1910 saw little major activity on grazing policy,
1911 saw even less.  Warren was distracted from all
political matters by his marriage to his second wife,
Clara. (His first wife, Helen, had died years earlier.) 
Even so, his main attention to land policy was the
continued work to secure extensions for homesteaders.  He
also bargained for “leaves of absences” for homesteaders. 
Indeed, among Warren’s few legislative measures that
session was a bill to accomplish precisely that, S. 3052. 
The motivation behind this move was to provide some relief
for homesteaders in a year of drought.  Establishing a
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homestead in some regions was difficult enough; Warren did
not see why homesteaders should be penalized by the
climate.31
Beginning in 1912, however, Warren entered a new phase
of his career, one marked by increasing uncertainty.  From
1912 to 1919, a clamor to alter land policy arose.  Warren
was at the center of some of this discussion and curiously
absent from the rest.  The fencing scandal of the previous
years returned to haunt Warren politically.  Coinciding
with that embarrassment was the ratification of the 17th
Amendment, requiring the direct election of Senators.  The
inauguration of Woodrow Wilson as president in 1913 also
saw the Republicans lose control of both houses of Congress
for the first time since the Cleveland administration two
decades earlier.  The Great War enlarged, diverted, and
enticed the stock raising industry prior to the falling
prices that would mark the 1920s.  Although Warren’s
political power in Wyoming was, in the end, never truly at
risk, this changing political landscape was enough to make
him uneasy.  Warren contemplated retiring from politics
altogether. 
In January 1912, Warren criticized the general land
policy of the United States in tones that seemed
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reminiscent of his pro-cession land grab fervor of the
1890s.  Warren could be counted on to defend the stock
industry, but beginning in 1912, as one early writer put
it, “he evinced an apparent interest in the development of
the West through the medium of the ‘new’ farmer”--that is,
the scientific dry-farmer.  To accomplish this,
homesteading had to be opened up and promoted with a vigor
not seen in some time.32
In May 1912 Warren pushed an enlarged homestead bill
for Wyoming.  This bill would gain for his state
approximately one million acres.  If passed, Warren
believed, the acquisition would “solve very many of the
range problems and difficulties which now annoy farmers,
ranchmen and stockmen.”  The bill caught unusual attention,
however.  Senator Heyburn accused Warren of a land grab for
Wyoming.  “I understand that bill is confined to those
lands in Wyoming,” Heyburn said, “or it is not of general
application.”  Warren corrected him as best he could.  The
bill was not specifically addressed to Wyoming, but as a
matter of fact it did apply only to certain arid lands
which “happened” to be located in Wyoming.  Warren was
walking a fine line and knew it.  His hopes for success
were mixed.  “I fear . . . that the chances for securing
the passage of the bill during this session of Congress are
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not very good,” he confided to a correspondent.  The
Interior Department opposed Warren’s bill, largely because
it put land in control of the state and not the federal
government. As usual, Warren blamed eastern opposition
based on ignorance of the western situation.  But,
tellingly, he acknowledged that divisions within the West
itself worked against changes in land policy.  “Even from
the West,” he wrote, “our own members are not wholly
unified on this question, some of them being opposed to
leasing legislation in any form.”33
By 1913, however, opinion within the industry, at
least as reflected by the trade associations, was unifying. 
The National Live Stock Association declared in January
that it supported the current administration of the
national forests.  Once icy relations continued to thaw. 
Moreover, the association passed a resolution calling for
federal control and leasing of unappropriated grazing lands
using language that echoed almost word for word Warren’s
wishes.34  The Wyoming Stock Growers Association met
and passed similar resolutions, prompting one columnist to
note the striking change of opinion and attitude.  “The
ranchmen now want a lease law.  I remember well when to a
man they were against it.”35
In 1913 Warren introduced a flurry of land-related
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measures into the Senate: fine-tuning the enlarged
homestead act, a bill to give a new right of homestead
entry to former homestead owners, several exchanges of land
upwards of two million acres, and expansion of the hunting
and destruction of predatory animals within and adjacent to
the national forests.  But the change in majority control
of the Senate meant that fewer of his measures would see
the light of day.  Concerned constituents wrote to Warren,
worried about patronage positions and changes in executive
department offices.  Warren responded saying to “hold the
line” as best as possible: “The President and his
administration will certainly appoint men of their own
party when vacancies occur, and to this we are no in a
position to object.” Warren’s frustration boiled over in a
smug response to an innocent inquiry about the Senate
restaurant.  It, too, was now in control of the Democrats,
and the inquirer could find out “from them . . . what the
changes are to be and who is to take charge.”36 
Warren had reason to be frustrated.  Once the
Democrats had recaptured both houses, the old charges of
illegal fencing were trotted out once again, this time into
the official record.  What Warren thought was wrapped up in
the secretive meeting with Theodore Roosevelt was now back
in the news.  As T. A. Larson recounts, “House Democrats
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could not resist looking into the matter.  They timed their
probe so that their findings could be released to the press
during the 1912 campaign.  Then, in 1913, their final
report was published as House Report No. 1135.”  It was
actually House Report No. 1335, but Larson’s account is
otherwise sound.  The “report” itself is little more than a
repackaged version of the original 1906 report done by E.
B. Linnen for the Interior Department.  The accusations--
twenty-odd years of illegal fencing by the Warren Live
Stock Company--were the same.  The House committee behind
the report was composed of four Democrats and two
Republicans, including Representative Frank Mondell of
Wyoming.  Predictably, the final assessment of the matter
broke down party lines.  The Democrats stood by the
charges, and the Republicans stood by Warren.  Mondell,
friend to the senator, argued effectively that the report
was “old news,” drudged up to discredit Warren.37
But the political damage was done.  Warren, already
out of power along with his fellow Republicans, was
sufficiently discredited as far as the House Democrats were
concerned.  An early student of Warren’s congressional
career, Wesley Donald Brown, looked at the making of the
1916 Stock Raising Homestead Act and wondered why Warren’s
name was not all over it. “Warren had been the stoutest
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supporter and champion of similar legislation,” Brown
wrote, “yet, for some hidden reason, he remained completely
in the background during the stormy sessions devoted to
this bill.”38
Writing less than twenty years after Warren’s death,
Brown can be forgiven for overlooking the fencing scandal
completely.  In retrospect, however, we can see that
Warren’s “conspicuous absence” from the major livestock
legislation of the mid-1910s was the result first of Warren
simply being in the minority party, and second the outcome
of a specific attack on his credibility by Democrats once
they had the chance. Additionally, and perhaps most of all,
Warren’s daughter and three grand-daughters were killed in
a house fire near the Presidio in San Francisco in August
1915.  Warren’s papers reveal virtually nothing of this
tragedy.  But it makes sense he would be distracted if not
depressed.  Only his grandson, Warren, survived.39
The fencing scandal never would have returned to the
forefront had the Democrats not captured the Congress. 
Ironically, the very fact that Warren was relegated to
minority status probably minimized the damage the scandal
could do to him in Congress.  With the Democrats in power,
Warren had no committee chair to step down from, no
privileged legislation to be assaulted.  To his
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constituents in Wyoming, the scandal was old news.  And
Warren’s service to the state in terms of patronage and
pork was never in question.  
Although Warren had receded from the foreground on
many land matters in the Senate -- thanks in large part to
his new minority party status and the fencing scandal -- he
continued to receive inquiries from constituents.  Some
asked for additional funding for the destruction of wild
predatory animals on the range, a service particularly
appreciated by the wool industry.  Most, however, wrote to
Warren about the grazing homestead act, often called the
640-acre homestead act.  Warren dutifully reported that the
measure was tied up in the Senate--by the majority party,
he did not hesitate to add--and that he did not expect it
to pass during the current session.40
In a revealing personal letter to a friend around this
time, Warren mused on politics. He worried that “the drift
of the Republican Party . . . in the last few years has
been entirely along the line of disorganization.”  Warren
had not used such pessimistic language or taken on a “woe
is me” attitude to such a large degree since the 1890s. 
His papers from this era are sprinkled with ponderings of
retirement.41
A few days later, however, the logjam of legislation
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that had been holding up the discussion of the Stock-
Raising Homestead Act in the Senate broke.  On February 18,
1915, House bill 15799 finally made its way onto the floor
of the Senate.  The bill had seven brief sections, but the
chief distinction was the change in the definition of
“homestead.”  Previous homestead laws had required
cultivation in the “improvement” of the land, a persistent
Jeffersonian value.  This bill, for the first time in
American history, recognized the grazing industry
specifically as an activity also worthy of using public
land.  Section Three was the key: “In lieu of cultivation,
as required by the homestead laws, the entryman shall be
required to make permanent improvements upon the lands . .
. for agricultural and stock-raising purposes.”  If passed,
this would signal a major change in the nation’s land
policy and the beginning of the end for the Homestead Act
as a measure for the individual farmer.  The bill had
finally made it to the Senate, but Warren was correct in
his prediction that it would not pass that session.  But
Warren was optimistic about the next session.42
In the absence of sweeping land policy reform, Warren
continued the piecemeal approach to gaining lands for his
state.  The Wyoming legislature passed a memorial that
called for the cession of public lands to the states, a
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favorite but losing old cause of Warren’s.  He was
realistic about the possibilities of land cession, and
hoped the Wyoming legislature would be satisfied by his
“bill pending proposing to cede a large acreage of public
lands to the State for public-road purposes.”  Indeed, as
the automobile began to change the American landscape,
western politicians such as Warren used the issue of roads
to their state’s advantage.  Warren’s own Senate Bill 3572,
introduced in 1913, attempted to grant public lands to the
states for construction and maintenance of roads.43
The live stock industry began to embrace the move for
a stock raising homestead act, however slowly.  Perhaps it
was just too early, but the meeting of the National Live
Stock Association in 1915 barely discussed the homestead
measure.  Instead, it discussed the usual issues:
protection,  growing satisfaction with forest grazing, and
a general call for federal control of the public grazing
lands.  Buried deep on the list of its resolutions,
however, the association did discuss its support of the
bill.  “We strongly recommend the passage by Congress of a
law providing for the federal classification and control of
such land, under a just and reasonable method as will best
utilize the same and preserve the grazing thereon, and as
will provide for stock-raising homesteads upon such
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portions as may be set aside by the government, after
examination, as being of such character that 640 acres will
reasonably support a family.”  If the National Live Stock
Association reflected the industry, or at least the
established part of it, there did not seem to be a clamor
for a stock-raising bill at this point.44
By 1916, that began to change.  The Wyoming Stock
Growers Association adopted resolutions calling for stock-
raising homesteads.  “We believe the enlarged homestead,”
the WSGA held, “eventually means the better protection and
fostering of the livestock industry, in that the grazing
lands will pass to private ownership and thereby enable
stockgrowers to protect and increase their livestock
holdings by owning their pasture lands.”  A true homestead
meant ownership, a step beyond leased grazing.45
The Department of Agriculture, however, was wary of
such legislation.  In the generally apolitical Annual
Report, the department commented on what it saw as a
negative impact on the forests from land legislation.
“Measures of various kinds . . . if adopted, seriously
would injure or even render ineffective the whole National
Forest enterprise.”  Warren’s hope of land cession,
however, was no longer a threat to the department.  “The
proposal that the properties be turned over in their
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entirety to the several States has a waning support and no
longer needs to be taken seriously,” the report said.  The
true danger to the forest system was the new stock-raising
homestead.  The passing of a stock-raising homestead law,
from the  perspective of the Secretary of Agriculture,
would be an adjacent threat to the national forests and one
that would have to be guarded against vigorously.46
As reported earlier, Warren was “curiously” absent
from the drive forward on the enlarged homestead bill. 
Nevertheless, by December 1916 it was moving forward toward
becoming a law.  One of central managers of the bill in the
House was Edward T. Taylor, a Democrat from Colorado.  From
1916 on, grazing policy would frequently have Taylor’s name
attached to it.  Apart from minor differences over
implementation (especially over the definition of
driveways, or the paths or trails of herding and transport
within the homesteaded range), the House and Senate moved
relatively quickly toward passage of the bill.47
Closing in on the holiday recess, the Senate moved to
act on the bill on December 20 and 21, 1916.  By the 21st,
the Senate entered the final stage of discussion and
debate.  Warren was absent, but the other senator from
Wyoming, Clarence Clark, took the lead in answering many
questions.  Before the end of the day, the Senate voted on
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the bill and it passed.  It was not a significant victory,
however.  Thirty-one yea votes versus twenty-five nays,
with an amazing number -- forty -- of senators not voting
at all.  Warren was in this last group.48  
The bill had passed Congress, however, and Warren
seemed satisfied with the result when he reported to
inquiring constituents.  He assumed it would be signed into
law, as it was, but he did not know how soon it would take
effect on the range to the practical use of the industry.49
A flurry of interest in the new law came into Warren’s
office.  Most communications were neither protests nor
endorsements, but merely inquiries about the details of the
law.  Those details were still being ironed out, Warren
said, and he would pass on information as it was made
available.  Warren’s secretary wrote, “I believe everyone
who can write . . . has written us for a copy.  And why
there should be such a grand rush over it is another queer
thing, as it may be a long, long time before the areas are
designated.”  Indeed, as Reed Smoot, Republican Senator
from Utah, said on the floor of the Senate, there was such
a demand upon all western senators that the law should be
printed as a public document.  Smoot’s request was met with
the printing of Senate Document No. 663.50  Warren resisted
giving advice to the many people inquiring about making a
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stock-raising homestead.51
The year had barely begun and the Forest Service
announced that it would be raising grazing fees in the
national forests.  Representative Carl Hayden of Arizona
entered into the record a lengthy collection of protests
from stock associations to individual owners.  The Stock-
Raising Homestead Act, though on its way to reality, was
still an abstraction to most westerners.  Forest grazing
was the here and now.  The Department of Agriculture
justified the increasing fees for a variety of reasons. 
First, it pointed out, the net area of the national forests
actually decreased from 1916 to 1917, and the number of
forests dropped from 152 to 147, partially due to
consolidation but also due to the whittling away that the
secretary had warned about the previous year.  Moreover,
the entrance of the United States into the Great War had a
significant impact on the administration of its forests, as
many foresters and other officials were commissioned by the
War Department as soldiers.52
Warren, meanwhile, continued on with his by now
familiar routine of acquiring more public lands for
Wyoming.  A bill, S. 7894, for example, to exchange lands
in Montana and Wyoming, drew, as Warren commented,
“considerable sparring . . . on the part of Senator Chilton
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[Democrat, of West Virginia] but he withdrew his objections
after I had an opportunity to explain the situation to
him.”53  
Another clue to Warren’s lack of direct involvement
with the Stock-Raising Act may lie in comments made by, of
all people, Warren’s rival Joseph Carey.  Addressing the
Wyoming Stock Growers Association, Carey did not oppose the
enlarged homestead overtly, but he left no doubt as to what
it would mean for the future of the industry.  In short,
the days of the open range were numbered.  Carey believed
all the public lands would be entered in a few years. He
expected that the availability of land for grazing would be
greatly reduced.  “Some of the stockmen will take advantage
of the conditions and will lease ranges in whole or in part
from homesteaders. . . . The ranges hereafter will be of
small size.”  For these reasons, Carey supported leasing
policies as the only hope of fair and just grazing for the
industry.  Enlarging the homestead was “sure to change the
condition of the live stock business in all of the
remaining public land states.”  The wise stock owner would
prepare for that immediately.54
Beginning in 1918, the situation the stock raisers
faced began to worsen.  A cruel combination of separate
events worked against them, from the Great War to the
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beginning of a three-year drought.  The Stock-Raising
Homestead Act, ostensibly designed to acknowledge a use of
the land different than basic farming, came to be seen as a
hindrance to the industry.  Rising grazing fees in the
national forests added to the concern.  Warren was largely
on the sidelines, offering the occasional measure to expand
Wyoming lands or aid the burgeoning petroleum industry--
including an area called Teapot Dome--but offering no
solution to the stock raisers’ problem and remarkably only
perfunctory consolation.55
A signal of the bad times ahead can be found in the
Department of Agriculture’s Yearbook for 1918.  While
emphasizing the benefits of national forest grazing, the
department contrasted the situation in private and the
unregulated public lands.  “The live-stock business is
becoming precarious for owners who are dependent upon the
open range.”  Grazing in the national forests, at least at
this point, was still humming along smoothly.56  In the
more candid Annual Report of the Secretary of Agriculture,
even the national forests were described as wearing thin. 
The drought affected these lands, to be sure, but at the
root of the problem was the war.57
At the 1918 meeting of the National Live Stock
Association, the industry was nervous.  It called for
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forest grazing fees to be frozen, if not lowered, and
certainly not raised.  It also demanded significant changes
in how forest service grazing was administered.  Among the
industry’s wish list: long-term permits, a move away from
the 640 acre unit as a basis for permits, and grazing
privileges to be based on “land and improvements, rather
than upon live stock itself.”  As always, the association
called for grazing jurisdiction over the nation’s
unoccupied public lands.  It even called for grazing in the
national parks as an “emergency war measure.”  Most
remarkably, though, the National Live Stock Association
also passed a resolution calling for the suspension of the
Stock-Raising Homestead Act!  The association believed the
640 acre land unit was “enticing many families away from
comfortable homes” to lands where “they were utterly unable
to make a living.”  Even more telling--and revealing of the
industry’s conservative tendency to protect existing owners
against new competition--the resolution declared that the
act “not only holds out false hopes, but also destroys
existing range.”  The resolution called on suspension of
the act entirely for the duration of the war.58
By 1919 the drought in the West was getting worse. 
The Department of Agriculture took credit for “acting
promptly” and adjusted the movement of cattle within the
211
national forests.  “At the time this movement [for relief]
began,” the department boasted, “decided signs of panic
were evident throughout the drought region.  In a month’s
time, however, they had entirely disappeared.”  Perhaps,
but this rationalized relief did not apply to the domain
outside the forests.59
In 1919 the department contemplated raising grazing
fees.  Receipts were already at an all-time high
($4,358,414.86 that year alone) but the pressure of the war
and the drought made forest service grazing a premium.  In
a sense, the federal government held the capital in a
seller’s market.  To make matters worse for the stock
raisers, prices were falling throughout the year.  The fall
of 1918 saw good prices and an unusually gentle winter,
leading many to think that their luck was changing.  But it
was not.  The drought continued, especially harsh in
Montana, Wyoming, Utah, and Idaho.60
When Warren noticed these declining prices and the
general state of uncertainty in the livestock industry, he
contacted his son, Fred, who was now running the Warren
Live Stock Company.  Until 1919, Warren’s papers kept
political and business correspondence separate.  That
changed in the 1920s, however.  The National Live Stock
Association, meeting in 1919 to assess the dismal state of
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the industry, called on politicians to rein in the rising
grazing fees.  At just the time the western senator was
needed the most, however, he requested that he be removed
from the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.   Why did
Warren withdraw from a position so central to his state’s
issues?  One can only speculate, but he was spending more
and more time in Wyoming tending to his private business. 
Indeed, the official notice of his withdrawal from the
Senate committee was sent by proxy; Warren was still in
Wyoming when the session opened.61
As the decade drew to a close, the aging Warren
withdrew into his business activities more and more.  He
continued to serve with vigor on many committees--Military
Affairs was always a favorite--but the issues of land
policy, grazing, and the livestock industry seemed to be an
irritant more than anything else.  As many parts of the
nation moved into the “roaring twenties,” American
agriculture barely got a turn on the dance floor.  Prices
continued to fall, and the limits of land policy grew
strained.  
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CHAPTER 6
WARREN’S FINAL YEARS 
AND DEADLOCKED SEARCH FOR A GRAZING POLICY,
1920-1929
The 1920s saw a renewed sense of urgency about the
grazing problem.  Agriculture in general missed out on the
“roaring twenties” and instead wrestled with falling prices
and depressed foreign and domestic markets.  Warren’s final
years in the Senate, though, were custodial, marked not by
bold moves to overhaul grazing policy but by piecemeal
measures.  The grazing debate moved ahead without Warren as
a central voice.  The aging senator was instead content to
react to issues and problems as they arose; he left the
search for a larger policy in the hands of others.  Yet as
a powerful politician, he was forced to interact with the
day-to-day realities of grazing problems.  Even in his
declining years, he could not fully escape the issue.
The war was over, livestock prices were falling, and
1920 began a decade of unease for the stock raising
industry.  The wool market collapsed overnight, for
example.  Now even more dependent on national forest
grazing, the industry found itself hemmed in by the
regulations of forest grazing and the deteriorated
conditions of the remaining open range.  The Department of
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Agriculture summarized the rancher’s difficult situation
regarding the national forests: “Much of the early
opposition to the National Forests was based on the feeling
that the system was un-American.  It was held that private
enterprise could develop to best advantage the great
resources involved.  On general principles, the average
American has a healthy dislike of too much government.” 
But by 1920, grazing in the national forests had become an
expectation, even an entitlement for the industry. 
Especially when contrasted with the dubious conditions and
administration of the open range, forest grazing had been a
success.1
That sense of entitlement did not carry with it a
blanket acceptance of all forest policy, however.  Indeed,
from 1915 to 1920 the grazing fees in the national forests
had doubled, much to the chagrin of permit holders as the
war increased demand.  The National Live Stock Association,
predictably, called for the lowering of grazing fees, or at
the very least a moratorium on any increase.  The group
also reasserted its desire for federal control of the
entire public domain, land outside the nation forests.  Two
hundred million acres of unallotted, unappropriated public
land, “more valuable for grazing than for any other
agricultural use, [was] now steadily deteriorating from
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overgrazing, threatening its utter ruin.”  The association
called on Congress to institute a grazing policy for such
lands, to be directed by the Department of Agriculture. 
The industry would complain about specific fees and
policies, but its reliance on the federal bureaucracy was
fully entrenched by the 1920s.2
Warren, always a friend to the military, spent much of
1920 pushing a bill to give soldiers preferential treatment
in claiming public land.  As a measure of postwar
appreciation, the measure sailed through with virtually no
opposition.  While Warren was racking up goodwill points
from veterans for a move that could have been passed by
virtually anyone, the real battle over grazing fees was
taking place in the House.  Congressmen Edward Taylor of
Colorado and Carl Hayden of Arizona spoke at length about
grazing fees in the national forests.  Taylor, especially,
had long held that public lands should be disposed into
private hands, but he had accepted the idea of grazing
control. Taylor would drive much of the future of grazing
policy.  Warren had little to say about the matter, and his
work on land policy as it affected Wyoming centered around
road construction, especially through the national parks.3
In a letter to his son, Fred, about the Warren Live
Stock Company and the general state of the livestock
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economy, Warren revealed his frustrations over falling
prices.  Profits were dismal, and Warren feared a
forthcoming “shipwreck [of] the business . . . everybody
will have to quit, eat less, and go naked.”  Warren also
betrayed his contempt for the organized labor movement,
however, something he was careful elsewhere to be
diplomatic about.  “There is one pleasure in that
contemplation,” he wrote, “and that is they will have a
chance to get even with the A. F. of L. who have not got
millions in their treasury and propose to run the world
along all Bolshevik and Soviet lines.”  The 1920s were not
off to an auspicious start for Warren and his private
business.4
While much of the grazing debate continued in the
House, Warren was not entirely uninvolved.  In the Senate
he followed an unauthored measure (originally introduced by
the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry) that would
require registration but no license for grazing use of
certain public domain lands.  Warren was not optimistic
about the bill’s future, but frequently mentioned it to
inquiring constituents who wondered what he was doing in
the matter of grazing.  Additional measures regarding the
leasing of grazing lands in Alaska also entered the
discussion, though there was little disagreement about
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grazing the territory so far away.5
Even the Department of Agriculture faced uncertainty
as to the future of grazing fees in the national forests. 
The 1920 Annual Report was unusually revealing.  The
department admitted that regulated grazing had become “the
principal source of money return to the Government from the
national forests.”  Fees had doubled since 1915, and the
department wondered about the wisdom of a continued
increase of fees which might “add to the instability” of
the industry.  The report noted that existing leases were
due to expire in 1923, and that care should be taken if the
system were to be greatly altered at or before that time.6
Beginning in 1920, agricultural prices plummeted
because of overproduction.  By some estimates the price of
food fell by 70 percent in the decade prior to the Great
Depression, obviously resulting in hard times for farmers
and stock raisers.  Warren was receiving more and more
complaints about the market in general and grazing fees in
particular.  “I am receiving much mail from bankers, stock
growers, wheat growers, and others as to the deplorable
conditions of the market,” he wrote to the president of the
Stockgrowers’ Bank in Worland, Wyoming.  Warren hinted at
some action.  “We are stirring up matters so that the
Senators as they come in from the agricultural districts
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may take a hand,” Warren said, “and we ought to be able, it
seems to me, with so many Members of Congress who must be
interested and so many producers who are urging them along,
to gain some relief.”  But he carefully refrained from
promising anything specific: “Just what, and how soon, we
are unable to state.  In fact, we cannot state to a
certainty that anything can be done, although we believe
that something can be accomplished.”7 
To the editor of the Sheep and Goat Raisers’ Magazine,
Warren expressed similar sentiments, and even began a
discussion of industry protection, however little hope
there might have been for relief along that avenue.  
“Whether a protective tariff measure would be approved by a
free-trade President is problematical,” he admitted.  “But
I should like to see the members of the respective
Committees on Ways and Means and on Finance try to engineer
and bring to some sort of conclusion an amendment of the
present tariff laws giving protection to these industries.” 
Warren concluded his letter with a personal touch,
reminding readers that he was in the same situation they
were in: “As you may know, I am a raiser of sheep and wool,
and have a personal as well as a public interest in such
matters.”8
But even on the matter of protection, Warren would not
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take the lead.  Instead he followed the path laid out by
Senator Reed Smoot, Republican of Utah.  Smoot never saw a
tariff he did not love, and would be instrumental in the
so-called Smoot-Hawley Tariff passed into law in 1930 that,
many believe, only accelerated the nation’s descent into
economic depression.  In 1920, Smoot introduced Senate bill
4557, a protective measure intended to provide relief for
the wool industry.  Warren said of this bill that it “seems
to me to be the most practical” move on the subject, and
assured constituents that they “many be sure that my
efforts will be directed toward obtaining the relief
desired.”  As always, however, Warren was cautious about
the chances of the bill actually being passed in that
session.9
Privately, Warren was very concerned over the wool
market.  The month of May was especially bad and the
industry had seen little recovery since.  Writing in
December a personal letter to a friend in Colorado, Warren
confessed that “the mercury in my system, especially as to
finances, is way down in the bulb, and the bulb is not very
full at that.”  He went on to recount the woes of the year. 
“In this year 1920 . . . we could not anticipate -- and I
guess nobody living expected it, for certainly it is
entirely without precedent -- that in the month of May, and
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within almost a 24-hour period, the bottom would drop
completely out of the wool market.  And there has been no
wool market since.”  As to whether tariff protection or
some other political device could salvage the situation,
Warren offered no comment.  Warren later wrote to Fred
outlining much the same situation, though discussing the
tariff possibility.  To his son he confided that the Smoot
bill would probably pass the Senate but he had “the gravest
doubts about it passing the House.”  The outlook was not
optimistic.10
On top of everything else, Warren began receiving
complaints from forest graziers about rumors that grazing
fees were about to increase.  Warren promptly wrote to the
chief of the Forest Service to get answers.  “Is it true
that the Forest Service expects to raise the fees for
grazing in the National Forests?” he asked.  Warren, too,
had seen statements in Wyoming newspapers to the effect
that the fees were to be raised.  The answer came quickly. 
“The Forest Service has no intention whatever of raising
the grazing fees at the present time,” Chief Forester W. B.
Greeley wrote.  It seemed that rumors began circulating
after some members of the House Agricultural Committee had
“expressed themselves very decidedly in favor of a radical
increase in the fees,” but the Forest Service itself, as
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well as the Department of Agriculture, had no intention of
raising fees.  This was consistent with the account made by
the Department in its annual report for that year.  The
Forest Service, Greeley wrote, considered itself in a
“quasi-agreement” with the stock raisers not to raise or
reduce fees until the end of the five-year period of the
leases.  By the mid-1920s, however, the situation would
need to be reassessed.11
Warren quickly moved to quash the rumors of grazing
fee increases, lest any of them cause a panic in the
already nervous industry.  He arranged to have portions of
Greeley’s letter published in newspapers throughout the
state.  Warren’s office wrote the press release, and
newspapers such as the Laramie Republican, Rawlins
Republican, Basin Republican, Kemmerer Republican, and the
Northern Wyoming Herald obliged by printing it word-for-
word.12
Having put out that small fire, Warren was grateful to
receive a letter from stock raisers in Nebraska that was
not panicked.  “Your letter is the first communication I
have received,” he wrote back, “[that] does not indicate a
belief that the country is in a calamitous and deplorable
condition.”  Warren went on to place his hope in the future
president and a return to Republican control of the
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government.  “A courageous administration by President
Harding will soon bring about improvements . . . .
Criticism and kicking will avail nothing.”  This exchange,
however, stood out because it was such a rarity for Warren
during this time.13
 His day-to-day affairs soon returned to a steady
issuing of reassurances that the forthcoming tariff would
solve the stock industry’s problems.  As quickly as the
letters about rising grazing fees dropped off, inquiries
about the tariff rose in equal measure.  Warren responded
in kind, generally sounding hopeful but pointing out that
protection was slow in coming under the current
administration and the best hope was if the Republicans
could recapture the congress.  To one constituent he was
especially candid.  “As you know, the Republican majority
in the Senate is very small, and even if Southern Democrats
would help us, contrary to their free-trade views, it is
not believed that the President would sign a protective
measure, and it is quite well understood that such
legislation could not be enacted over his veto.”  To
another Wyoming constituent, he wrote simply, “All we can
do now is watch, hope, and pray.”  By the end of the year,
he returned to Wyoming for the holidays and to handle
business.  His staff remained in Washington to continue
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churning out a form letter that said the Senator was “using
every effort possible to assist in bringing about 
favorable consideration of [Smoot’s] bill.”14
In 1921, the major development in the story of grazing
was an effort to have grazing fees on national forests
deferred.  Assured that the fees would not go up or down,
stock raisers hoped to delay payment in the  face of a
plummeting market.  The National Live Stock Association
said that its members were unable to sell their stock, pay
required grazing fees, or receive any credit extensions
from banks.  The association requested that payment of
grazing fees due on March 1 be allowed in two installments,
one at the beginning of the summer and the other at the
beginning of the autumn.  In another, mid-year meeting, the
association called not only for deferred grazing fees but
for reducing them.  Forest graziers said they had been
purchasing their own feed to protect their stock, something
in ordinary years they did not have to do.  The forest bill
was coming due, and they simply could not pay for it.15
Warren was quick to hop on this bandwagon.  He secured
the endorsement of deferred grazing from a local forester
and reprinted the letter in newspapers statewide.  A press
release prepared for the Laramie Republican said that the
senator urged that the fees for the grazing season of 1921
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be reduced because of the “unfortunate condition of the
live stock business.”  Warren’s call for a grazing fee
extension, the self-serving article said, would provide “a
measure of relief” by postponing grazing fee deadlines
until August 1.  In conjunction with the press release,
Warren contacted the secretary of agriculture, urging the
same.  Warren’s intercession on behalf of the grazing
industry also included a harsh proposal that, after the
proposed August 1 extension, any late payments be charged
with interest.  Graziers would gain some extra time to make
their payments, but they faced charges of trespass and even
cancellation of grazing privileges if late.  Warren had to
justify the grazing fee extension in terms, as he put it,
of “broad public interest” and the stiff penalty insured
him against charges of simply “giving away” grazing rights
to his constituents.16
In the Congress, the main drive for the deferment of
grazing fees, at least on the record, was in the House of
Representatives.  The House Committee of Agriculture
recommended that grazing fees be postponed because of the
“unusual financial distress” among the grazing industry
using the national forests for grazing purposes the past
year.  The committee did even better for the industry than
Warren had, pushing the payment deadline to September 1
231
instead of August as Warren had called for.  The committee,
however, addressed directly a problem with the deferment of
grazing fees that the live stock associations and western
politicians did not, namely the budgetary hardships that
local governments would face as a result of the deferred
fees.  Construction and maintenance of roads and trails in
the national forests, as well as local school district
funding, were highly dependent on grazing fee revenue.  To
offset the problem, the House committee essentially
rearranged the calendar of grazing fee permit issue,
collection, and reallocation of funds to local entities. 
The committee justified this shell game in this way: “this
adjustment was due to the local States and counties in
order to carry out the intent of existing law relating to
the use of national forest receipts.”  As Warren wrote
privately, “Even though the government does need the money,
the live stock growers need it more.”  While the House
worked to extend grazing fee deadlines, on the other side
of the capitol, the senator from Wyoming offered another
measure to benefit certain members of the grazing industry. 
On April 3, 1921, he pushed through an amendment to the
Homestead Act that expedited the “proving up” process for
disabled veterans of the Great War.  It was a small but
symbolic measure.  A veteran himself, and father-in law to
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Pershing, Warren was always eager to aid the military.  The
vigorous debate over grazing fees raged in the House,
however, and Warren was not reluctant to let Wyoming
Representative Frank Mondell take the lead.17
Although his public record revealed little of it,
Warren shared the same tension and unease that the
livestock industry exhibited.  In a letter to his private
attorneys, he confided that when people asked him to share
his thoughts on the wool business or the prospect of tariff
protection, he “did not like to express too much anxiety.” 
Indeed, Warren received numerous inquiries about the tariff
issue that generally expressed a fear of losing  support
for protection.  In responding to one nervous interest, the
National Sheep and Wool Bureau of America, Warren attempted
to assuage their fears.  “Yes,” he wrote, “the newspapers
print all sorts of things about what Senate and House
committees are going to do or not going to do.  As a matter
of fact, the Senate Finance Committee has made no plan
whatsoever about suspending the tariff hearings.”  The 1921
tariff debate encompassed many industries and products,
including beef and wool.  Fearing the “foreign meat
situation,” especially, testimony from representatives of
the National Live Stock Association figured prominently in
the hearings.  “We should place a tariff sufficiently high
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on live stock and the products of live stock to cover the
cost of production compared to that of foreign countries,”
one witness declared.  “Plus a reasonable profit,” he
added.  Nervous grazers especially feared competition from
Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, but also even Australia, New
Zealand, and South Africa.18
In addition to quelling rumors about Senate inaction
on the tariff, Warren also began receiving a steady stream
of correspondence complaining about the proposed expansion
of Yellowstone Park.  In response to a query from members
of the Wind River Live Stock Growers Association, for
example, Warren claimed that he did not know “of anything
that is being actively urged at the present time in either
direction mentioned.”   The greatest fear the Wind River
interests expressed rested in “possible restrictions of
grazing privileges in the reserved lands of Wyoming.” 
Warren assured the owners that he would “keep the best
wishes of your Association in mind if anything develops in
the future inimical to your interests.”  Industry
resistance to national parks would grow.  Indeed, the
National Live Stock Growers Association soon passed a
resolution protesting the creation of any additional
national parks, especially those created for recreation. 
The industry argued that the national forests served “all
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the needs of the public for recreation, hunting, and other
purposes,” while parks--walled off against grazing--
“entailed upon the country economic loss.”19
By the end of 1921, Warren’s private correspondence
with his son, Fred, increasingly revealed the fears and
frustrations over the dismal state of the grazing industry. 
The unfolding of this father-son conversation spoke volumes
about the growing anxiety that marked the decade and
provided a private counterpoint to a politician’s public
declarations that progress was being made.  “In my
opinion,” Warren first wrote, “no man can start in the
sheep business and stock up a ranch with young sheep at
present prices and expect to make anything, or even perhaps
pay expenses.”20
Another blow came in a July 1922 editorial in the New
York Herald.  The editorial criticized tariff legislation
in the Senate, not for the reform itself but because so
many members of the Senate were major players in the wool
industry.  Warren was listed second only to Senator Smoot;
both headed a list of western senators in a “wool growing
clique.”21
Privately, in a letter to his son, he seethed at the
editorial, especially coming from a publication “which is
now supposed to be a Republican paper.”  Warren dissected
235
the article for motivation, eventually deducing that it was
really an attack on the whole of the Senate, while the
“wool men” were simply a gimmick to “point with alarm . . .
and try to make it unpopular with the mass of voters
because the western wool growers were few in number.” 
Warren saw all of this as an omen for the grazing industry,
especially his own personal stake in it.  At the end of the
several page letter, he arrived at a startling conclusion:
“I am writing this, Fred, more to put you wise to the fact
that we had better get out of the business as soon as we
can.”  To a man who had built his fortune through a
combination of grazing politics and practice, the future
looked bleak indeed.22
Warren’s dismay over the industry would only grow more
profound.  A few months later he confided to Fred that “the
creeping sickness sails over me whenever I think of the
cattle we have had to sell at the prices we have received.” 
In another letter he wrote: “In this letter, Fred, I
confess that I am more or less discouraged, disgusted, and
blue, and have been growing more so for some months in
relation to land and live stock matters . . . I would drop
the whole landed business for what stands on our books.” 
Warren strained to find a villain in the collapsing
livestock prices.  He said that the wartime pressure to eat
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less beef “has gotten people into the habit of going
without beef” altogether.  Even deeper than consumer
habits, Warren blamed “the profiteers--the middle men . . .
particularly the retailer” for inflating prices and further
discouraging people from buying beef.  In a final display
of conflating issues, Warren then ranted about the cost of
a recent steak dinner, even as he railed against the market
prices. In another letter, however, he regained his
composure and actually offered a sound explanation for the
industry’s situation.  “We thought when the war commenced,”
he wrote to Fred, “that there might be a dump and prices
fall at the end of it, but very soon after that lull . . .
we would have all the better of it, because Germany would
be without cattle and wool; other nations in somewhat the
same condition, but the trouble is they are all so poor
they can scarcely buy anything, and in the meantime other
countries not in the war, under the stimulation of high
prices, increased their live stock and farm products so
that we, instead of being exporters, are sort of
sidetracked and we really have to buck against the world.” 
In the midst of his depression over the industry, Warren
stumbled onto the realization of a globalizing economy.23
None of this made its way into the public record,
however.  It was all father and son conversation.  In the
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Senate, Warren busied himself with routine matters of
validating public land entries for Wyoming constituents. 
He also shrewdly introduced documents to distance himself
from the still recent and unfolding Teapot Dome scandal,
first broken by the Wall Street Journal in April 1922. 
Indeed, Wyoming’s other senator, John Kendrick, would lead
the charge in the investigation that would eventually bring
down Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall.  Warren made it
into the record on the right side of the developing story. 
Kendrick made a name for himself in the Senate
investigation, but Warren soon had little to do with Teapot
Dome at all.  In 1923, Warren worked behind the scenes to
have former Wyoming representative Frank Mondell installed
as Fall’s successor as Secretary of the Interior, but
Warren’s dream of having a Wyoming figure in such a high
position never materialized.  President Harding instead
chose Hubert Work, a physician and former postmaster
general, to fill the vacant spot in the Interior
Department.  Harding’s administration was rocked by
scandal; having a Wyoming man in Fall’s place would only be
a constant reminder of Teapot Dome, and was probably never
a realistic choice.24
Instead, Warren continued to focus on Wyoming-related
issues.  Yellowstone National Park returned to the
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forefront of his attention.  Beginning in January 1923,
Warren again received many inquiries and concerns about
rumors of the southern boundary of the park being expanded. 
Warren expressed doubts that any expansion would occur
soon, but ensured concerned constituents that he would
monitor the “official” situation.  Individuals contacted
Warren in the hope of getting inside knowledge on the
National Park Service’s plans.  Even the Cheyenne Chamber
of Commerce, geographically on the opposite side of the
state, sent inquiries.25
Some constituents feared that Montana interests were
pushing the Park Service into expanding Yellowstone; moving
the boundary further south would mean lost land for
Wyoming.  By the middle of January, as the early March
dismissal of Congress approached, Warren was content enough
to reply that the Montana interest “had subsided.”  By the
end of the month, however, Warren’s office was still
receiving a steady stream of correspondence from Wyoming
interests.  Warren attempted to pacify anxieties.  “So far
as I know,” he wrote to one constituent in the Teton Range,
“there is no bill such as you describe pending before
Congress.”26
Other Wyoming interests saw great value in the
expansion of the park through tourism.  Warren received
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scores of letters from people in the Jackson Hole region
who were enthusiastic about the possibility of bringing
Yellowstone closer to their property.  As Warren put it
when writing privately to a Wyoming state representatives,
“quite a number of dude ranchers . . . would derive
financial benefit from the enlargement of the park.” 
Knowing that at this point the matter was essentially a
swirling rumor and far from implemented policy, Warren
played it safe and remained non-committal to both sides of
the question.  “I am familiar with both sides of the
question,” he wrote in a typical response, “and shall give
it careful consideration.”27  
Dealing with the Yellowstone question or responding to
inquiries about political philosophy could be an easy
diversion when compared to the growing discontent found in
all sectors of the agricultural industry, however.  Warren
expressed sympathy for the struggles of agriculture in the
1920s.  He cast himself in the role of the Jeffersonian
farmer, so important to American democracy.  “I too was a
dirt farmer all of my early life at the real work in the
field, where I earned my living by the sweat of my brow and
body,” he wrote to one Wyoming farmer.  Of course, Warren
had not been a farmer since his early twenties.  The recent
downturn in the livestock business, though, gave him an
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opportunity to commiserate with the struggling farmer.28
While Warren expressed comradery with the salt-of-the-
earth farmer, he saddled up with the grazing industry and
expressed disdain for organized labor more than ever
before.  He singled out Samuel Gompers and labor strikes as
“the real meat of our troubles.”  Gompers was “a Democrat,
a trickster, a man with a big salary that he believes he
can receive only by keeping things in an uproar and
inciting [his] members with the fear that Gompers must be
followed in whatever he proposes or they will suffer
accordingly.”  Organized labor, especially the threat of
strikes, disrupted the natural market system, Warren
believed, and was partially responsible for the falling
prices that “pretty generally ruined” the farmer and
rancher of the 1920s.29
Most Wyoming constituents, however, viewed Gompers and
rallying labor as distant and unimportant to the day-to-day
struggles of agriculture, a convenient scapegoat but not a
serious target for policy.  Livestock owners wanted
protectionism and the fringe benefits of tariff
legislation, especially provisions to fund the destruction
of predatory animals.  On the face of it, government
hunting and trapping of wolves and coyotes seemed to have
little to do with foreign competition, but western
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politicians such as Warren were skilled at bundling a
variety of benefits into their legislation.  
Indeed, Warren was always responsive to livestock
industry demands.  In February 1923, he forwarded to the
Internal Revenue Service an angry telegram from the Natrona
County Wool Growers’ Association, headquartered in Casper.  
Warren submitted the telegram as “one among many, many . .
. complaints” he had received.  In one angry paragraph, the
telegram summarized the misfortunes of the grazing industry
In short, except for a brief war-time period, business was
bad.  That Warren so dutifully forwarded such a message
indicated the pressure he was under as a politician and,
closer to home, as a businessman with a personal interest
in the failing industry.30
And his personal interests were indeed suffering. 
Writing a few days later to his son, Warren said that their
company was “more of a liability than an asset, for I can
see little hope in the future for profit.”  Again, he
contemplated selling it all.  “You know, Fred, one thing is
certain,” he said.  “It would seem better to beg the
business, get out as soon as you can, and charge off the
losses, and what capital you have left put into something
that you know would bring money.”  But Warren was not quite
ready to bail out on the business that he had nurtured for
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so long.  In the Senate, Warren placated the Wool Growers
of Natrona County by  pushing through unanimously a measure
(S. 4146)  to grant 640 acres to the county for “public
park purposes.”31  
From the perspective of the Department of Agriculture,
however, the bad times were described with less hyperbole. 
In summarizing the grazing industry for 1923, the
Department of Agriculture admitted that the 640-acre
grazing homestead act and tariff reduction had combined to
deplete the wool industry, while the cattle industry had
been growing.  Even the cattle industry, though, suffered a
setback after overextending itself during the war years. 
Credit was in jeopardy.  Stock liquidation was rampant. 
The majority of livestock owners were now fully dependent
on leasing their grazing lands, and increasingly “there is
generally insufficient range for all.”  The only bright
spot in the industry could be found with livestock owners
who had the resources to supplement public land grazing
with grain feeding in the final stages before leading the
animals to market.32
These comments were found in the Department of
Agriculture’s Yearbook, a document designed with the
agricultural user in mind.  The Annual Report, aimed more
precisely at Congress,  expressed even more concern about
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the need for a new grazing policy.  It recommended raising
grazing fees, or at least revamping them to reflect more
accurately the true value of the land.  “In other words,”
the report said, “the very stability which the livestock
industry desires and should have in the use of the
national-forest ranges demands that users pay the public
fairly for value received.”  This statement was qualified
with remarks that the government was not attempting to turn
national forest grazing into a profit-making venture, but
instead was seeking only to “require payment for the value
of the public resources used . . . as determined reasonably
and equitably on accepted business principles.”  These
notions would not go unnoticed by the livestock industry
for very long.33
But grazing was only one aspect of the national forest
system; the federal government had to manage it
appropriately with other uses, from timber to tourism.  One
solution was obvious: to increase the size and allocation
of the public forests.  While western politicians such as
Warren worked tirelessly to acquire more land for their
states, the federal government was moving in the opposite
direction.  This push-pull relationship was best summed up
in a concluding statement in the 1923 report: “Since local
as well as national welfare is at stake, every reasonable
244
encouragement should be given to the States to cooperate
with the Federal Government in buying idle forest land
which can be restored to productive use only through public
ownership.”  The notion of what constituted “reasonable
encouragement” would also soon come under question, if not
attack, from grazing interests.34
By the spring of 1924, Warren began receiving another
round of letters protesting grazing fees in general and
expressing fear that fees would be raised.  One cattle
owner from Pinedale, Wyoming wrote that he was deeply in
debt, had no chance at future credit, and would be unable
to pay even the token fees necessary to graze in the nearby
forest.  “The only thing we can do,” he said, “is to hang
on and hope for better prices for our livestock.”  This
man, accustomed to grazing public lands, requested that new
users of the forest be kept “to a minimum or a free grazing
permit be issued for this season.”  Another man, writing
from Rock Springs, echoed the concern and blamed banks for
the industry’s woes.  “It is pitiable the condition that
the cattlemen of this nation are in to-day,” he complained. 
“They have put up all the security they have; they have
their ranches that they have been for thirty to fifty years
building up; all their livestock, ranches, and all their
property mortgaged up to its full limit.  They have no way
245
to pay the grazing fees except the banks put up the money
without any security.”  The situation was dire, “all of
these cattlemen . . . down and out,” and the writer
appealed to Warren to do all he could to secure some
relief.  “Won’t you be good enough to go to the Secretary
of Agriculture and lay this matter before him?”35
Without delay, Warren did just that.  He wrote
directly to Henry Wallace, the secretary of agriculture,
and relayed his troubled constituents’  pleas for help.  He
asked Wallace to “extend some unusual relief.” Warren then
wrote back to the cattle owners to explain that he had
carried out their wishes in the name of good public
service.  He also included copies of two bills currently
lingering in the Senate that might offer some relief. 
Senator Phipps of Utah had introduced one bill, S. 2424, to
reduce grazing fees and also a more radical bill, S. 2325,
that would turn over all of the unreserved public domain to
the development of the live stock industry.  Warren was
candid about his doubts that such bills would ever be
implemented, having “received no encouragement up to the
present time.”  Indeed, Warren informed his constituents
that there was little chance that grazing fees would be
reduced, or that an increase could be averted, “unless
administrative power is taken away from the Secretary of
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Agriculture.”  Warren’s papers show no trace of a response
from Wallace on the matter.36
Perhaps out of frustration, perhaps out of desire to
be involved in less regional issues, Warren in the 1920s
expressed increasingly less interest in actually drafting
legislation in regard to the land policies affecting the
West.  Indeed, at the same time that he went to bat for
struggling Wyoming ranchers, he deliberately declined a
position on the Committee on Public Lands.  In the
provenance of his preserved papers, Warren kept a curious
piece of hate mail.  To what extent it is directly related
to his lack of action on land policy, or merely the ravings
of an unbalanced citizen, is unclear.  But there it is:
“You are a traitor to your party,” the writer said, “a
menace to your country.  If Congress knew how it stood in
the eyes of the majority of the people, it would adjourn
and its members slink home.”  Warren dutifully offered a
terse response: “Thank you--with kind regards, very truly
yours, F. E. Warren.”  After decades in office, and having
endured worse, Warren probably preserved the rant for a
chuckle.37
Although no longer serving on the Committee on Public
Lands, Warren and his office maintained a close
relationship with the grazing industries.  Not only did
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Warren repeatedly relay the desire to have grazing fees
reduced or deferred, he also pressured the Department of
Agriculture to take other steps to provide relief for his
state’s chief industry.  He wrote to Secretary Wallace with
“creative” measures such as defraying the expenses of
livestock inspection at various market centers.  Such
“relief” often fell upon deaf ears, with only a perfunctory
response from Wallace if any at all, but Warren made sure
his staff forwarded copies of his appeals to grazing
interests back in Wyoming.  At the very least, he
maintained an appearance of action.38
Warren was not above intervening on behalf of a
specific company either.  In 1924 he went to considerable
trouble to promote the business of the Leo Sheep Company in
Rawlins, Wyoming.  He introduced Senate Bill 3362
specifically to benefit the company.  Like many other
legislative proposals, the bill was a land exchange,
conveying “certain lands” to the United States government
for the purpose of “the improvement of the Medicine Bow
National Forest.” This bill was different, however, in that
from its inception it authorized a specific company -- the
Leo Sheep Company -- to sell part of its land and receive
additional unappropriated lands in return.  The federal
government only sold the grazing rights, however, keeping
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mining, mineral, and oil rights in its name.  More than
most national forests, the Medicine Bow was a fragmented,
disjointed series of “islands” on the map and not a
continuous swath of protected land.  The Leo Sheep Company
Bill, despite its name, was a step in unifying the Medicine
Bow forest, or at least that was how Warren and members of
the Public Lands committee promoted it.  Warren’s office
wrote to interests in Rawlins, Wyoming--the headquarters of
the Leo Sheep Company--and reported that the outlook for
the bill was “favorable.”39
The Leo Sheep Bill was symbolic of the path Warren
took in the 1920s.  No longer presenting sweeping proposals
to alter radically the land system of the United States,
the aging senator was content to react to issues one at a
time as they arose, especially as they affected his home
state.  The grazing industry in Wyoming, however, still
clamored for grand reforms.  At the same time that Warren
was pushing through the legislation to benefit the Leo
Sheep Company, the Wyoming Stock Growers Association met to
discuss the future of the industry.  
The WSGA devoted considerable time to hear the
comments of one Mr. Hatton, who had met with the secretary
of agriculture and other officials in the Forest Service to
ascertain the grazing situation.  Carried by applause,
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Hatton took his industry audience through a laundry list of
the wounds to the industry.  The Great War, he said, was
the first body blow.  Four years of the “greatest
catastrophe the world has known could not be made good in a
day.”  Out of the ashes of the world war, the grazing
industry next faced severe credit problems, Hatton said,
chiefly due to years of “recklessness and carelessness” in
both the issuing and foreclosing of credit.  Finally Hatton
arrived at the most tangible cause for discontent, “the
grazing fee question.”  Hatton singled out but did not name
a few congressmen who “thought the present rates were too
low and that they should be increased about three hundred
percent.”  Hatton sympathized with the Forest Service and
said that it only raised fees reluctantly; he cited the
phasing in of fee raises and the locking in of fees as
evidence that the Forest Service was not out to gouge the
western rancher.  Fresh from a meeting with federal
officials and apparently wooed by their perspective, Hatton
placed the blame for the lack of a grazing policy not on
the Forest Service but on the fragmentation of politics
itself.40
Hatton’s diagnosis was correct.  In the Senate, a
variety of grazing discussion was underway, though with
little unity or particular momentum in any direction. 
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Senator Duncan Fletcher, a Democrat from Florida,
introduced a “plan for making the forest reserves
productive.”  Fletcher’s plan centered around a paper
written by Martin Dodge, an official with a background in
public road policy.  The Dodge paper began with a cutting
observation that drew on conservation.  The paper declared:
“A Japanese statesman recently said, ‘The American cares
for his country because he believes it belongs to him; a
Japanese cares for his country because he believes he
belongs to it.’” The paper went on to accuse the western
states of greed that drove the “exhaustion” of the public
lands.  For all the bravado critical of western land
policy, the solution Dodge offered -- and by extension
considered by Fletcher -- was to offer an additional 160
acres to the homestead, hardly enough to make a significant
difference in the vast ranges of the West and perhaps just
enough to prolong the disproportionate land policy that had
been in place for decades.41
Another piecemeal move in the Senate came from Ralph
Cameron, a Republican senator from Arizona.  Cameron
entered into the record a desperate letter from a
constituent rancher.  John Hampton of Phoenix listed the by
now familiar refrain of the grazing industry: years of
drought and bad luck, credit woes, and the fear of rising
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grazing fees that would outpace profit.  Ranchers were cash
poor and unable to pay taxes and grazing fees, he said,
appealing that grazing fees be suspended for the next two
years.  In and of itself, the Hampton plea was nothing new;
indeed, the records of various stock raising associations
reflect resolution after resolution calling for the same
measures.  But Cameron was responding to the pressures of a
major industry in his home state, as Warren had on
countless occasions.  Through the early 1920s, few
politicians were calling for a complete overhaul of United
States land policy, but most instead seemed content to mend
the tattered garment with patches one resolution or bill at
a time.42
That began to change in 1925.  Both the House and the
Senate held hearings on the grazing situation.  The House
hearing debated the reduction or suspension of grazing fees
and also established a Board of Grazing Appeals as an
attempt to give burdened ranchers a forum for airing their
grievances -- apart from constant complaining to their
representatives in Congress. The Senate primarily tackled
the grazing issue in the context of the national forests. 
Warren’s interaction with constituents on grazing paced on
as always, though his on-the-record presence in the Senate
was overshadowed by other westerners.
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Where Senator Smoot of Utah began the year flooding
the Congressional Record with memorials from his state’s
legislature calling for reduction, suspension, or any
relief possible on national forest service grazing fees,
Senator Warren dealt with grazing issues behind the scenes. 
Warren used his influence to secure a job with the Internal
Revenue Service for a Wyoming constituent, a banker, who
had lost it all when his bank failed.  The credit woes of
the 1920s, it seemed, not only affected ranchers, although
few ranchers had a senator who would line up a second job
for them.43
Warren’s staff answered the increasing clamor for
grazing reform, cautioning all correspondents against
getting their hopes up; “I cannot imagine how it [a grazing
bill] would have the ghost of a show to get through all of
the legislative steps that would bring it to the President
for approval during the present session,” a typical answer
read.  Warren himself spent more effort on securing funding
for a road from Yellowstone National Park to Cody, Wyoming
and additional service roads for the recently completed
Shoshone Dam.  Warren did set aside time to answer a letter
inquiring about business prospects in Wyoming.  This letter
was quite like the inquiring homesteader from Pennsylvania
*See Chapter 1.
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in 1897.*  Where Warren was guarded and matter-of-fact  in
his 1897 response, offering a summary of land laws in a
token promotion of his state, his response nearly twenty
years later was bluntly pessimistic.  “I believe that no
State in the Union was harder hit by the changed conditions
that followed the cessation of the World War,” he wrote of
Wyoming.  “Those who did not suffer the loss of everything
in 1919 have had their burdens to bear during the
succeeding years,” he concluded.  Warren’s letter was
hardly the promotion a chamber of commerce would have hoped
for.  Indeed, Warren discussed the failure of legislation
to benefit Wyoming since the Great War; if Warren was
trying to frighten away settlers, as some ranchers wished
to do to limit competition, he probably succeeded.44
In late February 1926, the Senate began hearings on
the conditions of the stock raising industry in general and
grazing in the national forests in particular.  Many
senators took their place in the well.  Senator Henry
Ashurst of Arizona offered remarks under the heading
“Injustices Practiced Upon Cattle Growers” and claimed that
the range cattle industry was “about to be exterminated.” 
Smoot offered comments as well, and Senator Ralph Cameron
entered into the record pages of appeals sent to his office
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calling for a grazing policy that westerners could live
with.  Warren was not present.  Wyoming interests were
represented instead by Senator Kendrick, who supported
reducing grazing fees, but with reservations.  First,
Kendrick defended the Forest Service and the Department of
Agriculture from attack, casting blame for raised grazing
fees onto the House of Representatives.  Second, Kendrick
sympathized with the struggle of grazers to pay the forest
fees but emphasized the need to keep those fees competitive
with private lands, lest the national forests be overrun
and injured from overgrazing.  Warren’s office issued
perfunctory summaries of the debate and copies of proposed
legislation to those who inquired, but the senator said
little about the debate in either his personal or political
correspondence.45
Where Warren’s name did surface in connection with
grazing was from his position on the Committee on
Appropriations.  A Deficiency Appropriation Bill, a
standard bill following the House’s general appropriation
bill, worked in among many other items, direction and
funding for a “joint commission for the investigation of
the public domain.”  This commission would be made of up
three senators, appointed by the President, and three
representatives, chosen by the Speaker of the House.  Their
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task was to investigate the public domain and its
administration, including grazing lands, and forest
reserves.  Although no time frame for the commission was
assigned, it appeared that the land policy of the United
States would again come under scrutiny and perhaps
reevaluation.  Again, Warren’s association with this
commission was limited.  In the meantime, the House pressed
on and actually waived grazing fees in drought-stricken
parts of the West.  Technically, the Congress authorized
the secretary of agriculture to lower and waive fees
“according to his discretion,” but the meaning was clear. 
Some discussion of this measure followed on March 3, but
Warren did not participate.46
Warren showed little involvement in grazing on the
record, but behind the scenes, as always, he worked for
constituents and Wyoming interests.  He personally
intervened on behalf of a Wyoming judge who had a side-
business in the sheep industry near the Black Hills. 
Apparently the judge was having difficulty in securing a
grazing permit; Warren’s wrote directly  to the Chief of
the Forest service to expedite the matter.  He also wrote
to the judge, a resident of Sundance, Wyoming, to assure
him that he had done his best but could not promise
anything.  Warren frequently hedged his bets in this way.47
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Warren did submit to the Senate a few memorials from
the Wyoming state legislature, including a message from the
Wyoming state legislature that opposed the creation of
grazing districts on public land; indeed, Wyoming said, “we
urgently request that the Congress of the United States do
not pass said bill.”  Warren offered no comment at this
point other than to introduce these memorials into the
record.48
By the summer of 1925, grazing matters quieted down,
at least in Congress.  The Commission was underway, the
House had pressed for a reduction in grazing fees.  Warren
carried on as usual.  When the Wyoming Stock Growers
Association met in June, however, it seemed that little had
changed.  Warren’s old rival Carey, now working for the
industry, spoke to the group.  Carey saw a solution in the
works.  It was possible that a Leasing Bill might emerge
from Washington.  But Carey guarded his optimism,
recognizing the lack of a united front for the West. “It is
unfortunate that we cannot agree amongst ourselves, and
that consequently it is not possible to get legislation
through Congress.”  In this rare moment, the range industry
was telling itself that it was its greatest impediment, not
the Congress or some federal department.  By the end of the
meeting, however, the Wyoming industry group stopped short
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of calling for a new leasing system.  The WSGA’s 1925
meeting offered no resolution calling for -- or against,
for that matter -- a leasing bill as Carey desired.49
The search for a grazing policy continued the
following year with more hearings and debate.  Several
bills were introduced to address a variety of grazing
issues, from specific bills to reduce grazing fees or
provide for grazing in the territory of Alaska, to larger
measures designed to overhaul public domain use in general. 
Many of these bills disappeared into the chasm of
committees.  Congress reflected the anxieties over grazing
but enacted very little.  A lively debate in the House even
attempted to connect the need for a grazing policy with a
strong national defense, recalling the old aphorism, “an
army fights on its belly.”  For his part, Warren’s
interaction with the grazing issue was consistent with his
recent past -- that is, responding to specific problems of
constituents and industry interests.  Even so, whatever
renewed impetus there may have been for grazing reform,
Warren was growing weary and increasingly less involved
with the details of legislation.50
Even his desire to work on behalf of specific Wyoming
industries waned.  The 1925 bill, for example, to exchange
Leo Sheep Company lands with the Medicine Bow National
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Forest was favored by the Department of Agriculture but
opposed by the Department of the Interior.  Warren’s office
merely handed the matter to Wyoming’s other senator, John
Kendrick.  Kendrick held a seat on the on Public Lands and
Surveys committee and, Warren thought, stood a better
chance at achieving a favorable result for the Rawlins
company.  Senator Robert Stanfield, a Republican from
Oregon, had recently taken the chair of the powerful
committee; Kendrick and Stanfield, both allies of Warren on
many issues, could accomplish more than Warren might alone. 
At the very least, the matter was out of Warren’s hands.51
Privately, Warren doubted that any general grazing
policy would emerge from this Congress or any in the near
future.  Writing to a friend in Wyoming, Warren distilled
the difficulty of managing the public domain down to its
essence.  “The whole subject,” he said, minimizing intra-
West disagreements over grazing, “is necessarily tied up
with the conditions existing in other sections of the
country . . . The difficulty lies in arriving at a general
policy.”52
Indeed, one form of this resistence to a grazing
policy coming from those “other sections of the country”
that Warren referred to was reflected in a memorial to
Congress presented by Senator Hiram Bingham, a Republican
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from Connecticut.  Bingham entered into the record a
statement from the Connecticut State Board of Fisheries and
Game, opposing especially Senator Stanfield’s bill to
regulate grazing on the public domain.  Stanfield held
hearings in the summer of 1925 that offered a “sounding
board” against the Forest Service.  Stanfield’s bill, S.
2584, was a comprehensive bill, covering both land in the
public domain and in the forest reserves.  Stanfield called
for grazing districts to managed much like those in the
forest system.  Stanfield’s bill did not pass, but it made
it onto the floor--“the first bill in twenty-five years of
attempts to have such legislation reported from committee,”
according to E. Louise Peffer.  The bill did not pass
because of prolonged disagreement over grazing fees, and
perhaps the animosity stirred up by the hearings.  Bingham
and the Connecticut conservationists said that the bill, if
enacted into law “purports to regulate grazing on the
public domain” but would  “actually make regulation
impossible.”  The statement went on to condemn Stanfield’s
bill as “a most vicious attack upon our national
conservation program” that would be a “great cause of game
destruction and of deforestation.”53
Closer to home, another type of conservationist -- the
hunter -- opposed grazing in public forests for more
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selfish reasons.  The Teton Forest in the western half of
the state, home to the sharpest and perhaps most striking
peaks in all of Wyoming, had a robust industry in game
hunting (a stepchild of tourism).  The hunting industry
opposed cattle and sheep grazing in the area for fear of
disrupting the natural migrations of big game.  Senators
Warren and Kendrick felt pressure here from both sides and
sought a middle ground.  Kendrick personally toured the
Teton range and discovered that big game did not occupy all
of the territory and that cattle could not graze on the
land because of the abundance of poisonweed.  Warren saw in
this observation an opportunity to benefit sheep graziers
and appealed to the Forest Service to open the Teton forest
to the wool industry.  Although Warren received an amenable
response from the Forest Service, no action was promised. 
Warren at least scored points with the Teton County Wool
Growers Association for trying.  He wrote to the director
to say that the grazing question in the Teton Forest would
not be answered until the boundary of Yellowstone had been
fixed, and Yellowstone always seemed on the edge of
expansion.  Indeed, Warren’s office was periodically
flooded with concerned letters full of panic that some
substantial change to Yellowstone was in the works; he
dutifully inquired and reported that while bills to alter
261
Yellowstone were common, it was only through Public Lands
Committee that any significant change would occur.  “I have
not learned that anything whatsoever is being done in the
Public Lands and Surveys Committee with relation to the
boundary of Yellowstone National Park,” he said.54
While steps toward a grazing policy moved forward,
Warren stepped away and increasingly relied on Kendrick to
handle Wyoming matters.  In the spring of 1926, Warren was
even more distracted when his second wife, Clara, was
hospitalized in Baltimore.  When one Wyoming resident,
concerned about progress on an irrigation project in
Riverton, wrote to Warren, the senator replied and insisted
that although they were of different parties, the matter
was in good hands with Kendrick.  “There is no jealousy nor
trouble between Senator Kendrick and me,” Warren said. 
“Speaking for myself,” he went on, “my desire is that both
of us . . . may do everything we can to help the State,
forgetting, meanwhile, that we have a mixed Delegation.” 
Indeed, Warren’s correspondence with Kendrick indicates no
ill will at all; this observation is all the more striking
when placed alongside the life-long bad blood between
Warren and fellow Republican  Joseph Carey.55
Indeed, Warren’s detachment from grazing and other
legislative matters prompted some Wyoming residents to
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complain.  Warren’s office dutifully defended the aging
senator’s absence.  A man from Colony, a small community in
the extreme northeastern corner of the state, complained to
Warren’s office that the senator had “forgotten” to
introduce an unspecified bill that the constituent had
wanted.  Warren’s secretary offered a tactful apology which
insisted that the senator had not forgotten at all but
there was merely a communication problem.  Nevertheless,
the secretary tipped her hand when she said, “I shall again
call the matter to Senator Warren’s attention and suggest
that he go ahead with the introduction of the bill.”  In
closing, she smoothed things over, saying, “I know that I
do not have to defend Senator Warren to you because you are
his friend and have always been so.”56
Within a week or so, Warren’s wife was recovering and
he was back at work.  George Cross of the Stockmen’s and
Ranchmen’s Protective Association in Dubios, Wyoming
inquired of Warren about the status of public land grazing
in and adjacent to the national forests.  Warren responded
quickly this time, betraying his frustration at the lack of
a grazing policy as he did so.  “There is no law
authorizing grazing on the Public Domain,” he wrote to
Cross, adding, “I am at a loss to know what you desired me
to do.”57
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By the end of March 1926, a grazing bill emerged in
the Senate.  After years of minor legislation to reduce
fees here or exchange lands there, Senate Bill 2584
represented a significant move toward establishing a
coherent national grazing policy.  It was Stanfield’s bill,
however, and Warren had little to do with it.  The bill
would also regulate the open public range, some 180,000,000
acres of unallotted and unreserved land.  Of those lands,
130,000,000 acres were used primarily for grazing purposes
and had been so overgrazed and unmanaged that to bring them
under federal control could revive and sustain the
livestock industry.58
The 1926 Grazing Act had the support not only of
Secretary William  Jardine and the Department of
Agriculture, but also the Department of the Interior, the
United States Forest Service, the American National
Livestock Association, and the National Wool Growers’
Association.  Stanfield was especially proud to add to his
list of supporters A. F. Potter, a familiar name to all in
the grazing industry as he was head of the grazing office
in the Forest Department.  Potter commended Stanfield and
the other members of the Public Lands Committee, saying
that “you are all entitled not only to medals but to the
everlasting gratitude of every stockman using the national
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forest ranges.”59 
Warren’s papers barely reflect an awareness of
Stanfield’s bill, though the Congressional Record indicates
that Warren was at least present for some discussion on the
bill.  While the bill moved forward toward a vote, Warren’s
focus on grazing was more personal.  Captured in the
letterpress books of his political papers are a few
documents indicating that while Senator Stanfield was
passing grazing legislation, Senator Warren was shamelessly
promoting his Warren Live Stock Company, sometimes in the
oddest of venues.  An executive with the Graham Brothers
Trucks company appealed to Warren to provide an article of
about 1400 words that outlined the development of the sheep
industry and, naturally, “what influence the automotive
industry has had on the sheep industry.”  Having recently
purchased a Graham Brothers Truck himself, Warren obliged
and sent back an article, though it was only half as long
as the executive had requested.  Warren’s office provided
free advertising copy for the truck company, but also
managed to spread the word about his own business: “The
Warren Livestock Company has found that the uses of the
Dodge car and the Graham Brothers truck have helped
materially.”  This is what occupied Warren’s attention over
the Stanfield grazing bill.60
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Some people noticed.  G. A. Brimmer of Rawlins,
Wyoming wrote to Senator Warren expressing grave concern
over the Stanfield bill.  The bill, it seemed, did not
include public lands in Wyoming.  Warren took no
responsibility for the omission, but defended the Public
Lands committee anyway.  “So far as I can learn,” he said,
“no one made a specific request that the State of Wyoming
be omitted from the group of States named in the bill; but
the Committee’s understanding was . . . that Wyoming is
satisfied with its grazing conditions and does not want to
have a grazing district created as proposed in the bill.” 
This bold statement of the committee’s “understanding”
portended dissent from the livestock industry, both in
Wyoming and elsewhere, but Warren shrugged off the matter
for the moment.  Indeed, not being a member of the Public
Lands Committee allowed Warren to refer more and more of
these matters to Senator Kendrick.61
By the end of the year, Warren was ill with recurring
bouts of bronchitis, topped off with “bad colds and . . .
touches of the flu.”  His secretary claimed that he was
“working unusually hard -- harder than he should work under
the above-restricted circumstances.”  Warren was busy, but
not with grazing policy matters.  His duties on the
appropriation committee were demanding, and he still kept
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in constant contact with his son, Fred, to manage the
Warren Live Stock Company.  For all his talk of getting out
of the business, Warren still added to his estate and
expected it to remain a family business long after he was
gone.  A doting grandfather, he forwarded literature on the
sheep industry so that his grandson could read them:
“various articles . . . making up the best story about the
foreign wools, etc., that I have ever read.  I think they
are mighty good articles to keep in your wool library and
to read some time, and as young Francis E. becomes
interested in all sheep and wool subjects I think they will
interest him.”62
By 1927 Warren’s correspondence with Fred reflected a
guarded optimism.  When the final numbers for the season
came in, Warren’s company fared well.  He congratulated his
son in a give-and-take compliment: “you showed up better
than I feared you would,” he said.  Not letting the praise
stand, Warren recommended that Fred cut costs and not take
any unnecessary risks in the coming season.  As an aside,
Warren commented that his wife, Clara, was “doing a little
better each day now, and I have great hopes for her.” He
said nothing about grazing legislation.63
Indeed, what was there to say?  The promise of
Stanfield’s 1926 grazing bill to overhaul the public domain
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had been diluted by time.  The nation’s ranchers and the
politicians who represented them carried on as they had for
years before.  Senator Ralph Cameron of Arizona --
finishing out his term as a defeated candidate --
introduced into the record the objections of ranchers to a
grazing fee increase proposed by Secretary of Agriculture
Jardine and Chief Forester W. B. Greeley.  An editorial
from the Daily Silver Belt, a Miami, Arizona newspaper,
said, “Now that [Cameron] has gone down to political defeat
it is probably characteristic of the forestry officials to
interpret that fact as a vindication of the position.”  In
the larger grazing debate, strained relationships between
ranchers and the government continued.64
In an attempt to reconcile that relationship, Jardine
organized a “grazing fee conference” with members of the
livestock industry, held in Salt Lake City in January 1927. 
It was a one-day affair, though through it Jardine hoped to
settle the question that was, in his words, “breaking our
morale.”  Jardine emphasized that grazing regulations were
democratic and local in nature, and there were avenues for
appeal and recourse when necessary.  He then quickly traced
the history of grazing fees, reminding his audience that
“stockmen were [only] required to pay a grazing fee for the
first time on January 1, 1906,” and that fees had risen in
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intervals in 1910, 1912, and 1915, from 48 cents to 75
cents per head of cattle per year.  The most recent fee
increases had brought the amount to $1.50 per head per
year.  Jardine stressed that the fees were “fair and
equitable” to comparable private grazing fees and that fee
increases were never arbitrary.  The discussion that ensued
showed that the members of the audience disagreed.  In the
end, the conference had done little to “settle” the
question.  Warren was not present, and his name did not
come up in the discussion.65
The grazing debate was at a stalemate.  The aging
Senator Warren was less involved.  He presented yet another
memorial from the Wyoming legislature opposing any increase
in grazing fees, but did little else other than introduce
such messages into the record.  In February 1927, Warren
entered his last significant comments into the
Congressional Record in the form of a document on the
“relation of the public-land states to the federal union.” 
But even here, the words were not his but instead those
taken from a lengthy speech at a Casper, Wyoming Chamber of
Commerce Meeting.  Grazing issues were no longer a priority
for Warren.66
Indeed, one of Warren’s last significant legislative
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measures was a bill in June 1929 to provide $151 million in
federal farm relief, an unknowing acknowledgment of the
looming Great Depression and shifting role of the federal
government in providing direct relief to a suffering
economy.  But even here Warren was only acting in his
capacity as a member of the Committee on Appropriations. 
His political papers barely speak to the matter at all.67  
Instead he was celebrating his eighty-fifth birthday,
his papers full of messages of congratulations.68  On June
18, 1929, the Senate paused to pay tribute to the longest-
serving senator.  On that day, Warren had served thirty-six
years, six months, and twenty-eight days in the chamber,
the top of the list of only eleven senators who had served
more than thirty years.  Another statistic pointed out was
that, in his service on the Appropriations Committee,
Warren had “looked after the expenditure of something like
$40,000,000,000.”  As a final tribute, Warren’s colleagues
noted that the United States Geographic Board had approved
the naming of the highest peak in Wyoming, located in the
Wind River Range, as Mount Warren.69
Such honors reflected time and service, but age also
conspired against Warren.  By November 1929 he again fell
ill to a bronchial attack.  Despite a few moments in which
he appeared to gain the upper hand -- “he is considerably
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better,” his physician said at one point -- and lifted
spirits upon learning that Pershing was coming from France
to see him, Warren lost the final struggle and died on
November 24, 1929.70
Four days later, the “Grand Old Man” of Wyoming was
buried in Cheyenne, a city he did much to create.  A flag-
draped casket was rolled on an artillery caisson to its
final resting place; a military dirge filled the snowy,
leaden air.  A senator in attendance said the November
weather was “characteristic of the storms [Warren] breasted
all his life.”  The ceremony drew to a close as a thirteen-
gun salute pierced the sky and, finally, the lonely sounds
of taps sent everyone away.71
Although the New York Times called Warren an
“irremovable United States Senator,” it would not speak ill
of the dead.  Instead it dwelled on positive reminiscences. 
Warren’s motto, it seemed, was “facts, not words.”  For
this the paper was grateful.  “It cannot now be recalled,”
the Times wrote, “that he ever said an unnecessary word in
the Senate.”  While praising Warren, the paper also took an
opportunity to criticize self-serving politicians.  “It
must have come as a relief to a Senate buffeted for hours
by winds of rhetoric to have Senator Warren quietly rise
and intimate that it was an excellent time to accept a
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conference report or pass an appropriation bill to which
there were no real objections.”  For the moment, Warren was
remembered for pragmatism and terseness.  Indeed, in a
tribute to Warren at the next session of Congress, Wyoming
Representative Vincent Carter said that Warren was “the
very spirit of the practical.  He believed in building,
planning, and reaping.”72  Warren died exactly one month
after “Black Thursday,” the beginning of the unprecedented
stock market crash of 1929.  Both events marked the ending
of an era and the beginning of another.
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Grazing was and continues to be a perennial problem
for the American West.  The open range seemed to be the
most abundant natural resource in a land that was ill
suited to much else.  On the other hand, the land policies
that Americans brought with them as they settled the West
were anachronistic, inappropriate, and even arbitrary in
their application to the vast commons.  Social conflicts
such as the Johnson County War and the political battles
that politicians such as Francis E. Warren waged in the
struggle for a workable grazing policy may have been
unavoidable given the starting point of American land
policy in the West.  As Warren’s fruitless and frustrated
efforts demonstrated, it was impossible for a comprehensive
grazing policy to be enacted without a catastrophic
catalyst for change.
Such a trauma arrived for the nation, of course, with
the Great Depression.  Farmers and ranchers felt the pinch
before heavy industries, but by the 1930s the entire nation
had enough of Republican policies and elected a president
who promised a New Deal.  The major act of the New Deal in
regard to grazing was the passing of the Taylor Grazing Act
in 1934.  Survey textbooks may ignore the Taylor Act, but
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it should be included as the obituary for the Homestead Act
if for no other reason.  The Taylor Act closed off
homesteading and gave the federal government control over
the public domain.  173 million acres of grazing land were
now available to be managed and administered by the
Interior Department; 16 million of those acres were in
Wyoming.  The Taylor Act and its effect on the West has
received more than its share of attention from historians.1 
A contribution of this dissertation is to examine the
complicated story of grazing before the course-altering
Great Depression and New Deal.
Before we return to Francis Warren and offer a few
summations of his, in the end, sad struggle to achieve a
grazing policy, indulge the author for a moment.  We will
stay in Wyoming and retain our subject of grazing.  But we
look to the recent past to see just how alive and critical
the struggle over grazing policy can be.  Warren’s home
state has yet to find a solution to vexing problem of
grazing the commons.
In 1999, University of Wyoming law professor Debra
Donahue published The Western Range Revisited.  In her book
and on the lecture circuit, Donahue reassessed grazing on
public lands at the end of the twentieth century and came
to a radical conclusion: end public land grazing
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altogether.  Donahue presented two basic arguments.  First,
she demonstrated that since the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934,
the Bureau of Land Management’s grazing program brought in
less revenue than the outgoing costs of administration.  In
other words, public land grazing was a huge and wasteful
subsidy to western ranchers.  Second, she reinvigorated the
Coville and Pinchot emphasis on the destructive effects of
public land grazing to the greater ecosystem.  The only
solution, Donahue argued, was to remove livestock from
nearly all public lands in order to restore the natural
biodiversity of a long-abused environment.2
Donahue made the “unthinkable thinkable.”  “Commercial
livestock production,” she said in a environmental journal,
“is an inappropriate use of public lands -- inappropriate
because it is ecologically damaging, uneconomic, and
inequitable.”  Her argument confronted directly the
entrenched power structure of Wyoming that Warren had done
so much to establish.  Revenues generated by grazing fees
were overshadowed by the costs of administering the
program, resulting in a lopsided subsidy.  Millions of
“recreational users” enjoyed the public lands, she pointed
out, while by the 1990s less than 23,000 grazing permit
holders existed, thus resulting in inequitable use of land
ostensibly held in the public trust.  Her book also
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deconstructed the myths of the ranching “way of life” to
show that federal grazing permit holders were
overwhelmingly large corporations, banks, and wealthy
individuals, not the family ranch of cowboy fiction. 
Finally, Donahue argued that public land grazing did little
to support western communities, which in fact existed only
to serve public land ranchers.3
The reaction to Donahue’s “unthinkable” proposition
was fierce.  The president of the Wyoming Senate, Jim
Twiford, called for the outright elimination of the
University of Wyoming School of Law, Donahue’s employer.  A
former candidate for governor admitted that he had not read
the book but nonetheless called it “garbage.”  Another
rancher said, “With a title like hers, do we really need to
spend fifty dollars to read the rest?”  Even the University
of Wyoming president, Philip Dubois, was dubious about
supporting Donahue’s academic freedom.  First he issued a
statement -- addressed to a livestock industry newspaper,
no less -- that “the official position of the University of
Wyoming is, has been, and will continue to be, support for
those industries -- including production agriculture --
that have brought this state from its status as a territory
in 1886 to its promise in the new millennium.”  Later, in
“defending” academic freedom before the state legislature,
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Dubois backpedaled somewhat: “We defend the right of the
faculty to publish their work.  At the same time, as a
land-grant institution we feel an obligation to provide
support for the agriculture industry.  I don’t see those as
inconsistent positions.”  In the end, Donahue survived the
“ruckus” and, as it became apparent that the federal
government was not about to end public land ranching, the
furor died down.  Even so, Donahue confessed to an
interviewer, “I’m viewed as a traitor.  You’d think this
was the most radical publication since Lady Chatterley’s
Lover.”4
These modern day observations on the centrality of
grazing to Wyoming and the West bring us back to the
realities that Francis E. Warren faced in his decades of
wrestling with land policy in a grazing economy.  As a new
senator from a new state in the 1890s, he began his
congressional career with high hopes of bringing about a
major change in American land policy.  Through the 1890s,
he worked to solve the grazing problems of the West not
through a centralized approach along the lines that Powell
proposed, but instead through localized control.  Warren’s
drive to cede all public lands to the states, had it
succeeded, would have represented a fundamental change in
the relationship of the State to the states.  Although his
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push for state’s rights had the potential to win great
favor in Wyoming and the West, local events such as the
Johnson County War and the depressed livestock economy in
the 1890s, ironically, worked against Warren.  For a brief
time he lost his seat in the Senate.  Although he regained
his position of power, his land cession movement never
gained enough traction to pass Congress or be implemented. 
The push for land cession was Warren’s boldest move, a
measure with the greatest potential to bring about a
grazing policy for the West.  For the remainder of his
career, Warren’s involvement with grazing issues was
determined by the specifics of the situation at hand, an ad
hoc approach driven not so much by a desire for a sweeping
policy but instead a series of individual responses based
on the politics of the day.5
Coinciding with the collapse of Warren’s cession
movement was the rise of conservation.  The newly created
national forests would become the next stage for the debate
over grazing policy.  Warren and other western politicians
found themselves on the defensive as scientific management
of rangelands and regulated grazing of them attempted to
restore the public domain as a commons held in trust for
the entire nation and not merely the use of local industry. 
The genesis of managed grazing was identified with
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Frederick Coville and his attempt to restore damaged
environments to productive and protected use through
regulation.  Coville was no preservationist, nor was he
naive about the needs of the livestock industry in the
public domain.  But his focus on grazing was a centralized
one.  Coville’s ideas, and Pinchot’s implementation of
them, set the tone of the conversation about grazing.6 
Warren and the livestock industry in the West were thus
placed in a position of responding and reacting to the
direction of Washington.
That response was often one of resistence and
begrudging complaint.  From the emergence of Coville’s
proposals in the late 1890s to the ultimate implementation
of them in 1906, Warren represented his home industry
dutifully.  It was a challenge, however, as the “industry”
response to Coville’s plans varied between cattle and sheep
raisers.  Moreover, divisions within the West itself
between large owners and small owners added to the
complexity of the livestock industry’s response to
regulated forest grazing.  Finally, a general suspicion of
“outside” policy makers from Washington imposing their
ideas onto the West complicated the search for a unified
grazing policy; the “strategic mistake” that Powell made
resurfaced, although Pinchot made great strides in forming
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connections with westerners.  Warren’s response to this
culminating pressure was to lobby for grazing fee
reductions and waivers whenever possible.7
From the implementation of fee-based forest grazing in
1906 through the 1920s, Warren’s role in the search for a
grazing policy reached its lowest point.  Although the
livestock industry won a small victory with the passage of
the Stock Raising Homestead Act in 1916, Warren was pulled
from the forefront of the debate by a combination of
personal tragedy, political scandal, and a loss of
political power when the Democrats gained control during
the Wilson years.  Warren survived, to be sure, but the
fencing scandal hurt his credibility both at home and on
the floor of Congress.8  
As the nation emerged from World War I and entered a
new era of prosperity, the livestock industry faced falling
prices and the first signs of an even greater economic
depression.  Warren, aging and apparently no longer
interested in bold moves such as land cession, took on a
custodial role in grazing affairs; that is, he responded to
specific problems of interests from his state, but did
little else.  If political conservatism meant maintaining
the status quo and resisting great change, Warren fulfilled
that expectation in his final years.9
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